如何计算认股权证的资本成本

认股权证作为一种长期资金的筹资方式 ,其资本成本必须予以考虑。但是使用传统资本成本计算方法不能反映其真实成本。本文尝试使用B -S和CAPM模型来计算其资本成本 ,并用实例说明     

Negotiation support using the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution

The Graph Model for Conflict Resolution is a flexible methodology for systematically studying strategic conflicts in the real world, and is therefore a natural tool for negotiation support. The basic definitions underlying the graph model are reviewed, and the techniques for analysis and interpretation are discussed. The modeling and analysis of a case study, an international trade negotiation concerning the export of Canadian softwood lumber to the United States, are used to demonstrate the practical application of the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution as a negotiation support tool. The modeling and analysis is carried out using the GMCR software system. The ability of the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution to provide insights and advice to negotiators is emphasized.     

Social Comparisons in Ultimatum Bargaining

Experiments are used to examine the effects of social comparisons in ultimatum bargaining. We inform responders about the average offer before they decide whether to accept or reject their specific offer. This significantly increases offers and offer‐specific rejection probabilities. For comparison, we consider another change in informational conditions: telling responders the total pie is $30—ex ante it was either $15 or $30—affects offers and rejection probabilities roughly as much. Our results are consistent with people’s dislike for deviations from the norm of equity but inconsistent with fairness theories, where people dislike income disparity between themselves and their referents.     

The Marshallian macroeconomic model: A progress report

In this progress report, we first indicate the origins and early development of the Marshallian macroeconomic model (MMM) and briefly review some of our past empirical forecasting experiments with the model. Then we present recently developed one-sector, two-sector and n-sector models of an economy that can be employed to explain past experience, predict future outcomes and analyze policy problems. The results of simulation experiments with various versions of the model are provided to illustrate some of its dynamic properties that include “chaotic” features. Last, we present comments on planned future work with the model.     

中国商业银行市场结构分析——基于Panzar-Rosse模型

运用Panzar--Rosse模型这一国际上前沿的市场结构判定方法，分析中国商业银行的市场结构，发现其目前正处于垄断竞争状态，垄断性较强。在此基础上本文提出了降低市场准入门槛、改善市场竞争环境的政策措施。     

中国工业化进程与劳动力就业关系研究综述

工业化进程的加速推进与劳动力就业在一定程度上是存在矛盾的,国内外众多专家学者对这一问题也做了相应研究。文章分别从加速工业化进程对劳动力就业的抑制、促进和新型工业化与劳动力就业三方面对现有文献进行了梳理,并进行了评述,为进一步研究提供了理论基础和研究空间。今后进一步研究的方向主要是工业化进程与劳动力就业相互影响的内部机理,以为合理工业化路径选择和有效的劳动力就业模式提供理论支持。     

企业持续成长模式探讨——“变异”与持续成长

本文讨论了企业的持续成长模式．在借鉴生物生存机理的基础上．提出了“前变异”与“后变异”的概念．认为“前变异”是企业获取突破性技术的基本模式．“前变异”具有随机性和无指向性的特点．企业中大量存在的非分工合作是产生“前变异”的基础。     

Relative Guarantees

Many real-world financial contracts have some sort of minimum rate of return guarantee included. One class of these guarantees is so-called relative guarantees, i.e., guarantees where the minimum guaranteed rate of return is given as a function of the stochastic return on a reference portfolio. These guarantees are the topic of this paper. We analyse a wide range of different functional specifications for the minimum guaranteed rate of return, hereunder both so-called maturity and multi-period guarantees. Several closed form solutions are presented.     

Competition and Information Production in Market Maker Models

Abstract:   The microstructure literature models the mechanisms through which fundamental information is incorporated into market prices. This paper extends previous models by endogenising information production and analysing incentives for costly information production. In contrast to the existing literature, increasing the number of informed traders can result in reduced price informativeness. When prices have an allocative role this has welfare consequences: the regulatory implications of a dichotomy between private and public incentives for information gathering are discussed.     

格莱明银行模式:基于关联博弈的分析

从关联博弈角度对格莱明银行模式进行了分析,认为格莱明银行小组贷款模式实现了贷款博弈与社会资本博弈的紧密结合,正是这种紧密关联博弈克服了成员贷款中的 "搭便车"行为.由于重复博弈的存在,社会资本成为一种可置信的威胁,保证了贷款协议的执行,成功克服了合约中产生的代理问题.格莱明银行模式对我国小额信贷激励机制的建立具有重要的参考价值.