专业自保公司与企业内部自保的比较研究

本文对专业自保公司这种介于内部自保和商业保险之间的一种特殊的保险进行了分析。内部自保基金只是企业内部的一种风险准备金,国际上基本达成公认内部自保基金不具有保险属性,不能享受税前抵扣的好处。专业自保公司和内部自保在运作方式、组织结构、税收地位认定和监管方式上均是有区别的。国际上趋向于以更全面更合理的角度来分析专业自保公司的交易结构和经营实质。专业自保公司相比于企业内部自保是更具优势的风险管理方法。     

Self-Insurance, Self-Protection and Market Insurance within the Dual Theory of Choice

As demonstrated by Ehrlich and Becker [1972], Expected Utility Theory predicts that market insurance and self-insurance are substitutes, whilst surprisingly, market insurance and self-protection could be complements. This article examines the robustness of this conclusion, as well as its extensions under the Dual Theory of Choice [Yaari, 1987]. In particular, the non-reliability of self-insurance activities, background risk and asymmetric information are considered.     

Wealth Effects on Self-Insurance and Self-Protection against Monetary and Nonmonetary Losses

This paper considers the wealth effects on self-insurance and self-protection activities against possible losses of monetary wealth such as properties and nonmonetary wealth such as health. Increased initial income or monetary wealth decreases the demand for self-insurance against monetary wealth loss under the decreasing absolute risk aversion assumption, and has an ambiguous effect on self-protection. However, increased initial monetary wealth increases both self-insurance and self-protection against health loss, explaining empirical trends, if wealth and health are complements. When multiple self-insurance activities against both types of losses are considered, the effect of an increase in initial monetary wealth on self-insurance against health loss remains the same, but the effect on self-insurance against wealth loss depends on the preferences. JEL Classification No: D81, G22     

Should More Risk-Averse Agents Exert More Effort?

Consider an agent facing a risky distribution of losses who can change this distribution by exerting some effort. Should he exert more effort when he becomes more risk-averse? For instance, should we expect more risk-averse drivers to drive more cautiously? In this article, we give sufficient conditions under which the answer is positive, using results presented in Jewitt (1989). We first extend the standard models of self-insurance and self-protection and show that the comparative statics depends only on the effect of effort on the net loss. We then present conditions for the continuous case with applications.     

福利保障体制改革的消费效应研究

九十年代中国进行了以住房教育医疗养老为主要内容的福利保障体制改革,这种改革曾对我国消费产生了巨大的影响,这种影响目前是否还存在以及多大程度上存在着?这对判断我国当前宏观经济状况及走势具有重要意义.本文的分析说明,福利保障体制改革内在的动态效应减少了表面看起来对消费的可能的冲击,而保险的替代效应的存在使福利保障改革对消费的抑制效应至少在我国中等以上收入群体中大大缩小,但对低收入群体的影响依然很大.     

Insurance and the behavior of competitive firms under revenue risks: a note

This paper re-examines the model of Ford, Mpuku, and Pattanaik [“Revenue Risks, Insurance, and the Behavior of Competitive Firms”.Journal of Economics 64 (1996): 233–246] wherein a risk-averse competitive firm faces insurable revenue risk. The optimal output and insurance cover of the firm are shown to be deterministically related in that the marginal costs of self-insurance and market insurance are equated. In response to increasing risk aversion, the firm always takes a higher insurance cover. Increasing fixed costs generate an income effect which induces the firm to take a higher insurance cover should the preference of the firm satisfy decreasing absolute risk aversion. Market insurance and self-insurance can be either substitutes or complements, depending on the shape of the variable insurance-premium schedule.     

Reimbursing Preventive Care

The paper focuses on secondary prevention, such as diagnostic screening, medical examinations and checks-up, which refers to the early detection of disease. Secondary prevention is analyzed as a self-insurance activity reducing the negative shock of illness and can be either complement or substitute to illness treatment. This paper analyses the optimal reimbursement scheme for both prevention and treatment when each activity receives either a linear subsidy (i.e. cost sharing) or tax. Although optimal reimbursement systematically encourages treatment, it positively affects prevention if and only if prevention reduces the cost of treatment, that is in the case the two activities are substitutes.