Discussion on the Benefits Distributing Structure in Village Land Deal

According to everyone average welfare value of land resources; this paper constitutes the base line of glebe usufruct deal value by analyzing the factors, which are affecting glebe usufruct deal value. Having adopted share＇s quotient of ownership and contracting power, the paper erects assigning mechanism to the income of glebe deal. Because of the share dynarnicity being adopted which shows the flexible strong points, the shares of ownership and contracting power avoid many unnecessary otiose disputes on income of glebe deal, adding the stability to the glebe usufruct deal. It is beneficial to the freedom flow and validity manufacture factor installment and also to the nonagricultural changing course.     

征地现状调查

２００３年７月以后，中央政府三令五申，不准滥征耕地，大肆圈地的势头得到遏制。但违规征地没有止息，耕地仍在减少，形势不容乐观，仍须从严控制。     

重庆市城市土地经济效益评价

从产出和投入两方面构建城市土地经济效益评价的指标体系,采用层次分析法对重庆城市土地的经济效益进行评价,可知:重庆城市土地的经济效益总体水平较低、波动较大,重庆城市近年来投入偏高影响了土地经济效益,而且重庆城市土地利用的集约化水平不高.     

Land Reform: Taking a Long(er) View

The paper proposes a broad argument that the end of state–led development from the 1970s coincided with (i) the final wave of major redistributive land reform, and its place within transitions to capitalism, that lasted from about 1910 to the 1970s, and (ii) the beginnings of contemporary 'globalization'. Self–styled 'new wave' agrarian reform in the age of neo–liberalism, centred on property rights, is unlikely to deliver much on its claims to both stimulate agricultural productivity and reduce rural poverty. The reasons are grounded in the basic relations and dynamics of capitalism, and how these are intensified and reshaped by and through globalization. Understanding these processes, with all their inevitable unevenness, requires (i) recognizing that the historical conditions of the 'classic' agrarian question no longer apply, and (ii) developing the means to investigate and understand better the changing realities facing different agrarian classes within a general tendency to the concentration of capital and fragmentation of labour, including how the latter may generate new agrarian questions of labour.     

Are We Better Off if Our Politicians Have More Information?

The model of public policy studied in this paper has heterogeneous citizens/voters and two public goods: one (roads) chosen directly by an elected policy‐maker, and the other (pollution) stochastically dependent on the amount of roads. Both a one‐country and a two‐country version of the model are analyzed; the latter displays externalities across the countries which create incentives for free riding and strategic delegation. The welfare effects of providing the policy‐maker with information about the relationship between roads and pollution are investigated, and it is shown that more information hurts some—sometimes even all—citizens. In particular, the opportunity not to create an institution for information gathering can serve as a commitment device for a country, although with the unfortunate effect of making the overall outcome even worse. Implications for the welfare effects of “informational lobbying” are also discussed.     

Monopoly, competition and information acquisition

An incumbent monopolist is uncertain about its linear demand, but can acquire public information at a cost. We determine how an entry threat affects the firm's information acquisition. If returns to scale are constant and the state-contingent demands become more dispersed as output increases, then entry reduces information acquisition. If, however, either the incumbent or entrant has increasing returns; or if the state-contingent demands are nonlinear or fail increasing dispersion, then entry can increase information. Finally, entry can hurt consumers. Although entry always increases output, it can decrease information. Consumers sometimes prefer a better informed monopoly to a duopoly.     

Property Rights Reform in Rangeland China: Dilemmas On the Road to the Household Ranch

This paper contributes to the debate over land tenure in rural China by extending its spatial coverage to the country’s extensive rangeland regions. Key characteristics of pastoral tenure, identified from field appraisals in western China, include group tenure and fuzzy boundaries. Although these characteristics give rise to efficiency concerns, from a new institutional economics perspective they also facilitate the realization of certain benefits, benefits that could represent opportunity costs of further exclusiveness. The strengthening of rangeland co-management may constitute a more appropriate path to institutional improvement than the establishment of the household ranch, the current goal of national rangeland policy.     

城乡结合部用地矛盾成因分析--以北京市为例

特殊的土地利用和管理特点使得城乡结合部用地矛盾尤为凸现.人口、城市发展、集体经济发展是造成土地供求紧张的直接原因,但是管理制度的不健全则是导致和加剧矛盾激化的深层次原因.在对北京市城乡结合部土地利用与房地产市场调查的基础上,对北京市城乡结合部的用地矛盾进行分析,并从深层次揭示问题的根源和变化规律.     

强化处置闲置地

闲置地是当前土地资源利用和管理中值得关注的重要问题。闲置地弊端甚多，严重地威胁了子孙后代的生存和社会经济的可持续发展。闲置地本质上是二元土地制度的产物，也是投机因素作祟的结果。强化闲置地的处置须从改革土地制度、规范地方政府行为、无偿收回闲置地、健全政策法规等多方面努力。