绩效诱因契约设计对经理人风险行为的影响

经理人与投资人之间的代理问题是由于在信息不对称的环境下,投资人无法观察到经理人的经营活动是否真正从投资人的利益角度出发,从而引发了经理人的道德风险,产生了自利性高风险投资组合的逆诱因选择。通过应用选择权的观念推导三种不同的绩效诱因契约设计,对于抑制经理人自利性风险调整行为倾向有较好的效果。     

Clearing Up the Egoist Difficulty with Loyalty

This paper seeks to analyze and to motivate a trend toward virtue ethics and away from deontology in the business ethics account of organizational loyalty. Prevailing authors appeal to “transcendent” values (deontology), skepticism (there is no loyalty), or Aristotelianism (loyalty is seeking mutual self-interest). I argue that the “Aristotelian” view clears up the “egoist” difficulty with loyalty. Briefly, critics feel we must “transcend,” “replace,” “overcome” and most especially sacrifice self-interest on the altar of ethics and loyalty. I argue that few things can be more ethical than loyalty to shared values. When a company and I both pursue the same value X, there becomes no difference between my seeking my best interest and my seeking the best interest of the company (and vice versa). Hence, the way out of the egoist difficulty with loyalty is seeing a company’s interests as my own (Aristotle’s third stage of friendship).