Clientelism and aid

Using a model of probabilistic voting, we analyze the impact of aid on the political equilibrium in the recipient country or region. We consider politicians with mixed motives: they are interested in promoting social welfare but also value the benefit of holding office. We label as clientelistic the politician who most values the benefit of being in power. We find that the impact of aid on the political equilibrium and therefore on the quality of policy in the recipient country (using utilitarian social welfare as a benchmark) ultimately depends on the value of the elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption. When elasticity is low, the expected policy outcome gets further away from the socially desirable policy set. This substitution of policy quality for aid can help to explain the poor performance of aid in improving policy. Perhaps more surprising is the opposite case, which arises for high values of elasticity of marginal utility: an increase in aid tilts the equilibrium policy towards the welfare-maximizing policy set.     

Polarisation, uncertainty and public investment failure

In a political economy model, the effect of political polarisation on a government's intertemporal choice between redistribution and public investment is shown to be similar to the effect of political uncertainty. Moreover, polarisation and uncertainty reinforce one another in their impact on public underinvestment and may ultimately lead to no investment at all.     

Perceptions of public land governance from two Canadian provinces: How is the social agenda being met through sustainable forest management?

This article presents a comparative assessment of current spaces for public involvement in Crown (public) land management in the Canadian provinces of New Brunswick and Nova Scotia. More specifically, it addresses the barriers to public participation by examining the agency-client relationship – specifically, through the theoretical lens of capture – as an impediment to the inclusion of values that are outside the traditional, technocratic management realm of public forest management. Without public input, the public’s needs, values, and desires are not articulated and the social side of sustainable forest management is likely to be neglected. Low levels of trust in public land management agencies in New Brunswick and Nova Scotia, coupled with minimal space for public involvement, have created the perception of a policy network that is dominated by industry and/or government and provides minimal space for other interests. The primary research method is an online survey informed by forty-two interviews. The survey was administered to 89 key forestry stakeholders in New Brunswick and Nova Scotia. Participation observation and a document analysis are utilized to complement the survey. This research finds that (1) although survey participants come from diverse affiliations and two provinces with different forest policy and unique approaches to public participation, there is essential consensus of the need for an improvement of public involvement processes for public land; (2) trust in the forest industry and the Department of Natural Resources (DNR) is extremely low in both provinces. Even with recent participatory efforts in Nova Scotia, the trust level is lower than in the neighboring province of New Brunswick. Some participants connect this distrust to privileged access for certain interest groups and a closed policy network; (3) barriers to participatory processes differ between provinces, especially a fear of retribution, which is specific to New Brunswick; and (4) key stakeholders identify barriers to engagement that they perceive to be different for themselves and the general public.     

Clientelism and fiscal redistribution: Evidence across countries

This article marshals empirical evidence from a cross-section of up to 87 countries to consider the impact of clientelism on fiscal redistribution in the form of direct taxes and public transfers. Clientelism may directly undermine fiscal redistribution towards poorer individuals because their political support is cheaper to buy, political patrons will limit redistribution to keep clients dependent and, moreover, will eschew fiscal policies that target broad categories of citizens based on explicit criteria, and favor instead private benefits that they can disburse to individual clients with a relatively high degree of discretion. The empirical analysis controls for a range of potentially confounding covariates, explores various transmission channels and accounts for the real possibility that more extensive redistributive programs may undermine the strength of clientelism. The results strongly suggest that clientelism is inimical to income redistribution towards the poor through taxes and transfers and, moreover, identify reduced public good provision as one indirect channel through which clientelism may undermine fiscal redistribution.