Why will Trump lose the trade war?

ABSTRACT

The escalating U.S.–China trade conflicts have increasingly shadowed the outlook of the world economy. The Trump administration aims to achieve its strategic goals including reducing current account deficits, promoting the U.S. manufacturing sector, and curbing Chinese high-tech industries by waging the trade war against China. This paper argues that the current account deficits and the declining manufacturing sector in the U.S. are mainly driven by its internal structural factors, such as low saving rates, high labor costs, and rising service sector, rather than by the import competition from China. Moreover, the trade war further deteriorates the U.S. current account deficits and erode its comparative advantage, and it forces China to invest more in technological innovation and human capital, and thus promote its progress in high-tech industries. Thus, the U.S. will not be able to achieve its strategical goals and eventually lose the trade war.     

Environmental standards as barriers to trade

This paper examines the case of a good, polluting in consumption, whose pollutive content is restricted by a government with strong environmental policies. When foreign producers are unable to comply with the restrictive environmental standard of such a country, to which they wish to export, they often allege that those standards constitute illegal barriers to free trade. An example of such a good is gasoline, excessively pollutive formulations of which are prohibited from importation into the United States by the 1970 Clean Air Act. Rather than banning them, such imports should be taxed, along with the domestically produced substitute good, according to their respective pollutant contents. This would foster economic efficiency and should be more acceptable to foreign producers than the outright prohibition mandated by the Clean Air Act. The results of this paper reaffirm the argument in a previous article in this journal (Socio-Economic Planning Sciences 29 (1995) 187), though the countries’ roles in the two papers are reversed, that free trade and Pigouvian environmental policies increase international welfare.     

Economic liberalization and welfare in a model with an informal sector

The paper reexamines the conventional results relating to inflow of foreign capital, removal of protectionism and structural reform programmes, in a small open economy in terms of a two-sector general equilibrium model with an informal sector. The paper shows that in the presence of labour market distortion and a protectionist policy, inflow of foreign capital may be desirable irrespective of the pattern of trade of the economy due to its favourable impact on welfare. But the welfare implications of tariff reductions and/or structural adjustment programmes, such as deregulating the formal sector labour market, depend crucially on the economy's trade pattern. The paper provides an answer to the question as to whether in a developing economy labour market reform and tariff reform should go hand-in-hand or whether one should precede the other for welfare improvement.
JEL classification: F10, F13, F21, O17.     

Welfare reducing licensing

In this paper, we characterize situations where licensing a cost reducing innovation to a rival firm using two-part tariff contracts (a fixed fee plus a linear per unit of output royalty) reduces social welfare. We show that it occurs if (i) the firms compete in prices, (ii) the innovation is large enough but not drastic, and (iii) the goods are close enough substitutes. Moreover, we show that, regardless of the type of competition, first, the optimal contract always includes a positive royalty and, second, even drastic innovations are licensed whenever the goods are not homogeneous.     

关税减让政策对我国进口的影响

中国加入WTO后,关税减让协议的逐步实行对我国进口贸易产生了极大影响.研究结果表明,关税与我国进口贸易额之间存在着高度的负相关关系,在影响我国进口效应的诸多因素中.关税起到了主要作用,但并非唯一因素.而关税减让在影响我国进口商品结构方面的作用不大.可见,在优化我国进口商品结构方面还需要其他政策措施的辅助与调整.     

运用经济杠杆促进错峰调荷——安徽省峰谷电价分析

阐述了安徽省峰谷电价的实施背景、方案的主要内容和创新特点,2004年上半年的实际执行情况及取得的效果。结合安徽省实际情况,对下一阶段如何优化峰谷电价方案、进一步发挥价格杠杆作用提出了建议。     

特许经营收费公路的价格管制模型研究

在收费公路特许经营谈判过程中,通行费价格的确定和调整是核心问题之一。通行的价格管制模型有两个,即合理回报率价格管制模型和最高限价管制模型。在分析两个模型优缺点的基础上,作者引入包括资本市场基准收益率、道路拥挤程度等多个参数,优化了上述两个模型,并整合为一个统一的模型。     

碳关税的违法性及其应对

2009年美国众议院通过的《美国清洁能源与安全法案》规定,美国有权对包括中国在内的不实施碳减排限额国家进口产品征收碳关税。该法案有关碳关税的规定违反了《联合国气候变化框架公约》、《京都议定书》及WTO所确立的相关原则,也不符合WTO的相关条款。对此,我国必须在充分利用WTO现有法律机制的基础上,制定符合国情的碳税制度并积极参与国际规则的制定。     

贸易壁垒与碳关税政策

国际贸易是在自由贸易与贸易壁垒长期斗争中发展起来的,美国等西方国家为了自身利益,抛开长期帝3定和遵守的自由贸易游戏规则,推出碳关税政策,利用全球对气候的关注抢占道德制高点,以此保护滞缓的经济。利益从来就是人类行动的指南,深度分析碳关税政策,从而制定出应对新贸易壁垒的良策是我们的利益所在。     

“碳关税”措施在GATT/WTO体制中的合法性研究

碳关税措施的规定是针对国内产品征收的碳税所进行的边境税调整,但国内碳税并不在WTO的边境税调整范围之内。碳关税不符合非歧视待遇原则中的国民待遇原则;由于各国环境政策和环保措施不同,碳关税也违反最惠国待遇原则。碳关税措施不符合GATT第20条(b)款与(g)款的规定,但专家组和上诉机构的解释可能对于碳关税措施符合GATT/WTO的相关规则具有积极的意义。考虑到碳关税对我国部分产业和对外贸易的影响,应该依据上述理由予以反对,驳斥欧美部分国家对于碳关税措施在GATT/WTO中具有合法性的观点。