我国个人所得税后续改革中必须考虑的若干问题

我国工资薪金个人所得税扣除额宜实行分地区浮动制度,而扣除额的调整必须与扣除方式的改革相结合才具有实质意义。从目前的征管实践来看,加强个人所得税管理、有效控制税源是确保改革目标实现的关键。此外,单纯追求个人所得税的公平功能而忽视其效率的作用,对我国社会政治经济的发展将产生不利的影响,也不符合改革的目标。     

Reinsurance contract design with adverse selection

ABSTRACT

In light of the richness of their structures in connection with practical implementation, we follow the seminal works in economics to use the principal–agent (multidimensional screening) models to study a monopolistic reinsurance market with adverse selection; instead of adopting the classical expected utility paradigm, the novelty of our present work is to model the risk assessment of each insurer (agent) by his value-at-risk at his own chosen risk tolerance level consistent with Solvency II. Under information asymmetry, the reinsurer (principal) aims to maximize his average profit by designing an optimal policy provision (menu) of ‘shirt-fit’ reinsurance contracts for every insurer from one of the two groups with hidden characteristics. Our results show that a quota-share component, on the top of simple stop-loss, is very crucial for mitigating asymmetric information from the insurers to the reinsurer.     

Optimal Insurance Design Under a Value-at-Risk Framework

This study designs an optimal insurance policy form endogenously, assuming the objective of the insured is to maximize expected final wealth under the Value-at-Risk (VaR) constraint. The optimal insurance policy can be replicated using three options, including a long call option with a small strike price, a short call option with a large strike price, and a short cash-or-nothing call option. Additionally, this study also calculates the optimal insurance levels for these models when we restrict the indemnity to be one of three common forms: a deductible policy, an upper-limit policy, or a policy with proportional coinsurance. JEL Classification No: G22     

Which consumers are ready for consumer-directed health plans?

Consumer Directed Health Plans (CDHPs) are new and increasingly popular insurance products in the United States that aim to increase consumer involvement in health care decision-making. Using quantitative and qualitative methods, we examine characteristics of employees in a large firm that voluntarily enroll in CDHPs. We find salaried and hourly high deductible CDHP enrollees to be substantially healthier and have higher educational attainment than Preferred Provider Organizations (PPO) enrollees. There was less favorable selection into a more popular, lower deductible CDHP.     

效用决策、财政补贴及我国农业保险的最优保险模型研究

应用期望效用决策模型对我国农业保险的最优保险问题进行了研究,建立了实现农业保险博弈双方公平的均衡免赔率函数,以及政府通过财政进行保费补贴条件下的修正均衡免赔率函数。研究表明,提高农户和保险公司的风险识别能力、建立全国统一的政策性农业保险公司以及加大财政补贴的投入力度有助于提高农户的投保意愿,对促进我国农业保险的快速发展具有积极意义。     

一个森林保险模型及最优免赔额的确定

提出一种带有绝对免赔额和共保条款的森林保险模型。基于保险公司和投保林主均为风险厌恶型以及足额保险的假设,研究了共保条件下森林保险最优免赔额的确定问题。研究发现:1)对高低风险两种类型的投保林主来说,不同的免赔水平会对保险公司的行为产生不同影响;2)如果保险公司是风险中性的,最优保险合约下最优免赔额的确定完全由一阶条件决定。研究结果有助于设计出合理的保险合约。     

A Note on Deductible Insurance and Production

This paper examines the optimal production decision of a firm facing revenue risk. We show that the purchase of actuarially fair deductible insurance unambiguously induces the firm to produce more if the firm is not only risk averse but also prudent. If the firm's perferences satisfy constant absolute risk aversion, buying actuarially unfair deductible insurance unambiguously enhances production should the positive loading factor be sufficiently small. When there are moral hazard problems in that the firm's output cannot be contracted upon, we show that the purchase of actuarially fair deductible insurance unambiguously induces the firm to produce more if the firm's utility function is quadratic.     

保险实务中弹性免赔方式下的破产概率研究

文章基于弹性免赔方式的优点,在相关文献的基础上,研究了这一新的免赔方式的破产概率,并将其与初始免赔方式的破产概率进行对比,为实务中保险人的经营风险防范提供理论基础。     

Optimal insurance contract under VaR and CVaR constraints

This study endogenously develops an optimal insurance contractual form for maximizing insured expected utility under VaR and CVaR constraints. We find that CVaR constraint does not affect the contractual form, but may increase minimum insurance premium requirement. Additionally, when the VaR constraint is binding, the optimal contract is a double deductible insurance. However, if the contract is restricted to a regular form (both indemnity schedule and retained loss schedule are continuously nondecreasing) for avoiding moral hazard problem, the optimal contract is a piecewise linear deductible insurance. Finally, we provide intuitive comparison between this study result and relevant studies.     

OPTIMAL INSURANCE DESIGN UNDER RANK‐DEPENDENT EXPECTED UTILITY

We consider an optimal insurance design problem for an individual whose preferences are dictated by the rank‐dependent expected utility (RDEU) theory with a concave utility function and an inverse‐S shaped probability distortion function. This type of RDEU is known to describe human behavior better than the classical expected utility. By applying the technique of quantile formulation, we solve the problem explicitly. We show that the optimal contract not only insures large losses above a deductible but also insures small losses fully. This is consistent, for instance, with the demand for warranties. Finally, we compare our results, analytically and numerically, both to those in the expected utility framework and to cases in which the distortion function is convex or concave.