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排序方式: 共有202条查询结果,搜索用时 15 毫秒
1.
考虑包含一个上游制造商和两个下游销售商的单周期供应链系统。销售商销售不同质的产品且分别拥有关于需求的私有信息。他们之间进行基于价格的Bertrand竞争。建立了三阶段博弈模型,并计算出均衡结果。最后通过模型结果分析需求信息共享前后期望利润的变化,提出了制造商激励销售商其享需求信息的策略。结果表明销售商的需求信息共享在一定条件下是可以很好地实现的。 相似文献
2.
The literature on mergers has extensively analyzed the decision to merge by private firms, but it has not considered the decision to merge by private and public firms. We assume that when a private firm and a public firm merge (or when one of them acquires the other), they set up a multiproduct firm in which the government owns an exogenous percentage stake. In this framework, we show that the decision to merge by firms depends on the degree to which goods are substitutes and on the percentage of the shares owned by the government in the multiproduct firm. 相似文献
3.
In this note, we revisit minimum quality standards (MQS) under a vertically differentiated duopoly. We generalize the model in Ronnen (1991) and Valletti (2000) by introducing asymmetry into the fixed cost of quality improvement and by explicitly taking into account the endogeneity of quality ordering. In the generalized model, we show that the results derived by Ronnen (1991) and Valletti (2000) are largely robust. 相似文献
4.
Summary. We analyze an oligopoly model of homogeneous product price competition that allows for discontinuities in demand and/or costs.
Conditions under which only zero profit equilibrium outcomes obtain in such settings are provided. We then illustrate through
a series of examples that the conditions provided are “tight” in the sense that their relaxation leads to positive profit
outcomes.
Received: April 7, 2000; revised version: September 14, 2000 相似文献
5.
Reiko Aoki 《Economic Theory》2003,21(2-3):653-672
We show how credible revelation and ability to commit to quality choice effect equilibrium qualities and welfare when product
market is either Bertrand or Cournot competition. We show that results depend on the type of competition but not generally
on the cost of quality function. We show that with Bertrand competition, the equilibrium qualities are lower with credible
commitment. Competition is moderated and producer surplus is higher and consumer surplus lower. With Cournot competition,
higher quality will be better but lower quality will be worse with credible commitment. Consumer surplus is always greater
with credible commitment and if cost does not increase too quickly with quality, producer surplus will also increase. Thus
credible commitment is a collusive device with Bertrand competition but it can improve social welfare with Cournot competition.
Received: February 8, 2000; revised version: February 14, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" The idea of this paper originated in the weekly workshops of Mordecai Kurz at Stanford. I am forever in debted to Mordecai
and fellow students – Luis Cabral, Peter DeMarzo, John Hillas, Michihiro Kandori, Steve Langois, Patrick McAllister, Steve
Sharpe, Peter Streufert, Steve Turnbull and Gyu-Ho Wang – for their criticism and encouragement. I also benefited from comments
from Yi-Heng Chen, Jin-Li Hu, Kala Krishna, Jinji Naoto, Thomas J. Prusa, and Shyh-Fang Ueng at various later stages of this
work. Last but not least, I am grateful for the detailed comments of the referee. 相似文献
6.
孙文远 《数量经济技术经济研究》2006,23(4):61-69
本文讨论了存在成本差异的第三国市场模型的最佳贸易与产业政策选择问题,讨论了社会成本和私人成本、本国和外国成本差异情况下的Cournot竞争和Bertrand竞争的情况。本文发现,在Cournot竞争下,政府首先行动时,当政府基金影子价格低于4/3时,政府对出口进行补贴,并且本国越有成本优势,补贴越高,补贴的利润转移效应越大;当政府基金影子价格高于4/3时,政府对出口征收出口税,且本国越有成本优势,征税越多。在Bertrand竞争下,当政府先行动时,对出口征收出口税;当政府后行动时,对出口进行补贴。当本国企业具有劣势时,事后补贴是最佳政蓑。 相似文献
7.
基于cournot Model与Bertrand Model寡头竞争模型的药品最优定价策略 总被引:1,自引:1,他引:1
本文将竞争博弈模型引用到药品定价策略中,分别从制造商利润最大化,销售商利润最大化以及总体药品市场价值最大化的角度,研究了在Cournot Model下,制造商应该对销售商采取如何定价策略,而销售商应该如何应对才能达到总体利润最大化;在Bertrand Model下,论证多个药品制造商应该采取一体化的价格管理体系,并在文章最后给出Cournot Model以及Bertrand Model的寡头竞争模型在药品流通渠道管理中的应用。 相似文献
8.
We analyse competition between two network providers when the quality of each network depends negatively on the number of
customers connected to that network. With respect to price competition we provide a sufficient condition for the existence
of a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Comparative statics show that as the congestion effect gets stronger quantities
will decrease and prices increase, under both Bertrand and Cournot competition. In an example with endogenous capacities it
turns out that equilibrium capacities are at first increasing and then decreasing in the strength of congestion. Furthermore,
capacities are higher under Cournot competition. Welfare comparisons between Bertrand and Cournot competition are unambiguous
for fixed capacities, but may turn around for endogenous capacities. 相似文献
9.
Prabal Roy Chowdhury 《Economic Theory》2002,19(4):811-822
Summary. We consider a Bertrand duopoly model with increasing returns to scale where one of the firms have a cost advantage and prices
vary over a grid. We find that typically more than one equilibria exist. However, there are only two perfect equilibria. Moreover,
as the size of the grid becomes small, both these equilibria converge to the limit-pricing outcome.
Received: February 25, 2000; revised version: January 9, 2001 相似文献
10.
Eckart Jäger 《Journal of Economics》1999,70(3):281-307
The impact of exchange-rate changes on industrial prices seems ambiguous. Incomplete and even perverse pass-through has been observed: the import prices in the depreciating country decrease while those in the appreciating country increase. To explain these counterintuitive price reactions we consider a situation of international Bertrand competition: two firms, based in different countries, are selling in both countries simultaneously. The profit-maximizing duopolists set the prices for their products in each of the two markets which are segmented on the demand side. We then study the qualitative effect of an exogenous exchange-rate change on the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium. Under the strong assumption of linear demand and cost functions we have normal exchange-rate pass-through. However, allowing for more general cost structures in this simple static model enables us to show that the import prices in both countries might move in counterintuitive directions. 相似文献