Cognitive ability and human behavior in experimental ultimatum games

Recent researches have shed light on the effect of cognitive ability on economic decision-making. By measuring cognitive ability applying Raven's progressive matrix test, we obtain two significant results that this effect affects decision-making in two types of experimental ultimatum games. First, the higher the cognitive ability, the larger the amount a sender offers when the offer is smaller than or equal to the half split. Second, the higher the responders’ cognitive ability, the smaller the offer they accept, when they accept it or not with the strategy method. This study not only finds new factors that affect decision-making in experimental ultimatum games, but also provides more evidences that cognitive ability influences economic decision-making.     

网络直播购物情境下的拟剧化营销——基于抖音直播平台的分析与诠释

网络直播购物逐渐成为一种新的网络营销与消费方式。对于该模式的剖析,有助于对网络直播购物这一新兴事物进行全景化的解构与阐释,更好地理解与把握该模式的本质与趋势。本文基于第三方立场与视角,以戈夫曼拟剧理论为基础,锚定抖音平台为实践场景,尝试诠释拟剧理论在网络直播购物情境中的新变化、新形式、新内涵。研究选择Top100网络直播主播为分析对象,采用后台运营数据、页面数据爬虫、人工观察分析等多元数据采集与分析方法,对整个网络直播购物场景进行分析。研究发现,网络直播购物呈现出鲜明的拟剧化营销特质,各类要素间存在循环强化的运行机理,消费者的购物行为有着显著的集体偏好,且主体间的协同合作机制促进了消费的延续。该发现有助于对拟剧化营销运行机制、拟剧理论的新场景及网络直播购物这一新兴商业模式进行客观辩证的思考。     

欧盟视阈下在线平台中个人数据的增值税处理

近年来,在线平台的迅猛发展推动了全球经济数字化加速转型,但同时也引发了包括增值税政策适用在内的诸多挑战.通过研究《欧盟增值税指令》和欧州法院的判例法,以及分析个人数据与在线平台运行之间的关系可以推断出,个人数据是在线平台提供访问服务构成的增值税应税范围内的供应,且与消费者是否向在线平台支付金钱形式的对价无关.在实践中,使用客观价值方法来确定在线服务供应的应税金额存在实际困难,而使用直接联系标准解决易货交易问题,会导致增值税税基在本质上得到扩张.因此,建议当前不要将在线平台访问服务的供应视为一项应税交易.此外,对于商家为获得消费者数据而向平台付款的情形,因其不符合直接联系标准,也不应被视为服务对价.     

时间压力对网络冲动性购买的影响研究：交易效用和感知风险的调节

以往关于时间压力对冲动性购买影响的研究结论具有两面性，即促进或抑制。文章引入交易效用和感知风险两个调节变量，通过两个实验探讨了时间压力对网络冲动性购买倾向影响的边界条件。首先，当交易效用较高时，时间压力的增加会导致其网络冲动性购买倾向的提高；而当交易效用较低时，时间压力的增加会导致其网络冲动性购买倾向的降低（实验一）。其次，当人们感知风险较低时，时间压力的增加会导致其网络冲动性购买倾向的提高；而当人们感知风险较高时，时间压力的增加会导致其网络冲动性购买倾向的降低（实验二）。研究结论可以帮助电商企业进一步了解消费者的冲动性购买行为，充分利用时间压力的影响，制定更灵活有效的促销策略。     

Social Comparisons in Ultimatum Bargaining

Experiments are used to examine the effects of social comparisons in ultimatum bargaining. We inform responders about the average offer before they decide whether to accept or reject their specific offer. This significantly increases offers and offer‐specific rejection probabilities. For comparison, we consider another change in informational conditions: telling responders the total pie is $30—ex ante it was either $15 or $30—affects offers and rejection probabilities roughly as much. Our results are consistent with people’s dislike for deviations from the norm of equity but inconsistent with fairness theories, where people dislike income disparity between themselves and their referents.     

格莱明银行模式:基于关联博弈的分析

从关联博弈角度对格莱明银行模式进行了分析,认为格莱明银行小组贷款模式实现了贷款博弈与社会资本博弈的紧密结合,正是这种紧密关联博弈克服了成员贷款中的 "搭便车"行为.由于重复博弈的存在,社会资本成为一种可置信的威胁,保证了贷款协议的执行,成功克服了合约中产生的代理问题.格莱明银行模式对我国小额信贷激励机制的建立具有重要的参考价值.     

Average Monotonic Cooperative Games

A subclass of monotonic transferable utility (T.U.) games is studied: average monotonic games. These games are totally balanced. We prove that the core coincides with both the bargaining set à la Davis and Maschler and the bargaining set à la Mas-Colell. To obtain this result a technique based on reduced games is used. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C71     

政府预算过程中的多方利益博弈

本文通过探讨目标各异的多种角色参与的预算过程 ,指出预算过程是一种博弈过程 ,在此过程中代表各方利益的参与者为取得支出优先权展开竞争。本文主要对各支出部门之间、政府预算部门与支出部门之间、政府与公众之间以及中央与地方之间在预算决策中的竞争博弈行为进行分析 ,提出完善预算制度的政策建议。     

Pollution Control in Open Economies: Implications of Within-period Interactions for Dynamic Game Equilibrium

This paper examines a two-country, dynamic game model of pollution control in the presence of economic interactions between countries within a period, as well as the environmental interaction between periods (i.e., a change in the stock of global pollution). These economic interactions emerge because of changes in the terms of trade of polluting goods or the market share of domestic polluting industries. It is shown that if within-period externalities exist, a noncooperative equilibrium may result in a smaller stock of global pollution in the steady state than does international cooperation. Moreover, the properties of equilibrium paths depend on the direction and size of such externalities. In addition, trigger strategy equilibria that achieve the outcome of the collusive solution are examined.