Pharmaceutical cost‐sharing systems and savings for healthcare systems from parallel trade

This paper studies the consequences of parallel trade in a two‐country model. It compares a coinsurance scheme (consumers pay a percentage of the drug price) and an indemnity insurance scheme (reimbursement is independent of the drug price) with respect to changes in copayments and public health expenditure. In the destination country, copayments for patients decrease to a larger extent under indemnity insurance, whereas reductions in public health expenditure occur only under coinsurance. In the source country, copayments increase less under coinsurance, whereas health expenditure is reduced more under indemnity insurance. In both countries, total expenditure under parallel trade is lower.     

Unemployment insurance benefits and income smoothing

Labor unemployment insurance reduces unemployment concerns. We argue that these benefits moderate incentives to smooth earnings to reduce employees’ concerns about unemployment risk. Using exogenous variations in unemployment insurance benefits, we find evidence consistent with this argument. We also find that the link between unemployment insurance benefits and income smoothing is stronger when there is higher unemployment risk and when the firm is likely to employ more low-wage workers, who find unemployment insurance benefits especially useful. Our paper contributes to the literature by showing that public policy decisions such as unemployment insurance have significant, albeit probably unintended, externalities on corporate financial reporting.     

Audit Firm Attributes and Auditor Litigation Risk

This study examines the association between auditors' litigation risk and audit firm attributes. Using professional liability insurance premiums as a proxy for auditors' litigation risk, we present evidence that the risk is lower in audit firms having: (1) separate non-audit and audit divisions; (2) a higher proportion of partners; and (3) a higher annual growth in number of CPAs employed. Additionally, we find that the risk is higher in audit firms having: (1) operating losses; and (2) high revenue growth. Our results are consistent with the idea that audit firms' financial condition and organizational structure affect their independence/ expertise, and, in turn, their litigation risk. Our results are broadly supportive of the PCAOB's (2015) and US Department of Treasury's (2008) views that investors, audit committees, management, and other regulators could benefit from having access to financial and organizational information about audit firms.     

我国救济性投资的现状、问题及对策

我国救济性投资的救济力度远远低于救济需求,在社会救济意识、救济管理、资金来源、投资形式等方面存在不足,投资增长缓慢,且存在城乡失衡和地区失衡.应创新公民的社会保障观念和思维模式,建立健全救济性投资的管理机制,着力解决救济性投资的不平衡问题,并且投资形式要向着多元化、多层次的方向发展.     

我国保险条款可读性分析及其通俗化研究

我国保险条款晦涩难懂的问题已经在很大程度上制约了我国保险业的健康发展,本文详细剖析了我国保险条款在文字、内容、形式等方面存在的问题,并从我国实际情况出发,指出了当前我国进行保险条款通俗化的迫切性,提出了我国保险条款通俗化的思路构想.     

对陕西省农村社会养老保险供求主体的分析与政府作用研究

陕西是西部的农业大省,农村社会养老保险制度发展缓慢,农村养老保险市场需要寻找供需双方的均衡点,政府作为制度的提供者和政策的制定者,必须在农村社会养老保险制度建立和运营中明确思路,发挥主导作用,以保证陕西省农村养老保险健康、有序地发展。     

客户信用评级体系的校准度检验研究

利用多种统计量对客户信用评级体系进行校准度检验,以对其准确性做出定量评估。同时,使用这些统计量对由两种不同方法构造的信用评级进行了实证对比检验,结果表明,校准度检验能够对客户信用评级的准确性做出有效评估。     

Choice of Distribution System in the New Zealand Life Insurance Industry

Using 1988–93 panel data drawn from the New Zealand life insurance industry, this paper examines empirically the notion that the choice of distribution system is an efficient contracting solution to incentive conflicts between owners, managers and sales agents in life insurance firms. Consistent with what was hypothesised, the empirical results suggest that choice of distribution system is distinguished by organisational form, firm size, and sales commission. However, contrary to expectations, the variables representing product diversity and asset specificity were found not to be statistically significant. The empirical results thus lend mixed support for prior predictions.     

The economics of land transfer and title insurance

In the presence of uncertainty over the title of land (due to fraud or error), a legal system can protect either the current (innocent) owner, or a previous owner who claims title. The predominant system in the United States generally awards title to the latter in the event of legitimate claim. Thus, current owners frequently purchase title insurance to provide indemnification in the event of a loss. In contrast, the Torrens system awards title to the current owner, but provides for indemnification of any legitimate claimants. We evaluate these two systems and argue that if transaction costs are low, both promote efficient assignment of title (according to the Coase Theorem), but if transaction costs are high, the Torrens system is more likely to award title to the party that values it the most (namely, the current possessor).