Why principals tolerate biases of inaccurate agents

Some agents are more accurate than others in estimating the best policy. The more accurately an agent estimates a policy's effects, the more he will resist biases, such as bribes from a special interest. Thus, a special interest needs to pay a larger bribe to an accurate agent than to an inaccurate agent. The accurate agent who is biased will then more likely cause harm than does an inaccurate agent who favors the special interest. Therefore, the principal may gain more from controlling biases of an accurate agent than of an inaccurate one. Thus, high ability of public officials may be associated with little corruption.     

Periodic strategies in optimal execution with multiplicative price impact

We study the optimal execution problem with multiplicative price impact in algorithmic trading, when an agent holds an initial position of shares of a financial asset. The interselling decision times are modeled by the arrival times of a Poisson process. The criterion to be optimized consists in maximizing the expected net present value of the gains of the agent, and it is proved that an optimal strategy has a barrier form, depending only on the number of shares left and the level of the asset price.     

Discussion on the Benefits Distributing Structure in Village Land Deal

According to everyone average welfare value of land resources; this paper constitutes the base line of glebe usufruct deal value by analyzing the factors, which are affecting glebe usufruct deal value. Having adopted share＇s quotient of ownership and contracting power, the paper erects assigning mechanism to the income of glebe deal. Because of the share dynarnicity being adopted which shows the flexible strong points, the shares of ownership and contracting power avoid many unnecessary otiose disputes on income of glebe deal, adding the stability to the glebe usufruct deal. It is beneficial to the freedom flow and validity manufacture factor installment and also to the nonagricultural changing course.     

征地现状调查

２００３年７月以后，中央政府三令五申，不准滥征耕地，大肆圈地的势头得到遏制。但违规征地没有止息，耕地仍在减少，形势不容乐观，仍须从严控制。     

重庆市城市土地经济效益评价

从产出和投入两方面构建城市土地经济效益评价的指标体系,采用层次分析法对重庆城市土地的经济效益进行评价,可知:重庆城市土地的经济效益总体水平较低、波动较大,重庆城市近年来投入偏高影响了土地经济效益,而且重庆城市土地利用的集约化水平不高.     

试析中小型民营家族制企业财务管理问题及对策

近几年来,民营经济在我国经济中的地位越来越突出。该文在分析家族制管理模式的利弊及其对企业财务管理影响的基础上,对中小型民营家族制企业财务管理存在的问题及改善对策进行了探讨。     

深化乡镇综合改革难点研究

乡镇机构人员膨胀是当前农民负担过重的主要原因之一。而20多年来乡镇机构减而复胀且日益严重,成为改革的难点。乡镇职能错位、各类机构关系不顺、社会改革不配套,还有行政机构中客观存在的“帕金森定律”,是乡镇机构改革难点形成的深层原因。深化乡镇综合改革的远期目标是实现乡镇自治,而近期目标则是以转变职能为核心,调整政府管理体制;实现乡镇机构的功能整合;同时可以实行政府职能“外包”;还要加强机构编制的法治管理。     

A conceptual framework of anonymity in Group Support Systems

As the development and use of automated systems for collaborative work grows, the need for a better understanding of these systems becomes more important. Our focus is on one type of system, a Group Support System (GSS) and, in particular, on one important aspect of a GSS—anonymity. A conceptual framework for the study of anonymity in a GSS is presented, which describes the general classes of variables and their relationships. These variables include the factors that influence anonymity in a GSS, types of anonymity, and the effects of anonymity on a message sender, receiver, group process, and outcome. Each of these variables is discussed with working propositions presented for important group process and outcome measures. The objectives of this article are to highlight the importance and complexity of anonymity, to act as a guide for empirical investigations of anonymity, and to influence future GSS development and use.     

对可行性研究报告及经济评价的几点认识

指出在建设项目前期工作中存在的问题，建设项目前期工作滞后，前期方案深度不够，需对可行性研究报告及项目经济评价的方法与参数进一步完善，重视风险问题及清偿能力分析，提高技术经济人员的综合分析能力，实现投资决策科学化，提高经济效益。