Does oligopsony power matter in price support policy design? Empirical evidence from the Thai Jasmine rice market

In the oligopsony market, farmers may receive low prices and policy analysis assuming perfect competition can yield serious bias results. In this paper, we estimate oligopsony power between processors and farmers and evaluate the welfare impact of the paddy pledging program (PPP), a generous price support program in the Thai Jasmine rice market, with an imperfect competition model. We develop a model that consists of rice supply equation and derived demand equation. We then simultaneously estimate these equations using system estimation methods to recover oligopsony power parameters. Finally, we use these parameters to assess the welfare impact of the price support program. Using annual panel data running from crop marketing year 2001/2002–2015/2016 and exploiting the institutional feature of the PPP, we find strong evidence of some oligopsony power, a moderate level of oligopsony price distortion, and a negative relationship between price support and oligopsony power. We also find that the PPP is inefficient but effective in income redistribution. Moreover, the program benefits both farmers and consumers. With better policymaking decisions, the PPP can be efficient by setting a suitable support price. Therefore, our results show that in the case of the Thai Jasmine rice market, the generally accepted “wisdom” about agricultural price support policy does not necessarily hold, and price support can be designed to improve the efficiency of the market.     

Corruption in agricultural processing firms: A comparison of cooperatives and investor-owned firms

This paper examines managerial corruption in cooperatives (co-ops) and investor-owned firms (IOFs), including its impact on prices and farmer welfare. Even when co-op managers have greater incentives to engage in corruption because of the co-op's larger production, the resulting corruption is not sufficient to offset the competitive effect that co-ops exert vis-à-vis IOFs. This conclusion holds regardless of the functional form of the production function, the farm input supply curve, and the demand curve for the processed product. In addition to showing the robustness of the competition effect, the paper provides a highly flexible modeling framework that can be used to examine other co-op behavior questions.     

Institutional Market Power in Comté: Insights from a ‘Double Marginalisation’ Model

This article explores the economic efficiency of a horizontally and vertically coordinated industry where upstream producers are atomised, but downstream processors are few, explicitly considering participation incentives and allowing the coordinated industry to exert market power towards buyers. The model offers insight into the probable social impacts of the government‐sanctioned supply control scheme in place in the French Comté cheese market, suggesting it falls short of constituting a Pareto‐improvement compared with a laissez‐faire situation. More generally, our theoretical model provides guidance to identify instances where encouraging industry coordination may be socially desirable. We formally introduce the concept of ‘seller‐equivalent degree of overall market power’ of the separated industry, a market characteristic comprised of measurable or inferable parameters, the value of which is shown to determine the potential for Pareto improvements through industry integration.     

Nonparametric Estimation of Oligopsony Power in First‐Price Auction

This paper proposes a nonparametric procedure to estimate market power for first‐price auction data and applies the procedure to cattle procurement markets. Most previous studies have used parametric methods, which require specific functional forms for retail demand, input supply and processors’ cost equations. However, researchers often find that market power estimates from parametric methods are sensitive to the choice of functional forms and specifications. An application to data from cattle procurement experiments shows that our nonparametric approach greatly outperforms commonly used parametric methods in estimating the degree of market power. While parametric estimates are sensitive to functional form specification and are at least 90% smaller than ‘true’ market power indices, estimates from our nonparametric procedure deviate from the actual value by no more than 25%.     

Market and Cost Structure in the U.S. Beef Packing Industry: A Plant-Level Analysis

A resurgence of consolidation in the U.S. meat packing industry in the past few decades has stimulated academic and policy debate. Issues raised include the role of cost economies in driving these patterns, and the effects on the agricultural sector (cattle producers) from market power. Here, plant level cost and revenue data for U.S. beef packing plants are used to estimate a cost-based model incorporating cattle- and output-market pricing behavior. The robust results indicate little market power exploitation in either the cattle input or beef output markets, and that any apparent evidence is counteracted by cost efficiencies such as utilization and scope economies.     

Optimal Commodity Promotion when Downstream Markets are Imperfectly Competitive

We investigate the optimal collection and expenditure of funds for agricultural commodity promotion in markets where the processing and distribution sectors may exhibit oligopoly and/or oligopsony power. The conditions that characterize optimal advertising intensity under perfect competition for funds generated from either per-unit or lump-sum taxes do not, in general, hold when marketing is imperfectly competitive. Simulation analyses show that imperfect competition always reduces farmers' optimal advertising expenditure and that an imperfectly competitive marketing sector may capture half or more of the benefits from the funds that are expended.     

Market power,uncertainty, and the level of trade

We consider a set of home firms, each of which has a stochastic requirement for a particular input. High-cost home firms can produce the input themselves. Low-cost foreign firms produce the input to sell it to home firms through an international market. Efficiency requires the input to be produced by foreign firms and traded in the market. Yet, home firms will always engage in inefficient home production. By producing some of its own input needs, a home firm cuts down on aggregate input demand, thus depressing prices in the market.     

Price Behavior in a Dynamic Oligopsony: Washington Processing Potatoes

Punishment strategies are necessary to sustain a collusive oligopsony in a repeated game context when demand is uncertain and only market variables are observable. This paper proposes a test for tacit collusion among potato processors in Washington state using a dynamic regime-switching model estimated with a finite mixture method. The results support the existence of punishment and collusive regimes and show the welfare losses due to anti-competitive behavior on the part of processors to be significant. Processors' oligopsony power is enhanced by higher domestic production, imports, and existing stocks, but it is ameliorated by high capacity utilization rates and exports.     

Slotting Allowances as a Facilitating Practice by Food Processors in Wholesale Grocery Markets: Profitability and Welfare Effects

Slotting allowances, which are lump-sum transfers paid by food manufacturers to grocery retailers in return for various retail concessions, are becoming increasingly common in wholesale grocery markets. This article extends the literature on slotting allowances by considering two features that previously have been ignored: the role of food processors in determining these pricing arrangements, and the effect of slotting allowances on the size and distribution of economic surplus. Slotting allowances motivated by food processors increase procurement quantities and farm prices, and this raises farm surplus, increases total producer surplus, and improves consumer welfare in the food system.     

Modelling upstream and downstream market power in bilateral oligopoly

This article develops a general model that estimates market power exertion in a bilateral market relationship for processors and retailers where each may also have market power in their primary input market and output markets, respectively. Monte Carlo experiments are used to generate industry data for market structures such as perfect competition, monopoly, monopsony, bilateral imperfect competition with an integrated processor/retailer, bilateral imperfect competition with separate processor and retailer, and bilateral imperfect competition with four adjacent upstream and downstream markets. Then, new empirical industrial organization models are estimated using the data with models that match the market structure under which the data were generated (true) and with models that reflect alternative market structures (alternative). The general model is derived using the production function approach without imposing the fixed proportion assumption. Monte Carlo simulation results indicate that the general model is preferred to alternative models that presume competitive behaviour by processors in primary input procurement and by retailers in the output market. Results indicate that less flexible models lead to biased market power estimates in the presence of market power in the corresponding input and output markets.