Can stable environmental protection officials’ tenure reduce illegal emissions?

Based on the day-night PM_2.5 difference of the nearest atmospheric monitoring points to measure whether there is illegal emission, this paper explores the impact of environmental protection officials' tenure (EPLT) on illegal emissions. The results show that there is a positive correlation between EPLT and illegal emissions. Stable EPLT can reduce illegal emissions by increasing environmental information disclosure and environmental subsidies. It can increase illegal emissions by weakening public pollution reporting and media supervision, environmental law enforcement and promoting corruption. In addition, EPLT can increase illegal emissions as EPLT is less than 3.55 years, while EPLT can increase illegal emissions as EPLT exceeds 6.21 years. Further, when mayor's tenure and EPLT are both stable, the promotion effect of EPLT on illegal emission is stronger. Stable company director's tenure can also aggravate the promotion effect of EPLT on illegal emissions.     

Competition as a track for preventing illegal immigration

Rich countries often face sizeable illegal migration. This paper suggests that these countries would use the financial aid which they give to the source countries as an instrument to prevent illegal immigration. The core of this policy is to allow the source countries to compete for the pre-determined aid, which would be distributed according to the cross-proportion of the apprehended illegal aliens. Moreover, we show that it may be beneficial for the rich country to split the source countries into competing pairs rather than allowing all of them to compete jointly. The rich country has basically two policy means: funds allocated to strengthening its border control; and the foreign aid given to the source countries. The multi-country general equilibrium model presented shows how the rich country, by choosing an appropriate mix of these two policy means, can minimize the number of illegal immigrants subject to its budget constrain.Received: 15 August 2002, Accepted: 21 January 2004, JEL Classification: F22Nava Kahana, Tikva Lecker: The authors are grateful to two anonymous referees for their valuable comments.     

中美公众对收入差距的反应差异探讨

中美的基尼系数如实地反映了两国的收入差距。中美两国民众对收入差距反应有差异的原因是因为两国的收入分配形状、社会保障水平、经济发展水平、非法收入的社会影响不同。由此可得出这样一个结论：要缩小我国收入差距，就必须在农村实行规模经济，完善社会保障，加大打击非法收入的力度。     

Dissertation abstract: “Essays in applied economics on the intervention of a third player in agency relationships”

Agency theory has established that appropriate incentives can reconcile the diverging interests of the principal and the agent. Focusing on three applications, this dissertation evaluates the empirical relevance of these results when a third party interacts with the primary contract. The analyses provided rely on either laboratory or natural experiments. First, corruption is analyzed as a two-contract situation: a delegation contract between a Principal and an Agent and a corruption pact concluded between this Agent and a third player, called Briber. A survey of the recent microeconomic literature on corruption first highlights how corruption behavior results from the properties of those two agreements. We thereafter show that the Agent faces a conflict in reciprocities due to those two conflicting agreements. The resulting delegation effect, supported by observed behavior in our three-player experimental game, could account for the deterrence effect of wages on corruption. Second, health care is governed by contradictory objectives: patients are mainly concerned with the health provided, whereas containing health care costs is the primary goal of health care administrators. We provide further insights into the ability of incentives to balance these two competing objectives. In this matter, our theoretical and econometric analysis evaluates how a new mixed compensation scheme, introduced in Quebec in 1999 as an alternative to fee-for-services, has affected physicians’ practice patterns. Free switching is shown to be an essential feature of the reform, since it implements screening between physicians. Finally, the demand for underground work departs from the traditional Beckerian approach to illegal behavior, due to the dependence of benefits from illegality on competitors’ behavior. We set up a theoretical model in which the demand for underground work from all producers competing on the same output market is analyzed simultaneously. We first show that competition drastically undermines the individual benefits of tax evasion. At equilibrium, each firm nonetheless chooses evasion with a positive probability, strictly lower than one. This Bertrand curse could then account for the “tax evasion puzzle” i.e. the overprediction of evasion in models that ignore market interactions. We thereafter show that allowing firms to denounce competitors’ evasion is not likely to solve this curse—by providing a credible threat against price cuts, it fosters illegal work. Empirical evidence from a laboratory experiment confirms these predictions. Without denunciation, experimental firms often choose evasion whereas evasion benefits are canceled out by competition. When introduced, denunciation is rarely used by firms, but the threat makes evasion profitable. JEL Classification K42, I18, D21, C25, C91     

Simultaneous Estimation of Legal and Illegal Supply and Demand: The Case of Motion Pictures

Prior research into illegal goods has typically looked at one-way effects, such as illegal demand on legal demand. This research investigates a previously unexamined component of the market, illegal supply. The authors examine the supply and demand of legal goods and their illegal counterparts as a market system of four interdependent components. This research makes theoretical and empirical contributions by evaluating illegal supply in this system. Simultaneous equations estimate each market component on the others using data from the motion picture industry. The results find illegal supply has no effect on legal supply (movie screens), positive effects on illegal demand (piracy downloads), and some effect on legal demand (box office revenues). Timing effects highlight this: illegal supply has a positive effect on legal demand during a film’s opening week, but no effect post-launch. The other market components have positive effects on illegal supply (except legal supply, which is negative in the opening week). Additionally, illegal demand has a negative effect on legal demand during the opening week of release, but not in the subsequent weeks. This finding alleviates prior research tension as to whether piracy helps or hurts legal sales, as omitting illegal supply could result in biased estimates.     

苏里格气田苏X区盒8段储层测井二次解释及应用

就苏里格气田苏X区盒8段储层测井二次解释进行了研究。在阐述测井资料预处理的基础上,对储气层孔隙度解释、渗透率解释、泥质含量解释、含气饱和度解释的模型与有效厚度下限的确定作了论述。     

直流电阻率法在寻找地下水中的综合应用

为避免单一勘探方法的多解性,提高勘探的准度与精度,在某区的物探找水实践中,综合运用高密度电阻率法,对称四极电测深法、电阻率测井三种方法进行勘探,查明目标井位附近区域的岩性,推断地层的含水性,并根据勘探结果划定钻井布设的合理位置。     

Crowdfrauding: Avoiding Ponzi entrepreneurs when investing in new ventures

Crowdfunding has gained substantial interest in the U.S., allowing entrepreneurs to raise startup capital in exchange for equity in their ventures. This approach to equity capital can open up new sources of venture finance to legitimate entrepreneurs, but little attention has been given to how it offers new opportunities for illegal entrepreneurs to defraud investors. We adopt a forensic approach to examine entrepreneurs who launch Ponzi ventures—businesses that continually bring in new investors in order to use their money to pay returns to earlier investors—to demonstrate the ease, creativity, and audacity with which these illegal entrepreneurs operate. The provided examples of Ponzi entrepreneurs show how easily they can circumvent the safeguards purported to protect investors: screening by ‘the crowd,’ transparency and documentation requirements, independent audit reports, and withholding of funds until the venture's financial goal has been met. In this article, we offer possible solutions to help protect investors, legitimate entrepreneurs, and business in general from the damage created by illegal entrepreneurs.     

论违法发放贷款罪的司法认定

刑法设立违法发放贷款罪的目的,在于避免人情贷款、以贷谋私等危及贷款安全的行为,保证银行信贷资产的完整。但由于立法上的疏漏,司法实践中对本罪构成要件存在严重的认识上的分歧,导致法律适用不统一,出罪、入罪均带有一定的随意性,不仅没有实现本罪的立法目的,还对商业银行的经营产生了一定的负面影响,因此,有必要对本罪的构成要件进行研究。     

浅谈行政垄断

行政垄断是凭借行政权力形成的垄断,其目的是获取高额利润。行政垄断严重损害了消费的合法权益,破坏公平竞争,妨碍社会资源的优化配置,是一国家经济和社会进步的最大障碍。