Managerial Ownership, Information Content of Earnings, and Discretionary Accruals in a Non–US Setting

This study employs Danish data to examine the empirical relationship between the proportion of managerial ownership and two characteristics of accounting earnings: the information content of earnings and the magnitude of discretionary accruals. In previous research concerning American firms, Warfield et al. (1995) document a positive relationship between managerial ownership and the information content of earnings, and a negative relationship between managerial ownership and discretionary accruals. We question the generality of the Warfield et al. result, as the ownership structure found in most other countries, including Denmark, deviates from the US ownership configuration. In fact, Danish data indicate that the information content of earnings is inversely related to managerial ownership.     

关于开展航海职业教育扶贫工作的探讨

建设新农村的核心环节是提高农民收入。对贫困地区进行扶贫是党和政府解决贫困地区农民问题的重要手段之一,其中心工作是提高农民收入。通过开展航海职业教育扶贫工作可以有效地帮助转移农村富余劳动力,提高农民综合素质,增加农民收入,增强农民自身的造血功能,彻底改变贫穷的面貌;同时也有利于促进航运业和航海职业教育的发展。开展航海职业教育扶贫工作是一个多方合作共赢的过程。     

Value of Multinationality: Internalization, Managerial Self-interest, and Managerial Compensation

In this paper, we examine the impact of managerial self-interest on the value of multinationality. Since agency theory also suggests that a divergence between the interests of managers and shareholders can be aligned by effective managerial incentive, we also examine the effect of managerial compensation on the value of multinationality. Our results show that for high- Q (Tobin's Q > 1 ) firms, investors do not associate the spending of free cash flow on multinationality with the problem of overinvestments. For high- Q firms, it is also found that the value of multinationality can be enhanced by effective managerial incentives. For low- Q firms (Tobin's Q < 1 ), it is found that the concern of managerial self-interest overwhelms the benefits of internalization, making multinationality a value-decreasing event. For low- Q firms, managerial compensation is also ineffective in promoting value-enhancing foreign direct investments.     

试论职业培训中心的管理自我诊断

管理自我诊断是职业培训中心改进工作、促进中心发展的重要环节。本文论述了管理自我诊断的内涵、原则和方 法。     

论英语教学与学生的非智力因素培养

目前，英语学习中智力和非智力因素是影响学生学业成绩的两个重要因素。人的智力包括注意力、观察力、思维和记忆能力；而非智力是指人的意志、兴趣、动机和情感。本文就教师如何在英语教学中培养学生的非智力因素，促进他们消除学习方法上存在的某些障碍作了一些分析，以便帮助他们提高学习成绩。     

Managerial Equity Ownership and the Demand for Outside Directors

This paper examines the linkage between the use of outside directors and managerial ownership. We conjecture there are two linkages: the standard incentive‐alignment demand for monitoring when managers own little stock and an entrenchment‐amelioration demand when managerial stock ownership is high. As a consequence, we predict the association between managerial ownership and board composition will be nonlinear (U‐shaped if the entrenchment effect is sufficiently pronounced). Using UK data, we find that both quadratic and logarithmic models outperform the simple linear relationship assumed in prior research and that the substitution between managerial ownership and board composition is stronger than hitherto supposed.     

全面理解人力资本的经济价值——教育经济学与培训经济学的融合

教育经济学不应只是正规学校教育的经济学,在终身学习的理念下,正规学校教育的结束并不意味着学习步伐的停滞和人力资本投资的终结。教育经济学未来拓展的路径,除了理论基础上的"外延式"发展外,还可以在原有的人力资本理论框架内走一条"内涵式"发展的道路,即强调综合考察人力资本投资的多种途径,特别是教育和培训这两种最主要的人力资本投资形式,让教育经济学走出正规学校教育经济学的固有领地,团结在人力资本理论的名义下,与培训经济学融合,走向人力资源开发研究的广阔天地,惟其如此,才能全面、深入地研究人力资本的经济价值及其实现机制。     

Does a Switch of Budget Regimes Affect Investment and Managerial Discretion of State-Owned Enterprises? Evidence from Italian Firms

We investigate the investment decisions of Italian state-owned enterprises (SOEs) across budget constraint regimes and carry out a natural experiment that exploits a regime switch in 1987. Drawing on the theory of capital market imperfections, we apply an empirical framework for investment analysis to a panel of manufacturing SOEs in competitive industries. We identify parallels between SOEs and widely held, quoted companies afflicted by agency problems, managerial discretion, and overinvestment. We argue that, in the case of SOEs, the soft budget regime increases managerial discretion, facilitates collusion with vote-seeking politicians, and results in wasteful investment. Consistent with our predictions, we find that the regime switch disciplines SOE's investment behavior. Following a hardening of the budget constraint, managers lose discretion to indulge in collusion and overinvestment. J. Comp. Econ., June 2002 30(4), pp. 787–811. London School of Economics and Political Science, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE, United Kingdom; and CERIS–CNR, Institute for Economic Research on Firms and Growth, National Research Council, Via Avogadro, 8, 10121 Turin, Italy. © 2002 Association for Comparative Economic Studies. Published by Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: E32, G31, G32, L32, M40.     

基于知识约简的企业员工知识培训决策研究

文章首先阐述企业员工知识培训的重要性,指出企业对员工进行知识培训管理方面的不足,认为要有效地进行知识培训,必须首先了解员工的知识缺失,进行科学的知识需求分析.文章在介绍知识约简的相关概念基础上.提出了基于知识约简的企业员工知识培训决策的方法步骤,并结合算例进行了具体分析.     

“棘轮式”代理问题与子公司经理人激励:家族集团治理

家族集团中,在企业家通过本期产出水平来确定子公司经理人所应上缴的产出分配收益的情况下,经理人会通过调整自己的努力水平,间接控制自己在下期的上缴额度,从而导致激励效率损失.但是,如果企业家能收取固定的产出分配收益,并确定高额违约金,就能够有效地规避子公司经理人代理问题.