复保险欺诈法律规制

笔者认为复保险欺诈区别于善意复保险之处在于投保人于保险合同订立之际,意图谋取不当得利,或在保险合同有效期内知悉复保险的存在而不为通知,或故意为虚假通知.对于复保险欺诈的法律规制,认为应将复保险欺诈作为保险合同法定无效的原因,对严重的复保险欺诈应追究刑事责任;可以赋予保险人司法协助请求权,建立反保险欺诈信息中心.     

基于盲分离的单通道LFM引信欺骗干扰抑制

针对单通道LFM引信欺骗干扰抑制问题,提出了一种基于时频解耦盲分离（TFD-BSS）的干扰抑制算法。该方法首先通过Stretch变换将时频混叠的LFM信号转化为两差频信号,然后利用自适应滤波技术滤出干扰差频信号,并对其进行二次Stretch变换将干扰差频转化为欺骗信号以构造虚拟通道,从而将欠定盲分离转化为非欠定问题,最后通过延时差量法将干扰滤除。实验仿真表明,回波和干扰延时相差5 ns以上即可取得良好的分离效果。该方法不仅可为引信抗欺骗干扰提供借鉴,也是单通道盲分离算法的理论扩展。     

Why Markets in Proto-Deceptive Goods Should Be Restricted

In recent years there has been much philosophical discussion over the question of whether the prohibitions on markets in such items as human body parts and gene sequences, and services such as human reproductive labor and sex, should be lifted. Yet despite the attention paid to this issue there are been surprisingly little discussion of the question of whether markets in certain items that are currently freely traded should be restricted or eliminated. In particular, there has been little discussion of the question of whether markets in items that could be readily used to deceive people should be restricted. I argue in this paper that one of the central moral values of the contemporary West – respect for personal autonomy – requires that such markets be restricted.     

The Morality of Bluffing: A Reply to Allhoff

In a recent paper that appeared in this journal Fritz Allhoff addresses the morality of bluffing in negotiations¹. He focuses on cases in which people misstate their reservation price in negotiations, e.g., suppose that I am selling a house and tell a prospective buyer that $300,000 is absolutely the lowest price that I will accept, when I know that I would be willing to accept as little as $270,000 for the house rather than continue to try to sell it. Allhoff criticizes my (qualified) defense of bluffing in my paper Second Thoughts on Bluffing,² and offers what he takes to be a more plausible defense of bluffing. Allhoffs criticisms rest on several serious misinterpretations of my views. He ascribes to me several arguments that I dont make. He also attributes to me an unqualified defense of bluffing that I explicitly reject. I briefly document this in Section 1. In Sections 2 and 3 I explain and criticize Allhoffs positive views about bluffing and the morality of bluffing.Thomas Carson is professor of philosophy at Loyola University Chicago. He is the author of Value and the Good Life and The Status of Morality. He is the co-editor of Moral Relativism and Morality and the Good Life. He is the author of numerous papers on ethical theory and business ethics and is a member of the editorial board of Business Ethics Quarterly and Journal of Business Ethics. He is currently working on a book entitled Lying and Deception: Theory and Practice.     

Investment Professionals' Ability to Detect Deception: Accuracy,Bias and Metacognitive Realism

In the first empirical study on the topic, the authors examined the ability of investment professionals to distinguish between truthful and deceptive statements. A random sample of 154 investment professionals made judgments about a series of truthful and deceptive statements, some of which involved financial fraud. Investment professionals' lie detection accuracy was poor; participants performed no better than would be expected by chance. Accuracy in identifying lies about financial fraud was especially poor. Further, participants displayed poor metacognitive realism when assessing their own performance. The theoretical and practical implications for lie detection in the financial industry are discussed.     

行业产能发展的系统动力学分析

本文利用系统动力学方法构建了行业产能扩张模型,通过灵敏度分析,发现固定资产建设时间导致行业产能超过需求,其中折旧政策对影响过剩产能绝对数量有明显作用,据此提出加强行业宏观调控、发挥行业协会作用,加快设备折旧速度,企业扩张更多采取兼并方式等应对措施。     

Support for the Use of Deception Within the Work Environment: A Comparison of Israeli and United States Employee Attitudes

As businesses become more global, the opportunities for employees to work with individuals from different cultures increase. Research in cross-cultural interactions has increased in response to such changes. This research study considers employee attitudes and perceived organizational support for the use of deception within the work environment. In this study, two types of deception have been considered; deception for personal gain and deception for the organization's benefit. The reported likelihood for committing these two types of deception for United States and Israeli employees was gathered. The results indicate that United States employees are more likely to deceive others for personal gain than the Israeli employees. In addition, the results indicate that United States employees were more likely to perceive organizational support for the use of deception for personal gain than were the Israeli employees. No differences between the two samples were found for personal or organizational support for deception for the organization's benefit. Differences are explained using Hofstede's (1991) theory of international cultures.     

Marketing Communication Techniques in a Church Setting

No abstract available for this article.     

The Costs of Deception: Evidence from Psychology

Recently, it has been argued that the evidence in social science research suggests that deceiving participants in an experiment does not lead to a significant loss of experimental control. Based on this assessment, experimental economists were counseled to lift their de facto prohibition against deception to capture its potential benefits. To the extent that this recommendation is derived from empirical studies, we argue that it draws on a selective sample of the available evidence. Building on a systematic review of relevant research in psychology, we present two major results: First, the evidence suggests that the experience of having been deceived generates suspicion that in turn is likely to affect the judgment and decision making of a non-negligible number of participants. Second, we find little evidence for the reputational spillover effects that have been hypothesized by a number of authors in psychology and economics (e.g., Kelman, H.C., 1967. Psychological Bulletin. 67, 1–11; Davis, D.D. and Holt, C.A., 1993. Experimental Economics. Princeton University Press, Princeton). Based on a discussion of the methodological costs and benefits of deception, we conclude that experimental economists' prohibition of deception is a sensible convention that economists should not abandon.     

The Escalation of Deception in Organizations

Drawing on a number of recent high-profile cases of corporate corruption, we develop a process model that explains the escalation of deception in corrupt firms. If undetected, an initial lie can begin a process whereby the ease, severity and pervasiveness of deception increases overtime so that it eventually becomes an organization level phenomenon. We propose that organizational complexity has an amplifying effect. A␣feedback loop between organization level deception and each of the escalation stages positively reinforces the process. In addition, moderators are proposed that will halt escalation at various stages. By conceptualizing corporate deception as a social process, the paper contributes to a growing body of research that looks beyond 'bad' individuals for the causes of corporate illegality. Peter Fleming is Professor of Work, Organization and Society Queen Mary College, University of London. He has held academic positions at Cambridge University and Melbourne University. His research interests center on the emerging politics of power, control and ethics in contemporary corporations. He has published extensively in academic journals including Organization Studies, Journal of Management Studies, Journal of Business Ethics, Sociology, Sociological Review, Work, Employment and Society and has just published a book (with Andre Spicer) entitled Contesting the Corporation: Power, Resistance and Struggle in Organizations with Cambridge University Press (2007). Stelios Zyglidopoulos is a University Lecturer in Strategy at the Judge Business School of the University of Cambridge. Prior to that, he taught at Erasmus University in the Netherlands, and the Rochester Institute for Technology, in Rochester, NY. He received his PhD in Strategy and Organization from McGill University in Montreal, Canada. Dr. Zyglidopoulos has lived and worked in Greece, Canada, The Netherlands, and the United States. He has a number of years of business experience, mostly in sales and marketing, and is a reservist for the Greek Navy. His research interests focus on the management of corporate reputation; the evolution of corporate social performance; imprinting and organizational evolution; and the internationalization process of high-tech clusters.