The optimal treatment of tax expenditures

This paper analyzes the optimal treatment of tax expenditures. It develops an optimal tax model where individuals derive utility from spending on a “contribution” good such as charitable giving. The contribution good has also a public good effect on all individuals in the economy. The government imposes linear taxes on earnings and on the contribution good so as to maximize welfare. The government may also finance directly the contribution good out of tax revenue. Optimal tax and subsidy rates on earnings and the contribution good are expressed in terms of empirically estimable parameters and the redistributive tastes of the government. The optimal subsidy on the contribution good is increasing in the size of the price elasticity of contributions, the size of the crowding out effect of public contributions on private contributions, and the size of the public good effect of the contribution good. Numerical simulations show that the optimal subsidy on contributions is fairly sensitive to the size of these parameters but that, in most cases, it should be lower than the earnings tax rate.     

Envy and the Islamic revival: Experimental evidence from Tunisia

I design and conduct a survey with an embedded lab-in-the-field experiment to test whether envy triggers popular support for the Islamic revival using a nationally representative sample of 600 Tunisians. Individuals exposed to high inequality may feel envious if they perceive that the success of others is granted rather than earned. Thus, envious individuals may be motivated to engage in religious and political activities to cope with their feelings. I trigger the sentiment of envy with a 2 ?×? 2 design by interacting a priming video and low stakes. I find that individuals in the envy treatment donate a larger proportion of their endowment to a politically involved religious charity, my measure of support for the Islamic revival. Overall, my experimental findings, consistent with survey data, confirm the idea that envy is an important determinant of popular support for the Islamic revival, even after controlling for religiosity.     

Charitable Donations: Evidence of Demand for Environmental Protection?

Using data from the 2001 Giving and Volunteering in the United States survey, I examine household charitable donations to environmental organizations. Household income has a positive impact on environmental giving. While the tax price affects overall charitable contributions, it does not affect environmental giving. More education, being female, homeownership, and voting are also associated with a greater likelihood of contributing to the environment. African-Americans and Latinos are less likely to contribute to the environment, although conditional on giving, Latinos give more. Retired persons and households with children are less likely to contribute to the environment. Larger households give less to the environment. Households from the Northeast are the most likely to make environmental contributions while households from the South are the least likely.

Accidental Bequests: A Curse for the Rich and a Boon for the Poor*

When accidental bequests signal otherwise unobservable individual characteristics, such as productivity and longevity, the population should be partitioned into two groups: those who do not receive an inheritance and those who do. The first tagged group receives a Mirrlees second‐best tax schedule; the second group, when its type is fully revealed, faces a first‐best tax schedule. Receiving an inheritance makes high‐ability types worse off and low‐ability types better off. High‐ability individuals face a bequest tax of more than 100 percent, while low‐ability types face a bequest tax that can be smaller, as well as larger, than 100 percent, and it might even be negative.     

Giving gifts to groups: How altruism depends on the number of recipients

When a single gift goes to a group of recipients, how does giving depend on the size of the group? This question is important for understanding charitable giving and fund-raising, public goods provision, family altruism, and more. If we think of the gift as giving up a dollar to create a social surplus, then we want to know how the number of recipients of that surplus affects its value to the giver. In other words, how congestible is altruism? This paper builds a theoretical framework for this question and begins to answer it with a controlled experiment. The finding is that for most subjects altruism is congestible. For the average subject, a gift that results in one person receiving x is equivalent to one in which n people receive x / n^0.68 each.     

中国城市女性慈善参与的影响因素分析——以海西区部分城市为研究样本

以海西区部分城市女性慈善参与状况为样本，通过抽样问卷调查和实地访谈，调查了解女性的慈善意识状况和慈善参与典型实践，阐释分析影响城市女性慈善参与的社会层面因素、家庭层面因素和个人层面因素，以期为和谐构建中的城市女性慈善队伍的发展提供可能有益的参考。     

How responsive are charitable donors to requests to give?

People are more likely to contribute to a charity when they are asked to. Although this so-called ‘power of asking’ is well-known among fundraisers, the existing literature does not pay much attention to the role of donation requests in charitable giving. This paper uses a unique survey that includes a question on whether the respondent is asked to give to estimate the causal effects of charitable solicitations on giving behavior. In order to address the endogeneity of the donation requests due to non-random solicitation of charitable donors, I link this survey to IRS data on charitable organizations and propose identifying instruments. After controlling for the endogeneity, I find that donation requests increase the propensity to give by about nineteen percentage points for those who are asked to give. This effect is robust under different specifications and with different sets of instruments, and is much larger than the estimates from univariate models, which assume that charitable solicitations are exogenous. I argue that this result is counterintuitive and discuss some possible explanations.     

A Stochastic Overlapping Generations Economy with Inheritance

An overlapping generations model of an exchange economy with two sources of uncertainty is considered. Individuals have a finite expected life span and uncertain annual income. Conditions concerning birth, death, inheritance and bequests are fully specified. Under such conditions, the existence of a stationary Markovian equilibrium is established in some generality, and several explicitly solvable examples are examined in detail. Received August 6, 2001; revised version received March 12, 2002 Published online: November 11, 2002     

Profit maximisation vs. agency: an analysis of charitable giving by UK firms

The charitable giving of a large sample of publicly quoted UKfirms is analysed within a model that explores the profit maximisationand managerial utility enhancement motives for giving. The empiricalmethod draws a distinction between the decision to participatein giving and the determination of the amount of corporate contributions.Firm size and advertising intensity are found to be positivelyassociated with the probability of participation in giving.Stricter corporate governance and the rate of directors' remunerationare negatively related to the probability of participation.Among givers, the rate of giving is related positively to R&Dintensity, the rate of directors' remuneration, and corporateprofitability and negatively to firm indebtedness.     

A two-state analysis of estate taxes and charitable bequests from the most generous decedents

This study uses Censored Quantile Regression (CQR) and probate records for the years 2000–2005 to analyze charitable bequests of the most generous decedents from two states, Virginia and Louisiana. We focus on the most generous decedents because they account for a large portion of total charitable bequests. The most generous decedents' charitable bequest tax price (i.e., one minus the marginal tax rate) elasticity is not significantly greater than one in both our full sample and the subsample of the decedents filing federal estate tax returns. Our finding suggests that allowing charitable bequests to be deductible is not a treasury efficient policy for the most generous decedents. We also find that the tax price and wealth effects for the most generous decedents are overestimated by the Tobit model that has been traditionally utilized by prior studies. Furthermore, filers' charitable bequests are predicted to decrease if the estate tax is repealed.