税务行政处罚的法理探析

法学意义上的税收是一种金钱给付关系。关于税收的法律关系性质有权利关系说和债务关系说两种观点,不同观点之下对于税务行政处罚的法理有不同的分析。事实上,国家和纳税人之间是一种公法意义上的债权债务关系,税务行政处罚是国家对纳税人不按时履行税收合约的一种惩罚。     

执行 执行力 执行文化——关于国有企业执行力的思考

阐述了执行、执行力、执行文化的内涵,分析了国有企业执行力的状况,并提出了打造执行文化要重点抓好三个方面的工作问题.     

Dynamic managerial capabilities: Configuration and orchestration of top executives' capabilities and the firm's dominant logic

This paper contributes to the understanding of the executive team dynamic managerial capabilities by developing theory about the interplay between the firm's dominant logic and dynamic managerial capabilities (including managerial human capital, social capital, and cognition). We underscore the criticality of the two key CEO‐level functions: configuration and orchestration of senior executive team dynamic capabilities. We develop theory on how these functions create and sculpt the management team's absorptive capacity, which in turn shapes the team's adaptive capacity. We present theory about the distributed nature of efforts for organizational renewal where CEO's dynamic managerial capabilities in concerto with senior executive managerial capabilities will drive top management's ability to revitalize the firm's dominant logic and to achieve evolutionary fit. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

为企之道 重在执行

文章围绕如何提高执行力，如何建立良好的执行力保障体系，如何把企业战略、规划转化成为成果、效益等问题，根据人力资源管理的相关理论和日常的工作实践，对执行力深意进行解析和探讨。     

房价与企业高管薪酬业绩敏感性

非房地产企业受房价上涨的吸引投资于房地产业务,虽然能给企业带来业绩增长,但这使得企业业绩很难衡量高管的努力程度,业绩质量也不高,根据高管薪酬的最优契约理论,企业业绩在高管薪酬契约中的使用权重会被降低。基于中国35个大中城市的房价数据以及中国非房地产业的上市公司数据,研究发现：高房价显著降低了企业高管薪酬业绩敏感性,这一影响在高管薪酬契约有效性较高时更显著;以上结论在使用DID模型控制反向因果内生性问题后依然成立。     

上市公司过度投资动因研究——基于经理报酬视角的分析

当公司存在自由现金流量时,中国上市公司倾向于过度投资,不过自由现金流量与过度投资的关系会因公司的成长机会高低和持有的自由现金流量的多少而有所不同,从而表现出一定的区间效应。其中,代理问题最严重的高自由现金流量、低成长机会的公司过度投资倾向明显大于其他类型的公司。从对公司过度投资的动因检验来看,高自由现金流量的公司的过度投资与经理报酬显著正相关,显示出此类公司过度投资的动机很大程度上在于提高经理报酬,因而表现出很强的机会主义行为。     

The asymmetric relationship between executive earnings management and compensation: a panel threshold regression approach

Prior research shows that chief executive officers (CEOs) are rewarded for their earnings management. We re-examine this issue using a panel threshold regression approach, which allows the effect of earnings management on the CEO compensation to change across the level of earnings management and CEO compensation. Our results show that the effect of CEOs’ discretionary accounting choices on their compensation is not homogeneous across various degrees of earnings management and compensation. In particular, for firms with moderate (inordinate) levels of earnings management and CEO compensation, earnings management is rewarded (penalized).     

上市银行高管人力资本存量与薪酬水平相关性研究

近年来,上市银行高管薪酬备受社会各界关注。通过对沪深两市上市银行2006年至2009年数据进行分析,结果显示：上市银行高管年龄与高管薪酬之间存在显著的正相关关系;高管任期和高管学历对上市银行高管薪酬不具有解释力;上市银行高管薪酬与业绩呈正相关关系,但相关性不显著;银行规模对高管薪酬具有显著的正向影响。可见,高管人力资本水平和公司绩效能够在一定程度上解释上市银行高管薪酬,但解释力度较弱。     

Executive succession: The importance of social capital in CEO appointments

Research Summary: Firm performance and corporate governance have been shown to influence CEO selection, but our understanding of the role of social capital is more limited. In this study, we seek to provide further insight into the role of social capital by examining the influence of both “bonding” and “bridging” forms of social capital on CEO appointments. We find that candidates who have relational social capital, in terms of overlap with the CEO in organizational tenure, board tenure, and CEO tenure are more likely to be appointed as CEO. We also find that candidates who have external linkages to the CEO in the form of geographic, prestigious university, and prior employment affiliations are more likely to be appointed CEO. Managerial Summary: The appointment of a new CEO has significant and widespread implications for the firm’s future strategic direction and performance, the relationship between the board and CEO, and perceptions by investors, employees, and other key stakeholders. Our study finds that candidates who have shared connections and experiences with the CEO in terms of geographic, prestigious university, or prior employment affiliations as well as overlap in terms of organizational tenure, board tenure, and CEO tenure are more likely to be appointed CEO. Given the enormous impact that executive appointments have on the strategic direction and performance of the company, it is important to recognize that social factors such as shared experiences and connections influence how candidates are perceived, and thus, may affect appointment decisions.