Environmental Taxation and Vertical Cournot Oligopolies: How Eco-industries Matter

This article specifies what an optimal pollution tax should be when dealing with a vertical Cournot oligopoly. Polluting firms sell final goods to consumers and outsource their abatement activities to an environment industry. It is assumed that both markets are imperfectly competitive. Thus, the tax is a single instrument used to regulate three sorts of distortions, one negative externality and two restrictions in production. Consequently, the optimal tax rate is the result of a trade-off that depends on the firms’ market power along the vertical structure. A detailed analysis of Cournot-Nash equilibria in both markets is also performed. In this context, the efficiency of abatement activities plays a key-role. It gives a new understanding to the necessary conditions for the emergence of an eco-industrial sector.      

Static and dynamic efficiency of pollution control strategies

A great deal of the economic literature on pollution control strategies concentrates on the efficiency of environmental policy instruments. Most analytical studies in this field show that market instruments are more efficient with respect to the cost of pollution abatement of a given number of polluters than non-market instruments. According to several analytical studies, market instruments should also be more efficient with respect to innovation in pollution abatement equipment than non-market instruments. In the empirical literature a great number of case studies exist with estimations of the savings of abatement costs of market instruments in a situation without technological progress. Empirical studies about the impact of environmental policy market instruments on the abatement costs in situations with technological progress are lacking.The purpose of this paper is to fill this gap. The paper deals with an empirical estimation of abatement costs for the emission of SO₂ of coal-fired electricity units in the Netherlands from 1985 to 2000. First, the working of market instruments and non-market instruments (the existing environmental policy of the Dutch government) is simulated in a static situation. Second, we analyse the learning effects of flue gas desulphurization. The efficiency advantage of market instruments turns out to be larger in a situation of technological progress than in a static situation.     

论新闻侵权中的精神损害赔偿

新闻侵权是在新闻传播的过程中发生的侵权行为 ,其主体为新闻机构 ,侵害的对象为他人的合法利益。新闻侵权发生后 ,新闻机构应当承担民事责任 ,既包括非财产责任 ,又包括财产责任。如果受害人要求精神损害赔偿的 ,人民法院可根据侵权人的过错程度、侵权行为的具体情节等情况具体酌定。在某些情况下 ,新闻机构可根据宪法规定的言论、出版自由和批评建议权主张免除或减轻其民事责任。     

略论行政不作为违法的国家赔偿问题

实践中，行政不作为违法给公民、法人及其他组织的合法权益造成的损害程度不亚于行政作为违法，我国的《国家赔偿法》在此方面的规定存在不足。本文将从该法有关行政不作为违法的立法缺失入手，肯定国家对此应当承担赔偿责任，浅析此举的意义，最后分析了如何将《国家赔偿法》中行政不作为违法纳入国家赔偿机制。     

Health Damage of Air Pollution: An Estimate of a Dose–Response Relationship for the Netherlands

This paper estimates the dose-response relationship between air pollution and the number of work loss days for the Netherlands. The study is based on illness data (work loss days) for the Dutch labour population and average year concentrations of air pollution in 29 districts. The dose-response relationship has been estimated by means of two different techniques: the ordinary least squares method (OLS) and the one-way fixed-effects method (OWFEM), which we consider to be more adequate. In general health effects are much smaller when OWFEM is applied than if OLS is used. With OWFEM a significant relationship is found between sulphate aerosol (SO₄), ammonia (NH₃) and the number of work loss days (WLDs). Particulates (TSP), O₃ and SO₂ have no significant effect on the number of WLDs. These results differ from those obtained in studies in the United States, which indicate that particulates (TSP) and other small particles, ozone (O₃) and to a lesser extent SO₄ and SO₂ significantly influence the number of WLDs.     

Anticipated Environmental Policy and Transitional Dynamics in an Endogenous Growth Model

This paper makes a new attempt toinvestigate how an anticipatedenvironmental policy governs the transitionaldynamics of an economy when pollutionexternality is taken into account. Themodeling strategy we use is an AK technologyendogenous growth framework with an endogenousleisure-labor choice. It is found that, unlikeinelastic labor supply framework, a rise inpublic abatement expenditure will stimulate thebalanced economic growth rate. It is alsofound that public abatement technology plays animportant role in determining the transitionaladjustment of the economic growth rate inresponse to a pre-announced environmentalpolicy.     

Dynamic modelling of pollution abatement in a CGE framework

This paper deals with the specification of pollution abatement in dynamic computable general equilibrium (CGE) models and analyses the dynamic feedback mechanisms between economy and abatement in the context of environmental policy. A Ramsey-type economic model is presented, in which bottom-up technical and economic information on abatement techniques is integrated in a top-down dynamic CGE context. The practical suitability of the specification is illustrated by an empirical application for climate change and acidification in the Netherlands. The results show that a mixture of some slowdown of economic growth, a substantial restructuring of the economy and implementation of most technical abatement measures is optimal.     

Cost Uncertainty and Unilateral Abatement

Unilateral abatement is sometimes advocated in order to set a good example that will make other countries follow. The aim of this paper is to investigate whether existence of correlated cost uncertainty provides an incentive for a country to undertake unilateral abatement. The theoretical model is driven by two main mechanisms; first, a learning effect, as the follower country might reduce its risk premium as it can observe the cost level in the leader country. Second, there is the public good effect, i.e., the marginal benefit of abatement declines when abatement is a public good and other countries contribute to pollution reductions. Results shows that unilateral abatement would be efficient in reducing uncertainty about the unit costs of abatement if a country with low cost uncertainty would undertake abatement first, while a country with initially high cost uncertainty would follow. However, countries may prefer to act simultaneously because of the larger uncertainties that are inherent in a sequential game.      

International Trade and the Environment: Theoretical and Policy Linkages

I review and extend three approaches to trade and environmental policies: competitive general equilibrium, oligopoly and monopolistic competition. The first two have surprisingly similar implications: deviations from first-best rules are justified only by constraints on policy choice (which motivates what I call a “single dividend” approach to environmental policy), and taxes and emissions standards differ in ways which reflect the Le Chatelier principle. I also show how environmental taxes may lead to a catastrophic relocation of industry in the presence of agglomeration effects, although not necessarily if there is a continuum of industries which differ in pollution intensity. *An earlier version was presented as an invited plenary lecture to the European Association for Environmental and Resource Economics Conference, Oslo, 1999.     

Rethinking the costs related to global warming: A survey of the issues

One approach to the economic analysis of global warming seeks to balance the costs of damage from or adaptation to it with the costs of mitigating it. The costs of adaptation and damage have been estimated using techniques of environmental evaluation, but are subject to a wide margin of uncertainty. The costs of mitigation, principally by reducing the emissions of CO₂, have been estimated using different kinds of economic models, some of the results of which have suggested that very little abatement of carbon emissions is justified before the costs of abatement exceed the benefits of it in terms of foregone damage and adaptation costs. The paper analyses the extent to which this conclusion is a function of the modelling assumptions and techniques used, rather than likely practical outcomes, with regard to the models' treatment of unemployed resources, revenue recycling, prior distortions in the economy due to the tax system and possible dynamic effects from the introduction of a carbon-energy tax. It concludes that, with different and arguably more appropriate treatment of the above issues, especially when the secondary benefits of reducing CO₂ emissions are also taken into account, it is not clear that even substantial reductions in the use of fossil fuels will incur net costs, especially if there is the prospect of even moderate costs from global warming.