Creditors’ and Shareholders’ Reporting Demands in Public Versus Private Firms: Evidence from Europe*

In this study we investigate whether the importance of accounting information in contracting and communication with shareholders and creditors affects earnings timeliness in publicly disclosed general‐purpose financial statements. To operationalize the relationship between timeliness demands and the importance of accounting information to shareholders and creditors, we compare the (asymmetry in) earnings timeliness of public firms with that of private firms. We attribute public versus private firm differences in timeliness to shareholders’ demands when a country’s institutions provide strong investor protection. Similarly, we attribute these differences to creditors’ demands when the institutions provide strong creditor protection. Our analysis of public and private firms in 13 Western European countries suggests that creditors and shareholders have different timeliness demands. In particular, we find that the public versus private firm difference in asymmetric timeliness is not associated with a country’s degree of investor protection but positively associated with a country’s degree of creditor protection. The results further suggest that shareholders demand symmetric rather than asymmetric timeliness. An important implication of our study is that general‐purpose financial statements are responsive to creditors’ reporting demands, which contrasts with the idea that these — primarily private — creditors would use special‐purpose reports.     

论公司债债权人对公司治理的参与

现代公司法理论在公司治理中引入了债权人参与机制。公司债债权人作为一种证券投资者,数量众多,力量分散,决定了其参与公司治理的途径不同于一般债权人对公司治理的参与。公司债债权人参与公司治理的制度设计有:公司债债权人会议是参与公司治理的主体,债券受托人董事、监事制度,公司债债权人派生诉讼制度。     

基于债权人利益要求及其实现方式的非财务指标披露满意度研究

国内外从未有人从债权人角度进行过非财务指标披露的满意度排序研究和分组研究,本文从债权人角度出发,对债权人所关注的反映其利益要求和实现方式信息的非财务指标披露的满意度进行了排序研究和分组研究。研究得出结论：债权人对不同类的反映其利益要求和实现方式信息的非财务指标披露的满意度存在显著差异;企业因素产生了债权人同一类非财务指标披露的满意度差异。对满意度低的非财务指标的披露,企业应当改善其披露。对不同类别债权人披露满意度存在显著差异的非财务指标,企业应当特别需要改善披露。     

Administration of recoveries in individual insolvency: case studies of two UK banks

Against a background of greater competition, market saturation and falling margins over the past decade UK banks have sought greater efficiencies in credit and risk assessment procedures, especially with personal lending products. In the same way they have attempted to reduce costs associated with the monitoring and collection of bad debts. Failure to monitor debt recoveries adequately, however, can lead to further pressure on profits. This paper uses a case study approach to outline key strategies adopted by two major banks in respect of formal insolvency, the ‘tip’ of a considerable debt recovery ‘iceberg’. The paper illustrates the reactions and changing administrative practices of banks, as unsecured creditors, and draws on empirical research that has charted the effect of the Insolvency Act 1986 as regards individual debtors. The collection of bad debts presents banks with risks, heightened by adverse selection and moral hazard problems greater than those applicable to credit risk assessment. However, while the ‘downside risk’ equates with the debt write-off plus transaction costs the ‘upside potential’ has elements of both tangible and intangible benefit. The paper goes on to review specific centralization and outsourcing policies against the critical risks in insolvency. It also suggests that the bargaining power of major creditors, including banks, is increased through these activities, to the possible detriment of smaller creditors and of debtors.     

沉默的债权人与大股东的控制权升水

近年来,关于大股东与小股东之间的代理冲突成了学术研究中的一个热点问题.然而,纵观这些文献可以发现,几乎所有的研究都是仅仅局限于冲突的双方,即仅仅局限于股权融资的主体,而将企业资金来源的另一重要渠道的债务主体--债权人几乎完全置于一边了.与此同时,学术研究中通常认为债务融资对企业具有积极的治理效应,即利用债务融资降低股权融资的代理成本,从而可以提升企业的价值.为此,本文提出一个重要的思想并从理论上对其进行了证明,即在债权人的利益得到保护的条件下,债权人有可能保持沉默,坐视大股东对小股东的利益侵占行为,甚至与大股东合谋来共同侵占小股东的利益.笔者通过对模型的进一步分析表明,大股东与债权人的合谋行为不但侵占了小股东的利益,而且减少了企业的价值,降低了企业金融资源的使用效率,甚至对其他企业的发展造成了严重的制约,并最终减缓整个金融市场的良性发展以及导致整个金融资源的低效率使用.     

论公司的债权人治理

由于环境的变化和理论的发展,债权人的公司治理角色正在发生实质性的变化,它不但参与了公司治理,而且越来越成为未来公司治理结构的重要力量。本文在介绍债权人权利和债权人参与公司治理实践的基础上,对债权人公司治理的原因和治理效应进行了较深入的探讨。     

Bankruptcy regime and the banking system

Banks’ behavior as creditors relies heavily on the content of legal rights granted by the national bankruptcy laws. Using a sample of 87 countries over the period 2005–2016, this paper investigates whether the degree of such legal rights influences the following banking indicators: (1) private credit, (2) bank lending-deposit spread, and (3) foreign banks’ presence. Robust dynamic panel estimates indicate a significant and positive impact only on foreign banks’ presence in countries with a high level of creditors’ protection and bankruptcy systems that encourage the survival of financially distressed firms.     

集团内部资本市场、银行债务与债权人保护——来自中国上市公司的经验证据

本文研究了集团内部资本市场对上市公司银行债务融资的影响以及相应的经济后果。研究发现集团内部资本市场一方面可以起到对银行贷款的替代作用,这种替代效应的存在能在一定程度上缓解成员公司的融资约束,但另一方面它也可能成为大股东掠夺上市公司信贷资金的渠道,大股东代理成本越高的公司存在更严重的掠夺问题。掠夺效应的存在是上市公司发生债务危机的重要原因之一。     

The value of relationship banking: International evidence

This paper analyses whether repeated borrowing from the same bank affects loan contract terms. We find that relationship loans pay less spread and require less collateral compared to non-relationship loans. These effects for relationship loans are not derived from differences between relationship and nonrelationship loans. The reduction of interest rate spread for relationship loans disappeared during the financial crisis. The results also reveal that borrowers paid higher interest rate spreads, had to post more collateral and the maturity was shortened during the crisis period. The reduction in interest rate spread and collateral depends on the protection of creditors’ rights. In countries where creditors’ rights are well protected, relationship loans pay less spread and are required to post less collateral than relationship loans in countries with weak protection of creditors’ rights.