Self-quantification and the datapreneurial consumer identity

ABSTRACT

This study delivers a clearer understanding of the constitution of the datapreneurial consumer, the role of the market in that construction, and the implications for consumer identity projects in the age of Big Data and an increasingly data- and surveillance-driven society. The study uses a theoretical framework of the “quantified self” (QS) to examine consumers (re)building creditworthiness. In the context of a major online credit-user forum, it employs creative-nonfiction methodology to protect forum-member privacy. To the literature on creditworthiness, the study contributes a process model of the construction of the datapreneurial credit consumer identity. To the QS literature, it offers insight into how consumers may embrace quantification and self-tracking, even in areas where they are nudged or pushed into it. To the sociology of quantification literature, it adds empirics to explain how consumers may embrace market-provided self-quantification resources in attempts to liberate themselves from the structural control of that very quantification.     

An Econometric analysis of IBRD creditworthiness

This paper finds that one can econometrically ascertain the determinants of default to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) through panel logit analysis. Creditworthiness is found to be determined by political and external factors in addition to economic variables. Default to the IBRD is seen to fall into a graduated hierarchy of default, whereby default occurs first to Paris Club and Commercial Bank creditors, with subsequent default to the IBRD being triggered by a high proportion of IBRD and short-term debt in the portfolio and other economic and political factors.     

总部和加盟商的博弈：连锁品牌经营机制的经济分析

无论连锁品牌加盟商是否实施正确的品牌策略,都将存在连锁品牌外部效应,导致连锁品牌经营低效率,因此,连锁品牌建设与经营应该由连锁品牌总部负责,并收回加盟商品牌建设权。在连锁品牌总部进行品牌建设的前提下,连锁品牌效率最优化条件是：各加盟商为了提高单位品牌信用度所增加的品牌建设费用,应该等于各加盟商因为单位品牌信用度提高而增加的收益之和。     

Measuring the Effect of Corruption on Sovereign Bond Ratings

Abstract

Instrumenting for sovereign corruption, we find that Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index which ‘ranges from 10 (highly clean) to 0 (highly corrupt)’, is a significant predictor of the Standard and Poor’s sovereign bond ratings ranging from 1 (Sovereign Default) to 22 (AAA) in panel data from 52 countries from 1993 to 2002. Corruption downgrades the creditworthiness of sovereign bonds by diverting loan proceeds from productive projects to less productive ones, if not to offshore accounts. In particular, a one point worsening of the corruption perception index leads to an estimated one‐notch reduction out of 22 in the sovereign bond rating.     

Sovereign asset values and implications for the credit market

Using the contingent claim approach and market data on sovereign credit default swaps we assess the drivers of a country's risk perception. Deriving market-based asset values for a set of advanced economies we gain insights into the capital markets' perspectives on sovereign creditworthiness. We find the market-based asset values to be positively influenced by debt and to be an early risk indicator for economic developments. In a cross-section analysis we identify drivers of the economic risk of countries. Clustering the countries according to their debt to asset value ratios provides further insights into the market perceptions of sovereign credit risk. For example we find that the asset values of countries with higher ratios react to changes in the global equity market. Countries with a lower ratio react more to the political stability within the country.     

The Corporate Acquisition Policy of Financially Distressed Firms

The paper examines a unique motive for corporate acquisitions among distressed firms: the desire to enhance creditworthiness by both the acquirer and the acquired firms. I develop a theoretical model of the creditworthiness conditions necessary for corporate acquisitions and identify the optimal policy in searching for an acquirer. I distinguish between strategic and nonstrategic acquisitions and find the necessary conditions and most favorable policy for a strategic acquisition to evolve. I demonstrate the importance of the cost of finding an acquirer, the impact of sharing bargaining leverage, and the economic significance of credit quality for the success of the accord.