Lend me your wallets: the effect of charismatic leadership on external support for an organization

We argue that charismatic leadership can influence external support for the organization, particularly in making the company more attractive to outside investors. Two studies were conducted to test this general hypothesis. First, an archival study demonstrated that the stock of companies headed by charismatic leaders appreciated more than the stock of comparable companies, even after differences in corporate performance were controlled. It was also found that the effect of charismatic leadership was heightened under more difficult economic conditions. Second, an experiment was conducted in which the salience of charismatic leadership was manipulated, along with information about the prospects for an organization's turnaround. Results showed that appeals from a charismatic leader led to increased investment in the firm, and the leader's influence was greater when the prospects for an organizational turnaround were more difficult. It was also found that an endowment of stock enhanced the influence of charismatic appeals and that charismatic leadership may have affected the general risk propensities of followers. These findings were interpreted in terms of an external perspective on leadership, illustrating how leaders can manage the firm's economic and social environment. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Managing the transfer of capabilities within multinational corporations:: the dual role of the subsidiary

In this article, the relation is explored between the external technical embeddedness of the subsidiary, its assigned role, and capability development in the MNC. It is argued that assigning roles of responsibility or mandates to certain subsidiaries can effect integration of subsidiary-developed knowledge in the MNC. Departing from literature on the market-as-networks perspective and writings from recent years on subsidiary roles, hypotheses are developed and a model outlined. The model describes a significant link between the external technical embeddedness of the subsidiary and its assigned role within the MNC, and a significant relation between the subsidiary's assigned role and its importance for other units’ capability development. The model is tested on a sample of 97 subsidiaries using the LISREL 8.3 statistical method. The final model implies that by assigning specific roles to different subsidiaries, headquarters can exploit the knowledge developed in the external environments of these subsidiaries.     

Political Measures for Strategic Environmental Policy with External Effects

This paper investigates an environmental policy designed to reduce the emission of pollutants under uncertainty, with the agent problem as an optimal stopping problem. We first analyze the two cases in which there are one agent and two competing agents by following Ohyama and Tsujimura (2005). When we consider a model of strategic agents, we need to analyze the external economic effect that is peculiar to an agent’s environmental policy implementation. Then, to improve and resolve these external effects, we examine three alternative political measures, comprising an environmental subsidy, an environmental tax and an emission trading system. The results of the analysis indicate that the environmental subsidy and environmental tax promote environmental policy. However, they do not create an incentive to be the leader. On the other hand, an emissions trading system not only promotes environmental policy but also creates an incentive for leadership.This paper was previously circulated under the title “Political Measures for Strategic Environmental Policy with Induced Effects”. The authors would like to thank Masaaki Kijima for helpful comments. The authors would also like to thank Alistair Munro and two anonymous referees providing detailed comments and suggestions. This research was partially supported by Daiwa Securities Group Inc. The second-named author was partially supported by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (B) (2), 16310118.     

International Economies of Scale and the Gains from Trade

In this paper, we present a two-country trade model with external economies of scale that emerge on an international level but are partially localized in each country. First, we show that the larger country exports the good produced in an industry with external economies of scale in the trading equilibrium. Second, we investigate the welfare effects of trade for the following two cases: (I) the case where external economies are completely localized in autarky; (II) the case where external economies are internationally effective in autarky. In case (II), it is shown that trade can be welfare-decreasing for both countries.     

交易费用与企业技术创新战略决策

对企业技术创新战略决策进行了两阶段分析，并采用交易费用理论对创新企业技术创新来源决策进行了分析，认为企业内部技术创新是企业吸收外部技术的基础，大部分企业技术创新将走自主创新与引进创新相结合的道路。     

证券投资基金“老鼠仓”问题研究

所谓"老鼠仓"是指庄家在用公有资金拉升股价之前,先用自己个人的资金在低位建仓,待用公有资金拉升到高位后个人仓位率先卖出获利.它实质上是利用内幕信息进行违规的利益输送问题,是一种损害证券投资基金持有人利益的不道德行为.主要针对"老鼠仓"形成的原因进行了分析,并提出构建"老鼠仓"防火墙的对策措施.     

论董事会的独立性对上市公司治理结构的完善——独立董事的产生及现状分析

现代公司制度的核心是要建立起完善的公司治理结构,董事会在公司治理结构中起着核心作用。但随着股份公司的股权进一步公众化,越来越多的研究报告揭示了董事会职能减弱的客观事实;同时,董事会日渐形成的内部控制与现代企业的发展形成矛盾。由此,西方在公司治理结构上引入了独立董事制,独立董事的功能已在现代企业法人治理结构中确立。     

论我国非公有制经济发展的动力机制转换

我国非公有制经济发展的启动力量和扩张动力，一直主要源于政府的安排和推动。由于外部环境和内部实力的深刻变化，这种以政府为主导的外生动力机制的延续，对非公有制经济的主体意识、微观经营机制、市场空间扩张与力量壮大，均产生诸多消极影响。转换动力机制，激活并充分发挥其内在动力，是市场经济条件下实现非公有制经济持续、健康、快速发展的客观要求。     

浅议独立董事制度

近几年来,随着我国独立董事制度的建立,独立董事在公司中的作用越来越重要。文章对独立董事的意义和作用进行了分析和阐述,并指出目前我国独立董事制度中存在的问题。同时结合实际情况提出自己的解决对策。     

慈善组织理事会治理对会计信息质量的权变影响研究

利用2005-2019年中国慈善基金会数据,基于权变理论视角,探讨慈善组织理事会治理对会计信息质量的影响效应。研究发现：理事会规模越大、理事的平均年龄越大、理事中国家工作人员越多、女性理事占比越低,慈善基金会会计信息质量越高;而理事长和秘书长两职合一对慈善基金会会计信息质量不存在显著影响;理事会治理对会计信息质量的影响随着慈善基金会捐赠依赖度和外部审计质量的不同而发生权变,捐赠依赖度越小、外部审计质量越高的慈善基金会,理事会治理对会计信息质量的监督效应越强。