Institutional context as a moderator of the relationship between board structure and acquirer returns

The objective of this paper is to contribute to the understanding of the supervisory role of the board of directors in the context of mergers and acquisitions (M&As). We focus our study on the European case, for which there is no previous exhaustive evidence on this topic. Using information on 985 mergers and acquisitions carried out over the period 2003–2016 by companies in the major European countries, we analyze the influence of supervisory capacity of the board (small size, higher proportion of outsiders and separated Chairperson-CEO positions) on acquirer returns, differentiating between Anglo-Saxon and continental European contexts. Our results confirm that the effectiveness of corporate governance practices depends strongly on their fit with the broader institutional context. Specifically, we find that a smaller size of the board of directors and the separation of the positions of Chairperson and CEO lead to higher acquirer returns in European Anglo-Saxon countries. By contrast, we do not find evidence that any proxy of supervisory capacity of the board significantly improves acquirer returns in the rest of countries.     

试论我国企业并购的问题与对策

企业并购现巳成为我国企业界的热点,但在具体运作时还存在许多急需解决的问题。本文试对我国企业并购中的主要问题进行分析,并探讨相应的对策建议。     

Shareholder Value Creation in European M&As

This paper looks at the value generated to shareholders by the announcement of mergers and acquisitions involving firms in the European Union over the period 1998–2000. Cumulative abnormal shareholder returns due to the announcement of a merger reflect a revision of the expected value resulting from future synergies or wealth redistribution among stakeholders. Target firm shareholders receive on average a statistically significant cumulative abnormal return of 9% in a one‐month window centred on the announcement date. Acquirers’ cumulative abnormal returns are null on average. When distinguishing in terms of the geographical and sectoral dimensions of the merger deals, our main finding is that mergers in industries that had previously been under government control or that are still heavily regulated generate lower value than M&A announcements in unregulated industries. This low value creation in regulated industries becomes significantly negative when the merger involves two firms from different countries and is primarily due to the lower positive return that shareholders of the target firm enjoy upon the announcement of the merger. This evidence is consistent with the existence of obstacles (such as cultural, legal, or transaction barriers) to the successful conclusion of this type of transaction, which lessen the probability of the merger actually being completed as announced and, therefore, reduce its expected value.     

论企业并购中的知识产权战略

企业并购现象反映了企业传统竞争观念的战略性转变.企业并购一般要涉及到知识产权问题,知识产权已经成为众多大公司并购的一股潜在动力.特别是以知识产权为目标的企业并购会涉及到一系列的知识产权问题,对这些问题的解决是顺利完成企业并购的保障.这就需要对并购企业中的知识产权问题给予充分重视.在特殊情况下,以知识产权为目标的企业并购行为还可以作为实现企业竞争战略目的、对抗竞争对手打击的有效手段.     

OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE AND FIRM EXIT ROUTES

ABSTRACT

Our study presents empirical evidence about the role of ownership structure for firm exit probability by explicitly differentiating between distinct exit routes (bankruptcy and forced liquidation, voluntary liquidation, mergers and acquisitions – M&A, and removal from the court register). Based on the population of Slovenian firms in the 2006–2012 period and using multinomial probit, our findings support the predictions of agency theory. Ownership concentration, share of the largest owner, and the difference in shares between two largest owners all decrease the likelihood of exit for all studied exit routes but M&A. The magnitude of their impact is largest for exits, in which owners play a decisive role, i.e. voluntary liquidation and removal. The link between the number of primary owners and exit likelihood is U-shaped with the lowest exit probability for firms with around two owners.     

跨国并购后中国企业人力资源整合风险与对策

跨国并购整合的全过程,是人力资源全面驱动的过程,发现企业在跨国并购后人力资源整合风险是避免并购失败最重要的环节。本文从这一角度对人力资源整合风险进行理论探讨,在此基础上分析中国企业跨国并购中面临的具体的人力资源整合风险,并针对这些风险提出了相应的控制策略。     

Diversification, Ownership and Control of Swedish Corporations

We study the short‐ and long‐term valuation effects of Swedish takeovers. Using a sample of 93 bidding firms that acquired 101 targets between 1980 and 1995, we find that diversifying acquisitions lead to a negative market reaction and deterioration of the operating performance of the bidder. Announcement and performance gains in each of the three years following the acquisition occur only when bidders expand their core rather than their peripheral lines of business. Our findings suggest that focused acquisitions lead to greater synergies and operating efficiencies than diversifying acquisitions. Intra‐group acquisitions, however, show that bidders do not realise significant gains whether they adopt diversifying or focusing investment strategies by purchasing firms controlled by the Wallenberg and SHB conglomerate groups. Intra‐group targets realize significant gains regardless bidder's investment strategy. Finally, the evidence does not support the view that intra‐conglomerate acquisitions are associated with expropriation of minority shareholders. However, they appear to enhance the control rights of large shareholders of the bidding firm.     

Announcement effects of bank mergers in Europe and the US

We investigate the announcement effect of large bank mergers in the European and US stock market. Cumulative abnormal returns are calculated on the basis of the performance vis-à-vis the market and a sector index. Mergers result in small positive abnormal returns. Target banks realize significantly higher returns than bidders. In many respects, there is a difference between the announcement effects of European bank mergers compared to those in the US.     

The Wealth Effects of Fairness Opinions in Takeovers

This paper explores the wealth effects associated with a bidder's decision to solicit a fairness opinion in a takeover transaction. Using a hand‐collected sample with bidders’ filing proxy statements, this paper finds that the use of fairness opinions does not negatively affect bidder shareholders’ wealth, a finding that contradicts prior studies’ findings. In addition, I find a positive wealth effect associated with bidder use of fairness opinions in the post‐Rule 2290 period. Collectively, these results are consistent with a fairness opinion being used by bidder management as a means to facilitate transactions rather than a mechanism to entrench management.     

The effect of heterogeneous beliefs on mergers and acquisitions

This article investigates the effect of heterogeneous beliefs on firms’ mergers and acquisitions (M&A) decisions. Using data of China’s financial market, which is featured with great heterogeneity of belief, we find that heterogeneous beliefs are positively associated with the occurrence of M&A transactions, and firms with greater heterogeneous beliefs are more likely to pay the transactions with stock. Moreover, we show that government intervention, measured by state ownership, weakens the effect of heterogeneous beliefs on firms’ M&A decisions.