Quality Competition and Social Welfare in Markets with Partial Coverage: New Results*

We use a vertical product differentiation model under partial market coverage to study the social welfare optimum and duopoly equilibrium when convex costs of quality provision are either fixed or variable in terms of production. We show the following new results. First, under fixed costs, the social planner charges a uniform price for the single variant that just covers costs of quality provision. Like the duopoly equilibrium, this socially optimal pricing entails a partially uncovered market, but a smaller share of the market is served compared with the duopoly equilibrium. Second, for the variable cost case, it is socially optimal to provide both high‐ and low‐quality variants, but market shares need not be equal. This differs from the result in fully covered markets. Third, in the duopoly equilibrium, the quality spread is too wide under variable costs relative to the social optimum. Under fixed costs, the duopoly produces two variants, but quality is too low relative to the social optimum, which has only one variant.     

The coverage assignments of financial analysts

Previous studies document that forecast accuracy impacts analyst career outcomes. This paper investigates the influence of forecast accuracy on coverage assignments. I show that brokerage houses reward accurate analysts by assigning them to high-profile firms and penalise analysts exhibiting poor accuracy by assigning them to smaller firms. The coverage of high-profile firms increases the potential for future compensation linked to investment banking and trading commissions. In addition, covering such firms increases analysts' recognition from buy-side investors, which, in turn, increases the likelihood of obtaining broker votes and votes for the Institutional Investor star ranking. Overall, my results indicate that high forecast accuracy leads to increased future compensation.     

ENDOGENOUS TIMING IN QUALITY CHOICES AND PRICE COMPETITION

We modify the price‐setting version of the vertically differentiated duopoly model by Aoki (2003) by introducing an extended game in which firms noncooperatively choose the timing of moves at the quality stage. Our results show that there are multiple equilibria in pure strategies, whereby firms always select sequential play at the quality stage. We also investigate the mixed‐strategy equilibrium, revealing that the probability of generating outcomes out of equilibrium is higher than the probability of playing one Nash equilibria in pure strategies. In the alternative case with full market coverage, we show that the quality stage is solved in dominant strategies and therefore the choice of roles becomes irrelevant as the Nash and Stackelberg solutions coincide. With full market coverage and corner solution, the results show that the game has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies, where the high‐quality firm takes the lead in the quality stage.     

社区银行的内涵特征、历史沿革与模式创新--基于中外社区银行的内容分析与案例研究

本研究梳理了社区与社区银行的概念,通过对14组代表性定义的内容分析和编码发现传统社区银行的实质就是中小型商业银行。社区隐含了社区银行的覆盖范围、服务对象和业务特征,其服务对象没有实质差别。研究提出了社区银行的四个维度和特征,分别是银行规模、覆盖范围、服务对象和业务种类。监管机构和美国提出者更关注银行规模,而研究者特别是中国研究者更重视覆盖范围。因此,“地理范围论”和“资产规模论”基本成立,而“国别论”理论差别不大,“所有制论”和“形态论”并不成立。通过案例研究和实地调研归纳出社区银行的三种主要模式：即美国的“关系信贷”、澳大利亚的“特许经营”和中国的“金融生态”模式。其中,“特许经营”模式变相扩大了银行规模和覆盖范围两个维度,而“金融生态”模式扩展和丰富了银行规模、覆盖范围和业务种类。最后,结合发达国家的先进经验,有针对性地提出四点建议,并构建了中国社区银行建设的特征与要素模型。     

基于分布估计算法的无线传感器网络覆盖问题优化策略

在无线传感器网络冗余部署的情形下,给出了优化问题的数学模型,其中目标函数为覆盖度函数和节点利用率函数的加权,提出了加权分布估计算法的覆盖优化策略.通过实验,分别讨论了目标函数权重、传感器感知半径以及节点配置模式对优化结果的影响.     

The Effect of Media Coverage on the Pricing of Seasoned Equity Offerings

This paper examines the role of media coverage and investor attention on the outcomes of seasoned equity offerings (SEOs). I use an archive of Thomson Reuters news articles to proxy for firm visibility and investor attention. I find that the volumes of news articles prior to the offerings are positively associated with the offer price discounts of SEOs. Furthermore, the volumes of news articles are negatively associated with the cumulative abnormal returns three days around the SEOs. I conclude that the costs of equity increase with media coverage prior to SEOs. Overall, the evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that media coverage affects investors' information processing in SEOs. Copyright © 2018 ASAC. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

社会审计质量、国家审计监督与国企资产保值增值

在委托代理理论和协同理论框架下,选取2007—2017年中国A股国有上市公司为研究样本,实证检验社会审计质量对国企资产保值增值的影响以及社会审计与国家审计影响国企资产保值增值的替代效应。研究发现：高质量的社会审计有利于促进国企资产保值增值;社会审计与国家审计在促进国企资产保值增值中发挥了替代效应,而且这种替代效应主要体现在高质量的社会审计可以有效缓解国家审计扩大监督范围广度、提高目标实现深度与加强“监”的力度等方面的压力,但不会影响国家审计“督”的力度。研究结论对于国家审计机关合理利用社会审计资源、构建协同高效的审计监督体系、实现国企审计全覆盖、促进国企资产保值增值具有启示意义。     

政府随机审计的动态博弈模型及政策启示

本文在一个三阶段动态博弈框架下,对政府随机审计过程中的政府审计机关与政府审计对象以及国家与政府审计对象之间的动态博弈特征进行了分析。分析结果显示：政府审计机关与政府审计对象之间存在一个纯策略纳什均衡,而国家和政府审计对象之间存在一个混合策略纳什均衡。政府审计对象接受国家实质性审计的概率是政府审计对象被政府机关审计发现违规或不作为后的惩罚倍数的单调递减函数,而政府审计对象的违规或不作为的概率分别是政府审计对象被政府机关审计发现违规或不作为后的惩罚倍数和政府审计对象的应尽义务或责任的单调递减函数,却是政府审计机关审计行为成本的单调递增函数。同时,结合研究结论和中国政府审计全覆盖的现实,给出了一些政策建议。