Altruism, equity, and reciprocity in a gift-exchange experiment: an encompassing approach

Considerable experimental evidence suggests that non-pecuniary motives must be addressed when modeling behavior in economic contexts. Recent theories of non-pecuniary motives can be classified as altruism-, equity-, or reciprocity-based. We outline the qualitative differences in prediction these alternative explanations yield in a gift-exchange game. We estimate and compare leading approaches in these categories, using experimental data. We then offer a flexible approach that nests the above three approaches, thereby allowing for nested hypothesis testing and for determining the relative strength of each of the competing theories. In addition, the encompassing approach provides a functional form for utility in different settings without the restrictive nature of the approaches nested within it. Using this flexible form for nested tests, we find that intentional reciprocity, distributive concerns, and altruistic considerations all play a significant role in players' decisions.     

Dissertation abstract: Experiments on fairness and reputation

The three dissertation essays investigate different aspects of reputation in games where fairness is an important consideration. The first essay studies the effects of reputation on indirect reciprocity in different dictator games. The first experiment places dictators in two environments where they can either give money to the paired player or take money away from them: in one treatment the paired player is a stranger and in the other treatment the dictator has information on the paired player’s reputation. Contrary to anecdotal evidence, the statistical tests show that the dictators’ behavior towards a stranger is not statistically significantly different from their behavior towards an individual with an established reputation. The findings arise because a high proportion of dictators acted purely in their own self interest in both treatments. The data also provides evidence that dictators are more generous when they know that their choices (but not their identities) will be revealed in the future. In the second experiment the dictators’ choices were restricted to only generous actions. In such environment the dictators sent more money on average to recipients with a reputation for being generous than to recipients without a reputation. The second essay explores the ways in which information about others’ actions affects one’s own behavior in a dictator game. The experimental design discriminates behaviorally between three possible effects of recipient’s within-game reputation on the dictator’s decision: reputation causing indirect reciprocity, social influence, and identification. The separation of motives helps to identify the mechanisms of social transmission of impulses towards selfish or generous behavior. The data analysis reveals that the reputation effects have a stronger impact on dictators’ actions than social influence and identification. In the third essay¹ we examine the reputation effects in a labor market setting by analyzing the influence of negative technological shocks on long run relationships between firms and workers. The positive correlation between wage and effort in static conditions has been demonstrated in many experimental studies and has been one of the prominent explanations for the existence of wage rigidity. We subject these findings to further tests in a non-stationary environment that better corresponds to outside-the-lab market conditions. We observe the positive correlation of wages and effort but do not find support for downward wage rigidity in our data. Once the shocks occur, firms lower the wages and relationships often break down. The workers who accept a lower wage respond with exerting a lower effort. JEL Classification C70, C91, D63, D64 ¹Co-authored with Ninghua Du. Dissertation Committee: Dissertation Advisor: James C. Cox Martin Dufwenberg, Price V. Fishback, Ronald L. Oaxaca     

A solution to the random assignment problem on the full preference domain

We consider the problem of allocating a set of indivisible objects to agents in a fair and efficient manner. In a recent paper, Bogomolnaia and Moulin consider the case in which all agents have strict preferences, and propose the probabilistic serial (PS) mechanism; they define a new notion of efficiency, called ordinal efficiency, and prove that the probabilistic serial mechanism finds an envy-free ordinally efficient assignment. However, the restrictive assumption of strict preferences is critical to their algorithm. Our main contribution is an analogous algorithm for the full preference domain in which agents are allowed to be indifferent between objects. Our algorithm is based on a reinterpretation of the PS mechanism as an iterative algorithm to compute a “flow” in an associated network. In addition we show that on the full preference domain it is impossible for even a weak strategyproof mechanism to find a random assignment that is both ordinally efficient and envy-free.     

A comparative analysis of perception of dividends by financial managers

This paper is a report about the perception of dividends by Chief financial officers (CFOs). The research encompasses five countries, on three continents, and covers three types of economies. Our cross-sectional study is concerned with both inter- and intra-societal differences that may or may not exist regarding the perception of dividends by those who are in charge of making such decisions in the firm. Using a survey instrument, we find that both similarities and dissimilarities exist inter- and intra-culturally. Perhaps the most important conclusion we reach is that dividend research must take a different track than it has been following so far.     

The role of program fairness in asymmetrical channel relationships

Managing distributor compliance with manufacturer-initiated programs is critical to both program success and relationship enhancement. This study examines how a manufacturer might better motivate distributors with varying levels of dependence. Previous research suggests that two variables influence distributor compliance: economic incentives and dependence dynamics. Drawing from fairness heuristic theory, this study extends previous research by investigating the role of fairness in affecting compliance and long-term relationships. The authors observe the contingent effect of fairness along various levels of distributor dependence. In the context of a naturally occurring program, the authors collect data from a focal manufacturer's distribution channel and find that (1) fairness perceptions have significant impacts on both compliance and relational outcomes, (2) the efficacy of program fairness declines as distributor dependence increases, and (3) distributor dependence increases the effect of economic incentives on compliance. The authors discuss the theoretical and managerial implications of these findings.     

Role of tourism in connecting Taiwan and China: Assessing tourists' perceptions of the Kinmen–Xiamen links

For a broad understanding of tourism across the Taiwan Strait, this paper previously draws on an overview of tourism and the evolutionary process of “Mini Three Links” policy between Kinmen (of Taiwan) and Xiamen (of China). Further, using empirical testing, the paper assesses the perceptions of Kinmen tourists towards China. The results reveal the fact that low-politics activity or people-to-people contacts can be an effective force to reduce tension. The finding of the paper also indicates that as long as tourism across the Taiwan Strait continues to grow, the relationship between Kinmen and Xiamen can therefore be normalized and promoted.     

雇佣模式对员工创新行为的影响机制研究

雇佣模式如何影响员工创新行为已成为企业内外广泛议论的话题。从创新行为的组织影响因素出发,逐渐渗透到个体影响因素,探究工作安全感、组织认同感在雇佣模式与创新行为之间的中介作用,以及雇佣模式与心理契约感知不同维度对创新行为的交互作用。通过对439名不同地区员工调查发现：与无固定期限员工相比,固定期限员工更倾向于表现出较少的建言行为、组织公民行为和角色创新;工作安全感和组织认同完全中介了雇佣模式对建言行为的影响,部分中介了雇佣模式对组织公民行为和角色创新的影响;固定期限员工在交易型和平衡型心理契约感知下,表现为相对消极的组织公民行为和角色创新。     

Voluntary disclosure in a bargaining setting: A research note

We conduct an experiment on voluntary disclosure within a simple bargaining setting wherein a proposer must choose one of two possible offers and a responder chooses whether to reject or accept that offer. In one treatment the proposer has the option to disclose whether a fairer (more equal) offer was available relative to the one chosen. Under standard economic theory, a responder will interpret no disclosure to mean the proposer's offer was the less fair alternative, and so a proposer who is making the fairer offer will disclose. In consequence, voluntary disclosure should perform as well as mandatory disclosure in motivating proposers to make fair offers. Given their rejection rates, we find responders properly infer the meaning of non-disclosure. However, despite the correct inferences made by responders, proposers submit twice as many fair offers with mandatory disclosure than with voluntary disclosure. Our results suggest that the choice of voluntary versus mandatory disclosure has consequences for resource allocation within the firm even though under standard assumptions about preferences it should not.     

政策支持、创业激情与技术创业成功：政策感知的调节作用

为了厘清政策支持对技术创业成功的作用机制,将创业激情作为中介变量、政策感知作为调节变量,构建政策支持影响技术创业成功的理论模型,并结合云南地区291家技术创业企业数据开展实证研究。结果表明：政策支持促进技术创业成功;政策支持通过激发技术创业者创业激情进而促进技术创业成功;政策感知强化政策支持对技术创业成功的正向影响,同时增强政策支持对创业激情的正向影响,对创业激情的中介过程具有调节作用,即在不同水平政策感知下,创业激情的中介效用存在明显差异。     

中国社会保障的公平与效率评估分析——基于公平与效率视角社保发展的文献综述

公平与效率是影响中国社会保障制度建设和改革的重要因素。在普惠型社会保障制度框架的建设下,能否处理好公平与效率的关系,关系到国家的发展与居民幸福指数和安全感的获得？通过回溯中国社会保障制度的发展历程,评估现有制度的问题及原因,分析国内外学者对公平与效率的立场观点和研究成果,探索社会保障制度下公平与效率的最优状态,以丰富社...