The Layoff Rat Race*

We investigate how discretionary investments in general and specific human capital are affected by the possibility of layoffs. After investments are made, firms may have to lay off workers, and will do so in inverse order of the profit that each worker generates. Greater skill investments, especially in specific human capital, contribute more to a firm's bottom line, so that workers who make those investments will be laid off last. We show that as long as workers' bargaining positions are not too weak, workers invest in specific human capital in order to reduce layoff probabilities. Indeed, workers over‐invest in skill acquisition from a social perspective whenever their bargaining power is strong enough, even though they only receive a share of any investment. More generally, we characterize how equilibrium skill investments are affected by the distribution of worker abilities within firms, the probability that a firm will downsize, and the distribution of employment opportunities in the economy.     

Are Corporate Restructuring Events Driven by Common Factors? Implications for Takeover Prediction

Abstract:  The paper shows that variables commonly used in takeover prediction models also help to explain the likelihood of several other restructuring events, including divestitures, bankruptcies and significant employee layoffs. This finding helps to explain the larger misclassification errors in binomial takeover prediction models commonly used in prior research. The results show that modelling takeover prediction models in a binomial setting is likely to lead to misspecification in the parameter estimates and, further, result in erroneous conclusions about the determinants of takeover likelihood. The paper shows that controlling for other restructuring events by using a multinomial framework results in consistently lower misclassification errors in out-of-sample prediction tests, when compared to the benchmark of a typical binomial model.     

Just laid off,but still a “good citizen?” only if the process is fair

Recent United States Congress legislation (the WARN Act of 1988) mandates that organizations must provide at least 60 days notice before a layoff of 50 or more employees can be instituted. As a consequence, individuals who are notified of their layoff often remain in their jobs for a significant period of time-and managers hope that these people will be good organizational citizens during thisremaining time. This article identifies different psychological factors that could explain why individuals would remain good citizens, even after notification of their impending termination. In a survey of 147 skilled employees who received notification of their layoffs, we found that the perceived fairness of the layoff process was the primary factor influencing their citizenship behavior. Additional analyses suggested that the perceived adequacy of the explanation of the layoffs, and whether the layoff victims were treated with respect and dignity, were the primary factors influencing the perceived fairness of the layoff process. The theoretical implications of these results are discussed.     

Age Discrimination in Layoffs: Factors of Injustice

ABSTRACT. This paper considers two sets ethical obligations owed by a firm and its management to stockholders and employees with respect to layoffs. Literature and research from ethics and agency are used to frame ethical issues that pertain to age discrimination in layoffs. An actual court case provides an example for focus, analysis, and discussion. Points of discussion include management's obligations to employees and factors of injustice related to prejudice against age.     

Firm heterogeneity and trade-induced layoffs: An empirical investigation

We use a novel data set with verified observations of trade-induced layoffs by U.S. firms to study the interaction between firm productivity and trade liberalization as key determinants of firm-level job destruction due to trade. We find that patterns of trade-induced layoffs are broadly consistent with the predictions for firm-level employment generated by the Melitz (2003) heterogeneous firms theory – the number of trade-induced layoffs increases with firm productivity for non-exporting firms but decreases with firm productivity for exporting firms. The fact that exporting firms incur trade-induced layoffs at all invites a refined interpretation of the theory. Our findings suggest that exporting firms may lay off some workers who work in production for their shrinking domestic segments, while also engaging in some within-firm reallocation of workers. We also find that, even after controlling for productivity and export status, larger firms lay off more workers due to trade competition.     

裁员后留职员工的心理契约重构

由于种种原因,裁员后留职员工和企业之间的心理契约会被破坏,进而影响留职员工和企业的发展.应当探讨如何对留职员工和企业之间破坏的心理契约进行重构.为此,特提出四条对策,以期为裁员后留职员工和企业的发展提供参考.     

Institutions and preferences in settings of causal complexity: foreign institutional investors and corporate restructuring practices in France

In this article, we illustrate how the interaction between institutional arrangements and the presence of different categories of firm stakeholders with specific preferences provides important insights to understand the conditions under which corporate restructuring practices are introduced. Institutions shape the range of actors' strategic options and mediate the translation of the preferences of firm stakeholders into corporate policies. Nonetheless, strategic choice remains possible since firm stakeholders constitute subgroups with different interests and incentives that influence how they operate in an institutional framework. In particular, we examine under what conditions UK/US-based institutional investors and equity-based compensation incentives are associated with the implementation of asset divestitures and employee layoffs in France. We uncover three key findings. First, the presence of hedge funds and equity-based pay influence the likelihood of French companies undertaking asset divestitures. Second, the impact of hedge funds on employee layoffs is contingent on the ownership structure of firms. Third, layoffs in France are driven by inferior performance – a result that contrasts with the American experience whereby employee layoffs are also used as a strategic mechanism to deal with institutional investors in good times. Our findings demonstrate the importance of the institutional constraints of (national level) employment protection and the moderating effects of ownership structure (firm level) on the strategic and employment policies of French companies.     

Employee Downsizing Strategies: Market Reaction and Post Announcement Financial Performance

Empirical studies have generally reported insignificant market reactions to employee downsizing. In an effort to reconcile ongoing layoffs with inconclusive empirical results, we segregated our sample by downsizing strategy and examined employee layoff announcements made by Fortune 500 firms during the 1993–1995 period. Unlike previous studies, we find a positive market reaction for layoff announcements related to revenue refocusing. Market reaction with respect to layoff announcements involving cost cutting was insignificant while weak evidence was found for a negative market reaction to layoffs related to plant closings. Consistent with the market reaction, post announcement analysis revealed that downsizing in conjunction with revenue refocusing (plant closing) improved (reduced) firm financial performance and that revenue refocusing firms significantly outperformed cost cutting and plant closing firms over the three–year post announcement period.     

The Perceived Fairness of Layoffs in Germany: Participation,Compensation, or Avoidance?

This study analyses to what extend and under what circumstances layoffs are accepted in Germany. Principles of distributive justice and rules of procedural justice form the theoretical framework of the analysis. Based on this, hypotheses are generated, which are tested empirically in a telephone survey conducted between East and West Germans in 2004 (n = 3036). The empirical analysis accounts for the different points of views of implicated stakeholders and impartial spectators. Key findings are: (1) The management of a company can increase the acceptance of layoffs if the employees get some participation rights. (2) For impartial spectators generous compensation for those made redundant leads to a higher degree of perceived fairness. But job alliances are not even preferred to layoffs without measures to soften the blow of job loss. (3) Implicated stakeholders accept job alliances and perceive wage cuts as more fair than layoffs. However, compensation does not have the expected impact. Christian Pfeifer is resarch assistant at the Institute of Labour Economics, Leibniz University Hannover.