Communication in financial markets with several informed traders

This paper investigates the incentives for informed traders in financial markets to reveal their information truthfully to the public. In the model, a subset of traders receive noisy signals about the value of a risky asset. The signals are composed of a directional component (“high” vs. “low”) as well as a precision component that represents the quality of the directional component. Between trading periods, the informed agents make public announcements to the uninformed traders. With a sufficiently large number of informed traders, an equilibrium exists in which the directional components are credibly revealed, but not the precision components. Even though the informed traders retain some of their rivate information, the post-communication estimate of the asset value converges in probability to the full-information estimate as the number of informed traders increases. The paper is based on a chapter of my Ph.D. thesis at the University of Western Ontario and was circulated previously under the title “Public Communication Devices in Financial Markets.” I thank my dissertation committee Arthur Robson, Hari Govindan, and Al Slivinski for their guidance and support. I also thank Murali Agastya, Roland Benabou, Philippe Grégoire, Rick Harbaugh, Mike Peters, an anonymous referee and an associate editor, and seminar participants at various universities and conferences at which this paper was presented.     

Overcoming the liability of smallness by recruiting through networks in China: a guanxi-based social capital perspective

We investigate the role of guanxi in Chinese entrepreneurial firms’ recruitment practices in attempting to overcome the liability of smallness. Combining insights from the social capital and guanxi literature, we theorize the guanxi-based social capital perspective and use it to analysis 96 in-depth interviews with multiple members (entrepreneurs, senior managers and factory workers) from 15 die-casting entrepreneurial firms in Guangdong province, China. We find that the use of guanxi in recruitment practice can overcome the liability of smallness because it makes the hiring process more convenient, improves firms’ attractiveness to jobseekers and enhances the person-organizational fit between new hires and firms. We discuss how Chinese entrepreneurs and their senior managers use guanxi strategically to achieve these advantages. On the other hand, our findings suggest that jobseekers can also use guanxi to increase their options, improve their bargaining power and distract firms’ attention away from hiring the most appropriate candidate for the job in order to undermine the effectiveness of Chinese entrepreneurial firms’ recruitment procedures. We explore the implications of these findings for academic research and managerial practice.     

Interaction Approach and Liabilities: A Case Analysis of Start-Up Firms

ABSTRACT

Purpose: Start-up firms have to face some key challenges due to liabilities related to processes that are external to the organization, such as establishing relationships with customers, suppliers and other relevant actors. The purpose of the article is to understand how liabilities, namely newness, smallness, foreignness and outsidership, are related to each other in start-ups, and what are the main liabilities perceived/experienced by start-ups and their counterparts, using an interactive perspective.

Methodology: The article uses a case study methodology and proposes 3 cases of start-ups firms and their counterparts. Cases are built using multiple data-sources, both primary and secondary.

Findings: The article highlights the role of “heritage” left by the membership in the network. This “network heritage” means that some aspects of the network are pre-existing, in terms of previous and long lasting relationships with other actors. In this sense, the network in which the firm connects pre-exists and mitigates the existence of liabilities that come into play in the processes of interdependence with other actors. This provides a perspective of liabilities, specifically the liability of newness, as an asset in the sense that newness depends on a “short story,” without constraints of a “longer story” as that of competitors in the network. The liability of newness is an asset in terms of flexibility, customized offer and innovative content.

Originality/value/contribution: The main contribution of the article lies in taking an interactive perspective on start-ups and liabilities, analyzing the interaction processes taking place between the new venture and the surrounding network of essential actors.

Practical implications: Liabilities arise and can be overcome in the processes of interaction, which therefore can have an ambivalent role: fertile ground for the manifestation of liabilities but also the context for its overcoming/conversion of liabilities into assets. Entrepreneurs and managers should consider newness and smallness as positive attributes for other actors in the processes of interaction, as a potential generator of value. Such a perception of newness as an asset depends on two factors: the presence or absence of an organization-mother that limits the perception of newness as a liability; the sector in which the new company develops, if dynamic and innovative or still tied to traditional and consolidated processes where the experience, “history” and “heritage” of the firm are sources of legitimacy.