Direct Democracy and Local Public Finances under Cooperative Federalism

In this paper, we exploit the introduction of the right of local initiatives in the German state of Bavaria in 1995 in order to study the fiscal effects of direct democracy. Our identification strategy combines difference‐in‐differences and regression discontinuity methods: we compare municipal expenditure and revenue between pre‐ and post‐reform periods at population thresholds where the signatures needed to launch initiatives and minimum quorum requirements decrease discontinuously (difference‐in‐discontinuities design). The results suggest that stronger direct democratic institutions lead to an expansion of local government size.     

User Fee Abolition and the Demand for Public Health Care

This research examines the effect of the abolition of user fees in South Africa, a policy implemented in 1994 for uninsured children under the age of six and the elderly uninsured, as well as pregnant and nursing mothers. The analysis focuses on the implementation of the policy and the use of curative public healthcare services by children following strict and fuzzy regression discontinuity designs. The estimates point to statistically insignificant average and local average policy effects, even though the policy appears to have been implemented reasonably effectively, albeit imperfectly. In other words, the policy did not, on average, affect the use of curative public healthcare, at least for those children who should have benefited from the policy.     

Relative age effects in political selection

We exploit a regression discontinuity design to provide causal evidence of the relative age effect (RAE) on a long-run adult age outcome: Political selection. We find strong evidence of the RAE in politics in Finland. However, the effect is heterogeneous: We find that male candidates born early in the calendar year have a significantly higher probability of getting elected to the parliament but no similar RAE applies to female candidates nor to municipal elections. Moreover, this effect only takes place in the most competitive parliamentary districts and is present only for some parties. We also find that in all the groups where the RAE does not exist, early-born candidates are under-represented suggesting attrition of talent in the candidate placement. Overall, our results show that seemingly artificial cutoffs imposed by the government have persistent consequences even on the selection to the highest positions of power within a society.     

Are voters rational?

We test whether a voter's decision to cast a vote depends on its probability of affecting the election outcome. Using exogenous variation arising at population cutoffs determining council sizes in Finnish municipal elections, we show that larger council size increases both pivotal probabilities and turnout. These effects are statistically significant, fairly large and robust. Finally, we use a novel instrumental variables design to show that the jumps in the pivotal probabilities are the likely candidate for explaining the increase in turnout, rather than the other observed simultaneous jumps at the council size cutoffs. Moreover, our results indicate that turnout responds only to within-party pivotal probabilities, perhaps because they are more salient to the voters than the between-party ones.     

Competitive selection, self-organisation and Joseph A. Schumpeter

Post-Schumpeterians have tended to use biological analogies to understand economic evolution, in contrast to Schumpeter himself. In this paper it is argued that the biological analogies used tend to be outdated and that Schumpeter espoused an intuitive understanding of the evolutionary economic process that is closely related to modern conceptions of self-organisation, suitably adapted for application in socioeconomic systems. Using a self-organisation approach, competition can be understood without recourse to biological analogy, in terms of general systemic principles that operate in the presence of variety. Viewing economic evolution in terms of complex adaptation in self-organising systems yields nonequilibrium and nonlinear perspectives that parallel Schumpeter's own intuitions, reinvigorating them as the basis of evolutionary economic thinking in the new Millennium.     

民营资本的进入对我国风电产业发展的影响——基于断点回归的分析

为克服单差法存在变量内生性,倍差法对于控制组的严格要求往往无法得到满足,故文中采用断点回归的分析方法,在无对照组的情形下,对我国风电产业2012~2015年的资产总计、主营业务收入以及发明专利数月度数据进行实证研究,探究民营资本的进入对我国风电产业的影响。实证结果表明,从短期看,民营资本的进入对我国风电产业规模与技术效率具有统计上的显著正面作用,具有一定的经济意义;另外,这一机制的推行对产业创新产生了显著的负面作用。     

A regression discontinuity approach to measuring the effectiveness of oil and natural gas regulation to address the common-pool externality

Oil and natural gas reservoirs typically span multiple productive leases so that no owner has rights to the entire stock of resource, resulting in production externalities. Previous literature has examined the effectiveness of government regulation in Texas and Oklahoma in abating these externalities, finding Oklahoma to be more successful in unifying common pools and securing property rights. Using regression discontinuity design, we quantify the impact of regulatory difference between the two states. We find that Oklahoma produces an average of 3361 more barrels of oil over the life of a well, relative to Texas. Given the maturity of the fields in question, the result underscores the continuing importance of addressing common pool externalities even after the primary phase of recovery has largely been completed.     

Saltatory Ontogeny and the Life-History Model: Neglected Processes and Patterns of Evolution

A single cell – an egg – cannot be in the same stabilized state as a differentiated multicellular embryo or reproducing adult. The entire ontogeny must, therefore, consist of a sequence of stabilized states. Ontogeny of a phenotype cannot progress gradually but is a saltatory homeorhetic system, proceeding via natural thresholds from one self organized state to the next, hierarchically ever more complex and specialized. The natural boundaries of ontogeny – the far-from-stabilized thresholds – represent also states when changes can be easiest inserted or induced, and especially in the early ontogeny, from the intervals where evolution (change) can occur. As a result, ontogeny can also be divided into distinct life-history intervals called periods, be it embryo, larva (infant, pup), juvenile, adult and senescence, each divided in turn into phases, and each of these into natural steps. It is left to the imagination of scholars in social sciences to find parallels of saltation in economics and history.     

Class Size,Teacher Hours and Educational Attainment*

We employ a regression‐discontinuity design to identify effects on educational attainment after compulsory school of class size and the number of pupils per weekly teacher hour using administrative rules as instruments. We use Danish administrative panel data. Average class size is 20, about the same as in the US and most European countries. Restricting the sample to observations close to the enrolment discontinuity points where the administrative rules have greatest predictive power, instrumental variables estimates are consistently negative. Estimates from the preferred specification are marginally significant and indicate modest effects in line with earlier studies. Estimates for subgroups are less precise, but they indicate larger effects for pupils from less advantaged backgrounds.     

Fiscal rules to tame the political budget cycle: Evidence from Italian municipalities

The paper provides evidence that fiscal rules can limit the political budget cycle. It uses data on Italian municipalities during the 2000s and shows that: 1) municipalities are subject to political budget cycles in capital spending; 2) the Italian sub-national fiscal rule (Domestic Stability Pact, DSP) introduced in 1999 has been enforced by the central government; 3) municipalities subject to the fiscal rule show more limited political budget cycles than municipalities not subject to the rule. In order to identify the effect, we rely on the fact that the domestic fiscal rule does not apply to municipalities below 5000 inhabitants. We find that the political budget cycle increases real capital spending by about 10–20 percent on average in the years prior to municipal elections and that municipalities subject to the DSP show a pre-electoral increase in capital spending which is only a quarter of the one of municipalities not subject to the rule.