Who benefits from partial tax coordination?

In this paper, we investigate whether partial tax coordination is beneficial to countries within and outside a tax union, in which countries are supposed to compete in taxes and infrastructure. Our results demonstrate that a subgroup of countries agreeing on a common tax rate can harm both member and nonmember states. This is in contrast to the classical findings that partial tax harmonisation is Pareto improving. When a minimum tax rate is imposed within a tax union, we demonstrate that it does not necessarily improve the welfare of the member countries. Moreover, both the high‐tax and low‐tax countries can be worse off. This conclusion is at odds with the classical result that a high‐tax country benefits from the imposition of a lower tax bound.     

A multivariate distance nonlinear causality test based on partial distance correlation: a machine learning application to energy futures

This paper proposes a multivariate distance nonlinear causality test (MDNC) using the partial distance correlation in a time series framework. Partial distance correlation as an extension of the Brownian distance correlation calculates the distance correlation between random vectors X and Y controlling for a random vector Z. Our test can detect nonlinear lagged relationships between time series, and when integrated with machine learning methods it can improve the forecasting power. We apply our method as a feature selection procedure and combine it with the support vector machine and random forests algorithms to study the forecast of the main energy financial time series (oil, coal, and natural gas futures). It shows substantial improvement in forecasting the fuel energy time series in comparison to the classical Granger causality method in time series.     

Aggregate Dividend Behavior and Permanent Earnings Hypothesis

The study examines the aggregate dividend behavior of U.S. corporations based on the permanent earnings hypothesis. Using annual data of aggregate earnings and dividends from 1871–1993, I find that although managers change dividends proportional to permanent earnings changes, they make revisions with a larger percentage change in dividends than in permanent earnings. The results from the post‐war data show that firms follow a partial adjustment policy with a long‐term dividend payout target in mind and make revisions with a delay. The quarterly data analysis yields results similar to those of the post‐war annual data.     

Are We Better Off if Our Politicians Have More Information?

The model of public policy studied in this paper has heterogeneous citizens/voters and two public goods: one (roads) chosen directly by an elected policy‐maker, and the other (pollution) stochastically dependent on the amount of roads. Both a one‐country and a two‐country version of the model are analyzed; the latter displays externalities across the countries which create incentives for free riding and strategic delegation. The welfare effects of providing the policy‐maker with information about the relationship between roads and pollution are investigated, and it is shown that more information hurts some—sometimes even all—citizens. In particular, the opportunity not to create an institution for information gathering can serve as a commitment device for a country, although with the unfortunate effect of making the overall outcome even worse. Implications for the welfare effects of “informational lobbying” are also discussed.     

Monopoly, competition and information acquisition

An incumbent monopolist is uncertain about its linear demand, but can acquire public information at a cost. We determine how an entry threat affects the firm's information acquisition. If returns to scale are constant and the state-contingent demands become more dispersed as output increases, then entry reduces information acquisition. If, however, either the incumbent or entrant has increasing returns; or if the state-contingent demands are nonlinear or fail increasing dispersion, then entry can increase information. Finally, entry can hurt consumers. Although entry always increases output, it can decrease information. Consumers sometimes prefer a better informed monopoly to a duopoly.     

Quality Competition and Social Welfare in Markets with Partial Coverage: New Results*

We use a vertical product differentiation model under partial market coverage to study the social welfare optimum and duopoly equilibrium when convex costs of quality provision are either fixed or variable in terms of production. We show the following new results. First, under fixed costs, the social planner charges a uniform price for the single variant that just covers costs of quality provision. Like the duopoly equilibrium, this socially optimal pricing entails a partially uncovered market, but a smaller share of the market is served compared with the duopoly equilibrium. Second, for the variable cost case, it is socially optimal to provide both high‐ and low‐quality variants, but market shares need not be equal. This differs from the result in fully covered markets. Third, in the duopoly equilibrium, the quality spread is too wide under variable costs relative to the social optimum. Under fixed costs, the duopoly produces two variants, but quality is too low relative to the social optimum, which has only one variant.     

企业并购会计处理方法的研究

伴随着市场经济的发展成熟,市场竞争日益加剧和激烈,而作为市场主体的企业欲在激烈的市场竞争中生存和发展,一般通过内部扩充和外部扩张而运行,而并购则是企业外部扩张最迅速、最典型、最重要的方式。而全球经济一体化的加速发展,中国的企业并购也愈来愈频繁。本文拟对企业并购传统会计处理方法及其新理论作初步的探讨。     

企业并购活动中目标企业选择的层次分析评估研究

企业并购是企业进行资本扩张、促进企业间存量资源合理统流动的重要途径。对企业并购中的目标企企的选择、价值评估进行研究，构建我国企业并前过程中目标企业选择的评价指标体系，运用AHP法对目标企业选择进行定量化评估，将有利于企业通过并购后，实现资源的最优配置．保证企业经营机制协调、有效地运行。     

制约上市公司并购的外部因素及对策

随着我国证券市场的建立,上市公司并购出现快速发展的趋势,但同时存在着制约其发展的一些外部因素。本文建议,应建立健全相关并购法规,减少政府干预,完善证券市场机制及拓宽并购融资渠道,加强与规范中介机构在并购中所起的作用,以推动上市公司并购的健康发展。     

并购行业模式对企业价值创造的影响

以1998～2004年A股非金融类上市公司发起的并购重组事件为样本，通过实证考察并购行业模式与收购企业价值之间的因果关系，证实我国上市公司实行行业相关性并购较无关性并购对收购企业具有更强的价值创造效应。同时，将对应于企业价值指标、有关并购价值创造的经济学假设分解成五类财务因素指标，通过比较不同并购模式下收购方指标变动特征的异同，揭示出规模经营、交易内部化和市场势力是影响收购企业价值的主导因素。