政府公共工程招投标腐败举报研究

政府公共工程招投标领域内,参与投标人为达到自身的某种目的常常采取行贿等非法手段。这种腐败违法行为不仅严重败坏了社会风气,且给政府公共工程建设带来极大破坏。消除这种行为,除了需要相应的监管部门付出很多努力外,与招投标违法举报人的举报积极性密切相关,举报人提供的线索在查处腐败案件中起关键的作用。充分发挥举报人的积极性,是查处腐败案件的重要突破口,也是做好工程建设预防寻租腐败等发生的重点和难点。该文从政府公共工程招投标腐败举报问题出发。从举报人是否属于当事人的角度进行分类,研究了它们的异同点,并对举报人与被举报人之间利益进行博弈分析,在此基础上提出了完善政府公共工程招投标腐败举报制度的途径。得出结论是,提高举报人积极性的努力方向有两条：其一是降低举报人的举报风险;此外就是增加举报人在举报活动中的预期收益。     

从博弈的角度看中小股东解决纠纷的过程--从一个流行模型的残缺谈起

经研究发现 ,张维迎教授在 2 0 0 1年第五版的《博弈论与信息经济学》中所借用的承诺要胁诉讼博弈例子中对诉讼费用的处理有点不妥 ,便作出了适当的调整 ,但却得出了令人沮丧的结论 :承诺要胁诉讼不成立 !继续研究发现只有打破这种败诉风险由当事人承担的机制 ,才能传递出有力量的信号 ,才能做到真正的威胁 ,那就是建立“生死与共”的竞争性的律师定价机制和保费率真正是胜诉率信号的诉讼费用保险机制与最经济的诉讼程序与非诉讼程序、保障其实现的机制和可供的备选机制。本文论证了其合理性     

Functions and failures: how to manage technological promises for societal challenges

Technological promises are becoming part of the way in which scientific and technological communities try to attract the attention of stakeholders, aiming at legitimation, reputation, and funding. Not all promises, however, become reality. With the increase in the use of promises comes the risk of disillusion and cynicism, which may affect negatively policy-makers and the public opinion. The paper suggests that the introduction in the field of S&T and innovation policy of a tool commonly used in engineering fields aimed at identifying and measuring all possible failures of a proposed technology. Instead of focusing on the magnitude of promises, it suggests that a useful perspective can be gained by placing systematic attention to the negative side, i.e. all reasons why a given technology may fail to deliver the promises. The paper develops the methodology, presents a case study, and illustrates the benefits of using it in policy-making.     

Refining the debate on GM crops using technological foresight—the Danish experience

Rapid developments in and the controversial nature of biotechnology call for communication, networks, partnerships, and collaboration in research, not just among researchers, but also between researchers and research “users” in industry, government, and elsewhere. Technological foresight appears to offer a coordinating method for developing and strengthening those linkages. To test this, a technological foresight study was performed on genetically modified (GM) crop technology in the Danish context. The background of the study was the conflict and intense debate in Denmark over applications of gene technology, especially over the deliberate release of genetically modified (GM) crops. However, the current debate characteristically involves sharply opposed fronts, lacking willingness and courage to engage in a free-flowing and open-minded debate on both rational and normative components of biosafety. In it, stakeholders and experts on both side of the conflict advocate widely differing opinions. Without a proper generally intelligible dialogue, the broader public audience finds it hard to comprehend this type of debate. The study pursues the notion that public dialogue can act as a driver of future applications in the technological domain, specifically GM crops. The study concluded with a stakeholder workshop that revealed three key issues that might provide helpful starting points for a more free-flowing and open-minded debate about the future of GM crops. The issues were those arising from the following statements: a broad perspective on risk is crucial; international regulation must make allowance for developing countries; a better configuration of the risk debate is needed. These issues are discussed in more details in the article.     

Games played in a contracting environment

We analyze normal form games where a player has to pay a price to a supplier in order to play a specific action. Our focus is on supplier competition, arising from the fact that distinct suppliers supply different players, and possibly different actions of the same player. With private contracts, where a player only observes the prices quoted by his own suppliers, the set of equilibrium distributions over player actions coincides with the set of equilibrium distributions when all actions are supplied competitively, at cost. With public contracts, the two distributions differ dramatically even in simple games.     

Existence of an equilibrium for infinite horizon economies with and without complete information

This work proves the existence of an equilibrium for an infinite horizon economy where trade takes place sequentially over time. There exist two types of agents: the first correctly anticipates all future contingent endogenous variables with complete information as in Radner [Radner, R. (1972). Existence of equilibrium of plans, prices and price expectations in a sequence of markets. Econometrica, 289–303] and the second has exogenous expectations about the future environment as in Grandmont [Grandmont, J. M. (1977). Temporary general equilibrium theory. Econometrica, 535–572] and information based on the current and past aggregate variables including those which are private knowledge. Agents with exogenous expectations may have inconsistent optimal plans but have predictive beliefs in the context of Blackwell and Dubbins [Blackwell, D., Dubins, L. (1962). Merging of opinions with increasing information. The Annals of Mathematical Statistics, 882–886] with probability transition rules based on all observed variables. We provide examples of this framework applied to models of differential information and environments exhibiting results of market selection and convergence of an equilibrium. The existence result can be used to conclude that, by adding the continuity assumption on the probability transition rules, we obtain the existence of an equilibrium for some models of differential information and incomplete markets.     

Voluntary Disclosure of Nonproprietary Information: A Complete Equilibrium Characterization

The so-called disclosure principle is a 'puzzle' in the accounting literature: Game theoretic models of financial markets show that in equilibrium firms should disclose all their private information. Yet, the result is not convincing. Researchers have therefore built sophisticated models in order to demonstrate for which reasons the disclosure principle might fail. This note shows that even in the original model there are multiple equilibria. In those equilibria good types disclose and bad types do not. The commonly known full disclosure equilibrium is a limit point of the equilibrium set.