The importance of consumer multihoming (joint purchases) for market performance: Mergers and entry in media markets

Consumer “multihoming” (watching two TV channels, or buying two news magazines) has surprisingly important effects on market equilibrium and performance in (two‐sided) media markets. We show this by introducing consumer multihoming and advertising finance into the classic circle model of product differentiation. When consumers multihome (attend more than one platform), media platforms can charge only incremental value prices to advertisers. Entry or merger leaves consumer prices unchanged under consumer multihoming, but leaves advertiser prices unchanged under single‐homing: Multihoming flips the side of the market on which platforms compete. In contrast to standard circle results, equilibrium product variety can be insufficient under multihoming.     

Forecasting the UK economy with a medium-scale Bayesian VAR

We estimate a Bayesian VAR (BVAR) for the UK economy and assess its performance in forecasting GDP growth and CPI inflation in real time relative to forecasts from COMPASS, the Bank of England’s DSGE model, and other benchmarks. We find that the BVAR outperformed COMPASS when forecasting both GDP and its expenditure components. In contrast, their performances when forecasting CPI were similar. We also find that the BVAR density forecasts outperformed those of COMPASS, despite under-predicting inflation at most forecast horizons. Both models over-predicted GDP growth at all forecast horizons, but the issue was less pronounced in the BVAR. The BVAR’s point and density forecast performances are also comparable to those of a Bank of England in-house statistical suite for both GDP and CPI inflation, as well as to the official Inflation Report projections. Our results are broadly consistent with the findings of similar studies for other advanced economies.     

Economic Impacts of the Possible China–US Trade War

This article uses a multi-country global general equilibrium (GE) model to numerically simulate the effects of possible China–US trade wars. We introduce an endogenous trade imbalance structure with trade cost into the model which helps to explore both tariff and non-tariff trade war effects. Our simulation results show that China will be significantly hurt by the China–US trade war, but negative impacts are affordable. The US can gain under unilateral sanction measures to China, but will lose if China takes retaliation measures. Comparing the effects under mutual trade war, China will lose more than the US. Introducing non-tariff barrier trade wars will intensify the negative effects, and comparatively negative effects to China are larger than to the US. Mexico’s involvement in trade war with the US will strengthen the negative effects and comparatively hurt the US more. Under non-cooperative and cooperative Nash bargaining equilibrium, the US can gain more than China in trade war negotiation, which means the US has stronger bargaining power than China. Additionally, trade wars between China and the US will hurt most countries and the world especially in GDP and manufacturing employment, but benefit their welfare and trade.     

Do Fundamentals Explain the Behaviour of the Swedish Real Effective Exchange Rate?

This study examines the long‐run relationship between the real effective exchange rate and its fundamental determinants, and derives a real effective equilibrium exchange rate for the Swedish krona. Our results indicate that the krona was severely overvalued in late 1992, when the fixed exchange rate regime was abandoned. By the end of 2000 the krona was undervalued by approximately 5 percent, given the prevailing economic conditions. Arithmetic examples of suitable SEK/EUR conversion rates are calculated under various assumptions to provide a guideline if Sweden were to adopt the euro in the future.     

Strategic knowledge sharing in Bayesian games

This paper provides a model for the study of direct, public and strategic knowledge sharing in Bayesian games. We propose an equilibrium concept which takes into account communication possibilities of exogenously certifiable statements and in which beliefs off the equilibrium path are explicitly deduced from consistent possibility correspondences, without making reference to perturbed games. Properties of such an equilibrium and of revised knowledge are examined. In particular, it is shown that our equilibrium is always a sequential equilibrium of the associated extensive form game with communication. Finally, sufficient conditions for the existence of perfectly revealing or non-revealing equilibria are characterized in some classes of games. Several examples and economic applications are investigated.     

Economic Implications of Alternative Allocation Schemes for Emission Allowances*

For reasons of political feasibility, emission trading systems may have to rely on free initial allocation of emission allowances in order to ameliorate adverse production and employment effects in dirty industries. Against the background of an emerging European‐wide emission trading system, we examine the trade‐off between such compensation and economic efficiency under output‐based and emissions‐based allocation rules. We show that the emissions‐based allocation rule is more costly than the output‐based rule in terms of maintaining output and employment in energy‐intensive industries. When the international allowance price increases, the inferiority of emissions‐based allocation vis‐à‐vis output‐based allocation becomes more pronounced, as emission subsidies drastically restrict efficiency gains from international trade in emission allowances.     

Efficient Liability Rules: Complete Characterization

Received May, 18, 2000; revised version received March, 19, 2001