企业激励机制模型设计中的几个问题

企业激励机制系统的设计必须以产权清晰、资本市场的发展为前提，系统模型的设计者应该是具有专业知识的专门机构，在指标设计中必须处理好数量测度与非数量测度、短期指标与长期指标、静态指标与动态指标之间的关系.     

票据无权代理追认制度微探

票据行为是一种法律行为，自然也可以以代理方式为之。民法上有关代理制度的规则一般也都可以适用于票据代理行为。但由于民法与商事法的立法旨趣各有侧重，为促进票据流通、保障交易安全，票据代理不能照搬民法上关于代理制度的规定。票据的无权代理是票据代理中一个非常典型的问题，与民法上的无权代理区别很大，其中存在的问题很多。对于票据的无权代理中是否应当赋予本人以追认权，多数大陆法系国家的立法例与英美法系国家之立法例有所不同。     

国家行为与产权：一个新制度经济学的分析框架

早期的产权理论侧重于微观层次的分析，较少考虑中观（利益集团）及宏观层次（国家）对产权结构形成的影响及不同层次产权的交互作用的机制。文章从新制度经济学关于国家的定义入手，通过对个体权力与国家、集体行动与国家以及法治化社会与国家的三个层次的分析，提出建立产权制度分析的国家模型，从而论证国家与产权制度变迁的关系。     

Managerial Ownership, Information Content of Earnings, and Discretionary Accruals in a Non–US Setting

This study employs Danish data to examine the empirical relationship between the proportion of managerial ownership and two characteristics of accounting earnings: the information content of earnings and the magnitude of discretionary accruals. In previous research concerning American firms, Warfield et al. (1995) document a positive relationship between managerial ownership and the information content of earnings, and a negative relationship between managerial ownership and discretionary accruals. We question the generality of the Warfield et al. result, as the ownership structure found in most other countries, including Denmark, deviates from the US ownership configuration. In fact, Danish data indicate that the information content of earnings is inversely related to managerial ownership.     

Value of Multinationality: Internalization, Managerial Self-interest, and Managerial Compensation

In this paper, we examine the impact of managerial self-interest on the value of multinationality. Since agency theory also suggests that a divergence between the interests of managers and shareholders can be aligned by effective managerial incentive, we also examine the effect of managerial compensation on the value of multinationality. Our results show that for high- Q (Tobin's Q > 1 ) firms, investors do not associate the spending of free cash flow on multinationality with the problem of overinvestments. For high- Q firms, it is also found that the value of multinationality can be enhanced by effective managerial incentives. For low- Q firms (Tobin's Q < 1 ), it is found that the concern of managerial self-interest overwhelms the benefits of internalization, making multinationality a value-decreasing event. For low- Q firms, managerial compensation is also ineffective in promoting value-enhancing foreign direct investments.     

调配产权收益完善资产负债结构

国资监督机构在深化国资国企过程中应集中调配产权权益,完善资产负债结构,优化资源配置,通过资本运营和良好的市场环境,充分发挥中央和地方政府的职能,在互为尊重的前提下,杜绝侵权行为的发生。     

论商标反向假冒行为及其法律规制

商标反向假冒行为妨碍了他人对自己商标的正常使用，扰乱了正常的市场秩序，欺骗了广大消费者和公众。很多国家的立法都明文对其进行规制，我国现行法律亦从不同角度对其进行规制。当前，对严重的商标反向假冒行为，应予以刑法调整。     

中国加入世贸组织后外贸管理体系变化研究

中国自改革开放至加入WTO,外贸法规、政策发生了很大变化,与过去相比,正向更加标准、更加透明方向迈进,逐渐接近国际标准.但目前中国外贸法体系及与之相关的实施细则有待于修正和完善,进一步适应WTO规范.     

Managerial Equity Ownership and the Demand for Outside Directors

This paper examines the linkage between the use of outside directors and managerial ownership. We conjecture there are two linkages: the standard incentive‐alignment demand for monitoring when managers own little stock and an entrenchment‐amelioration demand when managerial stock ownership is high. As a consequence, we predict the association between managerial ownership and board composition will be nonlinear (U‐shaped if the entrenchment effect is sufficiently pronounced). Using UK data, we find that both quadratic and logarithmic models outperform the simple linear relationship assumed in prior research and that the substitution between managerial ownership and board composition is stronger than hitherto supposed.     

知识产权与网络经济

产权是一个社会的基本经济规则，它从根本上决定经济的组织和效率。知识产权是现代经济增长的基本因素，与企业制度的安排从而与市场效率有关。对现代经济来讲，知识产权最重要的实现形式是企业制度的安排，同时企业制度也是重要的保护知识产权的方式，法律上的保护更多的是事后救济。