知识型员工双重社会网络对企业创新绩效作用机制研究

基于企业基础资源观和组织学习理论，从知识型员工个人和组织社会网络两个方面构建知识型员工双重社会网络影响企业创新绩效的理论模型，分析知识共享、组织学习及资源整合在员工双重社会网络对企业创新绩效影响机制中的作用。结果表明：知识型员工双重社会网络对科技型企业创新绩效的作用路径有3条，资源获取与整合、知识共享与学习及员工动态创新能力分别在其中发挥中介作用；在不同类型组织文化环境中，知识型员工双重社会网络对企业创新绩效的作用特征、作用重点以及作用机制存在显著差异，内部整合维度主要通过知识共享和组织学习影响企业创新绩效，外部适应维度主要通过隐性知识传播和资源整合影响企业创新绩效。     

试论二元经济形态下的会计模式

本文分析了在知识经济兴起的环境下我国现行会计模式存在的缺陷,并根据知识经济发展的历程以及我国目前工业经济与知识经济并存的现状,提出了一种能适应两种经济形态的兼容性会计模式,最后指出了目前实施该模式尚存在的制约因素。     

试析二元经济结构下的失业问题

就业是民生之本，积极扩大就业是提高人民生活水平，全面建设小康社会的重大而艰巨的任务。本文分析了我国目前的就业现状及其成因，并结合发展中国家特有的二元经济结构下存在的农村劳动力过剩和城市严重失业双重困扰的现象对我国的失业问题进行了理论分析。并运用西方经济学有关理论对我国失业问题提出了一些对策建议。     

Distributional assumptions and a test of the dual labor market hypothesis

Recent application of the switching regression model to allocate workers into the primary and secondary labor markets is considered to be the best solution to the classification problem of the empirical testing of the dual labor market theory. In such models, normality of the error terms is assumed. This paper adopts the switching regression model to test the dual labor market theory by assuming different distributions of the error terms. The test results strongly support the dual labor market theory regardless of the assumption one makes about the error terms. However, the results indicate that different distribution can lead to different percentage distributions of workers in the two segments. In particular, the normal distribution generates more workers in the primary segment than the non-normal distributions. Therefore, care must be taken not to generalize the type of industries or occupations that fall under the primary and secondary segments. First version received: October 2000/Final version received: March 2002 RID="*" ID="*"  I would like to thank Kevin Lang, Robert Marshall, and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments. I am grateful for comments received from the session participants of the Western Economic Association International Conference, San Francisco, CA, June 28–July 2, 1996, and the Midwest Economic Association Conference, Kansas City, 1997. I thank George Bonney, the Chief Statistician of Fox Chase Cancer Center, Philadelphia for his comments. Any remaining errors are my responsibility. I gratefully acknowledge financial support from Penn State Research and Development Grant, 1995.     

Inter-enterprise arrears in economies in transition

In the context of economies in transition, the paper argues that an excessive liquidity squeeze could throw the economy into a persistent state of low economic activity. In such bad equilibrium, enterprise transactions become largely demonetized, with a chain of arrears, a form of involuntary credit, spreading over the entire system. The empirical analysis of the Romanian experience seems to support the view advanced in the paper.     

Jointness in production and farmers' willingness to supply non-marketed ecosystem services

This paper highlights how farmers' willingness to supply non-marketed ecosystem services (ES) is influenced by whether or not the non-marketed ES are produced jointly with agricultural products. When marketed products and non-marketed ES share some production inputs the production relationships between the two may be complementary, competitive or substitutive. Using a cost minimization framework, it is shown how complementary relationships lead to costless voluntary provision of non-marketed ES (typically the case for ES that are supportive of provisioning ES for marketed farm products). It is also shown how competitive production relationships lead to provision of non-marketed ES at lower cost than when non-marketed ES are direct substitutes for farm products or are produced outside of agriculture. The paper closes by showing how the minimum willingness to accept (WTA) payment for ES that are complementary/competitive is less than or equal to the minimum WTA for the same ES produced in substitute or independent production relationships.     

Incentive Regulation of Prices When Costs are Sunk

We present a model featuring irreversible investment, economies of scale, uncertain future demand and capital prices, and a regulator who sets the firm’s output price according to the cost structure of a hypothetical replacement firm. We show that a replacement firm has a fundamental cost advantage over the regulated firm: it can better exploit the economies of scale because it has not had to confront the historical uncertainties faced by the regulated firm. We show that setting prices so low that a replacement firm is just willing to participate is insufficient to allow the regulated firm to expect to break even whenever it has to invest. Thus, unless the regulator is willing to incur costly monitoring to ensure the firm invests, revenue must be allowed in excess of that required for a replacement firm to participate. This contrasts with much of the existing literature, which argues that the market value of a regulated firm should equal the cost of replacing its existing assets. We also obtain a closed-form solution for the regulated firm’s output price when this price is set at discrete intervals. In contrast to rate of return regulation, we find that resetting the regulated price more frequently can increase the risk faced by the firm’s owners, and that this is reflected in a higher output price and a higher weighted-average cost of capital.     

Racing in two dimensions

In this paper we study an industry in which there is an ongoing sequence of R&D races between two firms. Firms are engaged in product innovation. Products are horizontally and vertically differentiated. There are two key characteristics/dimensions to products, and the level at which these are embodied in products can be increased by R&D. At each time firms can spend R&D on improving their product in one or both dimensions. We allow the possibility of economies scope — so R&D undertaken in one dimension can spillover to the other. The question we are interested in is whether a firm that is ahead in a single dimension but behind in another will focus all its R&D effort in the area in which it is ahead (product specialisation), or whether it will try to do R&D in both dimensions in the hope that it might get ahead in both and end up with a superproduct that dominates in both characteristics. The outcome of this R&D competition determines a Markov transition probability matrix determining the evolution of the industry. We show that when the R&D technology is characterized by constant returns then the only steady-state outcome is one in which the economy stays forever in a position in which one firm produces a super-product and the other gives up doing R&D altogether. This outcome is unaffected by the degree of economies of scope. When the R&D technology is characterised by decreasing returns, then the industry will visit all states and so will exhibit both product specialisation and superproduct dominance at various times. Now the extent of economies of scope matters and we show that the greater the extent of economies of scope, the less likely is the industry to exhibit product dominance, and the more likely it is to exhibit product specialisation.     

城乡税制统一:基于公共财政的分析视角

城乡分割的二元税制加重了农民负担,降低了我国农产品的国际竞争力,也有悖于市场经济的公平原则;在农村公共产品供给上,政府存在着职能缺位,这些都不利于建立城乡统一的公共财政。当前统一城乡税制面临着财政资金压力、税收征管能力、二元经济结构等方面因素的限制。统一城乡税制需要逐步完善城乡税收体系、加大政府对农村公共品投入以及深化基层人事制度改革和促进农业产业化等方面的配套改革。     

集体行动的逻辑与可持续发展的困境

个体理性的效率追求是经济活动的动力,但个体理性往往导致集体非理性。本文从个体理性与集体理性概念的相对性出发,探讨个体、地方政府、国家在经济活动中本位利益的追求与可持续发展目标的背离。纯粹的市场效率追求会导致“市场失灵,”政府在解决“市场失灵”时如果无法有效约束个体理性的本位利益追求与政绩偏好,在可持续发展问题上就会出现一定程度的“政府失灵”。在“双重失灵”的情况下,集体行动的逻辑必然导致可持续发展陷入困境。要在个体理性的效率追求与集体理性的“共同信念”中实现可持续发展战略,必须明确政府责任并进行追加性制度投资。