Strategic Behavior and Consolidation in the Agricultural Biotechnology Industry

We develop a model explaining the consolidation patterns in the agricultural biotechnology industry. Among different consolidation and cooperation mechanisms, we consider collaborative and licensing agreements, joint ventures, acquisitions, and exchanges of ownership and spin-offs. The key results derive from the benefits of coordinated actions, distinction between transferable and nontransferable payoffs, the substitutability, complementarity, and the importance of the managers' noncontractible investments, and access and expansion of markets. Results from the model are used to examine the cooperation and consolidation activities for four major players in the agricultural biotechnology industry, DuPont , Dow Chemical , Monsanto , and Novartis .     

Modeling Conditional Yield Densities

Given the increasing interest in agricultural risk, many have sought improved methods to characterize conditional crop-yield densities. While most have postulated the Beta as a flexible alternative to the Normal, others have chosen nonparametric methods. Unfortunately, yield data tends not to be sufficiently abundant to invalidate many reasonable parametric models. This is problematic because conclusions from economic analyses, which require estimated conditional yield densities, tend not to be invariant to the modeling assumption. We propose a semiparametric estimator that, because of its theoretical properties and our simulation results, enables one to empirically proceed with a higher degree of confidence.     

Incentives for voluntary disclosure

Rule l0b-5 of the 1934 Securities and Exchange Act allows investors to sue firms for misrepresentation or omission. Since firms are principal–agent contracts between owners – contract designers – and privately informed managers, owners are the ultimate firms’ voluntary disclosure strategists. We analyze voluntary disclosure equilibrium in a game with two types of owners: expected liquidating dividends motivated (VMO) and expected price motivated (PMO). We find that Rule l0b-5: (i) does not deter misrepresentation and may suppress voluntary disclosure or, (ii) induces some firms to adopt a partial disclosure policy of disclosing only bad news or only good news.     

Reconfiguring the innovation policy portfolios for Taiwan's SIP Mall industry

Since the year 2000, silicon intellectual property (SIP), which can minimize the gap in ‘design productivity’ that exists with systems-on-chip (SOC), has become one of the most important factors in the development of integrated circuit (IC) products in the SOC era. Although SIP is very important for IC industry development, complicated business, technical as well as legal issues inside SIP transactions have hindered successful transactions and the integration of SIPs into SOCs. Thus, web-based SIP e-Commerce mechanisms, called SIP Malls, have emerged, aiming to resolve complex SIP issues. To maintain its leading position and competitiveness in the World's IC industry, as well as the value added by SOC products in Taiwanese IC firms, the Taiwanese government has developed SIP Malls, using innovation policy tools. However, the Taiwanese SIP Mall industry remains immature. No existing Taiwanese SIP Malls generate a profit or account for a significant share of worldwide SIP transactions. This research will develop an analytical framework for defining an innovation policy portfolio that aims to develop Taiwan's SIP Mall industry, so that it will enhance the value added of SIP Malls and, thus, the nation's competitiveness in the SIP and IC industries, something which already has become one of the Taiwanese government's major concerns. The industry innovation requirements (IIRs) are summarized using the Delphi method. Meanwhile, the major IIRs identified by Decision Making Trial and Evaluation Laboratory (DEMATEL) are introduced. After the IIRs are derived, the relationships between the IIRs and innovation policy tools are derived by Grey relational analysis (GRA). Then, the innovation policy tools are clustered, based upon the Grey grades derived by GRA. Finally, reconfigured innovation policy portfolios are presented for the Taiwanese government's policy definition. The results demonstrate that developing an innovative policy portfolio that includes scientific, technical, educational, public enterprise, information, legal and regulatory, financial, and taxation policy tools will be the most necessary step towards developing Taiwan's SIP Mall industry.     

电子商务合同成立与认定刍议

随着我国电子商务的加快发展，在理论与实践中，产生了一系列的问题，需要深入研究。电子商务合同与传统的合同制度有不同的特点，尤其是电子商务合同的成立与认定问题。     

Does subsidised temporary employment get the unemployed back to work? Aneconometric analysis of two different schemes

Subsidised employment is an important tool of active labour market policies to improve the reemployment chances of the unemployed. Using unusually informative individual data from administrative records, we investigate the effects of two different schemes of subsidised temporary employment implemented in Switzerland: non-profit employment programmes (EP) and a subsidy for temporary jobs (TEMP) in private and public firms. Econometric matching methods show that TEMP is more successful than EP in getting the unemployed back to work. Compared to not participating in any programme, EP and TEMP are ineffective for unemployed who find jobs easily anyway or have a short unemployment spell. For potential and actual long-term unemployed, both programmes may have positive effects, but the effect of TEMP is larger.     

会计诚信契约的理论框架与实现机制研究

会计诚信是一项非正式制度安排，一种隐含契约，也是企业契约主体之间的信任关系表现。按信任的来源分类，会计诚信可以分为基于制度的会计诚信、基于契约的会计诚信与基于信誉的会计诚信三种。提高会计信息质量必须从制度、契约和信誉三方面加强会计诚信契约的履约机制建设。     

现代契约经济学的企业边界决定理论:比较和评述

包括Klein的自我履约机制,Grossman, Hart and Moore的资产配置理论和Rajan ＆ Zingales的＂进入权＂理论在内的现代契约理论在不完全契约的框架下,通过引入可占用准租、资产剩余控制权和进入权等重要概念,较好地解释了企业边界决定问题,但却没有得出最大化准租的企业边界是最佳的企业边界这一应有的结论.最大化准租是交易双方多重复合交易的成果,在这一最终目的指引下,契约安排的不同形式及其所决定的企业边界的多样性,为现实中的企业调整边界和实施战略管理提供了理论依据.     

Double Moral Hazard,Monitoring, and the Nature of Contracts

generalized double-sided moral-hazard model, with risk-averse parties who mutually monitor each other (to get a reasonable idea of outcome/effort). The model considers trade-off between monitoring costs and moral hazard costs, which are endogenously determined by the extent of monitoring. Using this model, we formally prove a generalized version of Coase's conjecture – that the optimal contract minimizes the agency and risk costs. We then show how varying assumptions about the feasibility or cost of monitoring of the outcome or the worker's effort lead to different contracts being optimal. The analysis is then used to explain the nature of contracts observed in practice under many different situations. We will give an explanation as to why industrial workers typically work under wage contracts, while share contracts are common in agriculture and will explain why profit sharing is more common for senior managers than for the production workers. Received September 19, 2000; revised version received October 30, 1997     

Welfare reducing licensing

In this paper, we characterize situations where licensing a cost reducing innovation to a rival firm using two-part tariff contracts (a fixed fee plus a linear per unit of output royalty) reduces social welfare. We show that it occurs if (i) the firms compete in prices, (ii) the innovation is large enough but not drastic, and (iii) the goods are close enough substitutes. Moreover, we show that, regardless of the type of competition, first, the optimal contract always includes a positive royalty and, second, even drastic innovations are licensed whenever the goods are not homogeneous.