Back to Buchanan? Explorations of welfare and subjectivism in behavioral economics

In light of behavioral findings regarding inconsistent individual decision-making, economists have begun to re-conceptualize the notion of welfare. One prominent account is the preference purification approach (PP), which attempts to reconstruct preferences from choice data based on a normative understanding of neoclassical rationality. Using Buchanan’s notion of creative choice, this paper criticizes PP’s epistemic, ontological, and psychological assumptions. It identifies PP as a static position that assumes the satisfaction of given ‘true preferences’ as the normative standard for welfare. However, following Buchanan, choice should be understood dynamically as a process whereby preferences constantly regenerate. Accordingly, the meaning of welfare emerges from an ongoing quest for individual self-constitution. If this holds true, then rationality axioms cannot serve as a priori normative standards. Instead, creative imagination and learning processes must remain central to any understanding of welfare in economics.     

Normative and positive theories of public finance: contrasting Musgrave and Buchanan

This paper assesses James M. Buchanan's claim of following a positive approach in stark contrast to the normative approach to public finance of Richard A. Musgrave. The goal of this paper is to shed light on the foundations of modern American public finance by analysing one aspect of the methodology of its two most prominent fathers. I show (1) that it is difficult to distinguish Musgrave's and Buchanan's theories of public goods along the positive/normative dividing line and (2) that Buchanan's theory can also be considered normative. In the first three parts, I follow the Weberian methodological tradition in looking for value judgements in the theories, and by reflecting on the nature of ideal types. In the last part, I propose a broader interpretation of Buchanan's methodological stance within the academic context of the 1960s.     

Constitutional Interpretation: Burke and Buchanan and their 18th Century Intellectual Roots

There is a respectable tradition of Burkean constitutional interpretation in legal scholarship whereas Edmund Burke is a relatively neglected figure in constitutional political economy. A comparison of the constitutional interpretations of constitutional political economy and Burkean legal scholarship provides a potentially fruitful outcome for both. This is particularly so given the 18th century intellectual roots of each. An examination of the Burkean tradition demonstrates why it is methodologically inductive, evolutionary and pessimistic, compared to the deductive, individualistic and optimistic approach of the Smithian tradition of constitutional political economy. Interestingly, these sharp distinctions in method produce similar results.

The moral ecology of markets: on the failure of the amoral defense of markets

Many economists have defended capitalism; most have tried to do so within the self-imposed methodological constraint that economists should employ only empirical arguments, not normative ones. This essay examines three classic amoral defenses of capitalism—by Milton Friedman, James Buchanan, and Friedrich Hayek—and argues that each fails on its own terms, since each implicitly incorporates moral presumptions essential to the author's argument. Constructively, the essay proposes that no one can adequately endorse (or critique) markets without making a moral evaluation of their context—their “moral ecology.” Four issues are identified as necessarily addressed in every adequate evaluation of markets. The essay does not endorse any one position on these elements, but argues instead that seemingly incommensurable standpoints on markets—ranging from Marxist to libertarian—actually represent positions on the these four basic issues.     

Buchanan’s constitutional political economy: exchange vs. choice in economics and in politics

This article discusses the methodological foundations of Buchanan’s constitutional political economy. We argue that Buchanan is a constitutional economist because he is an economist or a political economist. In other words, Buchanan is a constitutional economist—he insists on the necessity of focusing on constitutions and to analyze the “rules of the social game”—because he defines economics as a science of exchange. Buchanan’s definition of economics is not only specific, it is also opposed to the definition of economics that other economists retain and, above all, opposed to the definition of economics that many public choice theorists use. The latter have, in effect, adopted the Robbins 1932 definition of economics as a science of choice that Buchanan criticizes and rejects. Buchanan’s constitutional economics can be a branch of public choice only under certain conditions.

An Economic Rationale for a Work and Savings Ethic? J. Buchanan’s Late Works and Business Ethics

This article discusses the possibility of an economic foundation for a work and savings ethic. In particular, James M. Buchanan has, in his late works, endorsed traditional ‘Puritan’ demands for working and saving more, while arguing that this is beneficial for all members of a society. I will question Buchanan’s analysis of the ‘Puritan’ ethic both in normative and methodological respects before aiming at a constructive interpretation.     

Monetary policy,inequality and political instability

Voters in the industrialised countries are increasingly expressing dissatisfaction by dissenting from the established political parties and candidates. Based on the concepts of justice by Hayek, Rawls and Buchanan, we argue that the growing dissatisfaction is rooted in the asymmetric pattern of monetary policies since the mid‐1980s for two reasons. First, the structurally declining interest rates and the unconventional monetary policy measures have granted privileges to specific groups. Second, the increasingly expansionary monetary policies have negative growth effects, which have reduced the scope for compensation of the ones excluded from the privileges. As a result, the acceptance of the prevailing economic and political order is undermined and political instability increases.     

布坎南宪法经济学思想：逻辑与启示

宪法经济学的建立和发展是布坎南后期学术上的重要理论贡献。宪法经济学的知识传统来源于公共选择理论、古典经济学理论和维克赛尔财政理论。宪法经济学以规则的选择为研究对象,以个人主义、理性选择和交换视角为方法论,以＂一致同意＂和集体政治决策的双层结构为理论基础,以契约理论为政治哲学。文章认为,宪法经济学思想的理论价值与缺陷并存,对我国的经济改革颇具启示意义。     

The distance between Buchanan's “An Economic Theory of Clubs” and Tiebout's “A Pure Theory of Local Public Expenditures”. New insights based on an unpublished manuscript

This article introduces Buchanan's comment on Tiebout's “A Pure Theory of Local Public Expenditures”. It helps us to understand the nature of the relationship between Buchanan and Tiebout. Usually, it is claimed that Buchanan modelled Tiebout's insights, that there exists a Buchanan-Tiebout hypothesis, and that Buchanan in 1965 complemented what Tiebout had written in 1956. We show that Buchanan could not have written “An Economic Theory of Clubs” as a complement of “A Pure Theory of Local Public Expenditures”. He disagreed with Tiebout's ideas on mobility because he saw mobility as a cause of inefficiencies and not a cause of homogeneity in groups. This is what we show by putting Buchanan's comment on Tiebout into historical perspective. It appears that Buchanan interpreted Tiebout 1956 from the perspective of his works on fiscal federalism from the early 1950s. We show that there is a continuity between Buchanan's work from the early 1950s and his works in the early 1970s; and Buchanan's way of reading Tiebout is part of it. Hence, when he wrote “An Economic Theory of Clubs”, Buchanan was convinced that Tiebout was wrong and that he was offering an alternative framework for public economics.