企业集群形成中的政府政策作用:理论研究与我国的实证分析

政府在企业集群形成中到底起什么作用?这一直是企业集群理论研究和实践中需要探讨的问题之一。事实上，企业集群的形成包含着各种类型的博弈活动，是各种博弈的演化结果。企业集群的形成过程本质上是一种类似于有限理性下学习速度较慢的大群体反复博弈——复制动态(Replicator Dynamics)进化博弈。为此，作者建立了企业集群形成的进化博弈模型，模拟了企业集群形成的演化路径，揭示了企业集群形成的内在机理，得出了政府在企业集群形成中的政策作用的一般规律性：政府的不作为；积极干预到不干预；注重引进关联性强的企业；重视中小企业的新建。并在此基础上，通过对我国几个典型的企业集群形成实践进行实证分析，检验和论证了政府在企业集群形成中的不同作用。     

基于演化博弈的城市拆迁补偿机制研究

房屋动拆迁是我国城市建设与旧城改造中的重要环节,也是当前社会普遍关注的焦点。房屋动拆迁问题产生的重要原因在于补偿机制的不合理。本文引入演化博弈理论,建立城市拆迁补偿的演化博弈模型,分析不同收益值情况下的演化稳定策略,并针对当前拆迁补偿机制存在的漏洞,提出完善我国城市房屋拆迁补偿机制的政策建议。     

行业潜规则的形成与规制：基于演化博弈的分析

行业潜规则在我国经济现实中广为存在,具有既有信息极不对称、未来信息反馈机制不畅、行业内部结盟性、行政监控成本高等特点。行业潜规则会侵蚀外部人利益,产生负外部性。长远来看,它将阻碍产业的发展,对其实行政府规制是必要的。在一定的假设前提下,以演化博弈为分析工具,研究得出结论：在一定环境条件下潜规则具有扩散性,并存在演化稳定点。并以我国食品安全管理中常用的抽查与处以罚金的方式作为规制形式,通过ESS分析,证明该规制方式有助于降低潜规则的扩散。     

基于航运系统的承运人合作演化博弈分析

本文运用演化博弈理论研究了航运业中承运人群体之间的合作行为。研究表明,当没有监控机制存在时,航运业承运人群体之间的合作将是无效的。在航运旺季时,承运人之间存在合作和不合作的演化均衡,在航运淡季时,承运人之间出现双方都不合作的演化均衡。然而,当航运区域的枢纽港充当监控平台时,在航运旺季和航运淡季时,对承运人群体合作和背叛行为给与不同范围的激励和补偿,将使承运人之间出现高效的合作演化均衡。研究结果对区域航运业有一定的借鉴作用。     

基于进化博弈的战略网络节点间信任关系研究

信任是战略网络生存和进化的基础,对战略网络的治理有重要作用。文章从信任博弈双方的有限理性出发,建立战略网络节点间信任行为的进化博弈模型,并分析博弈双方的进化稳定策略。进化博弈的稳定策略分析结果说明,节点企业为了实现长期利益,最优的策略选择就是提高彼此间的信任度。     

在ESS支持下的市场营销

通过对在企业市场部门下经理支持系统（ＥＳＳ）的运用的介绍，并将其与管理信息系统（ＭＩＳ）进行比较，提出了应在企业市场营销部门进行ＥＳＳ的开发和应用，以更适合支持营销经理人员作出正确决策的观点。     

Is limit pricing evolutionarily stable?

We have analyzed the question whether or not limit-pricing behavior can be viewed as a strategy, which survives the replicator dynamics in a game in which firms change strategies through imitation. Our results show that, regardless of the proportion of low cost incumbents in the population, potential entrants that play the strategy "enter" when they observe limit output are wiped out. The unique ESS consists of all low cost incumbents playing the "limit output" strategy, and all high cost incumbents playing the "monopoly output". This ESS includes potential entrants playing "stay out" after observing the limit output, and playing "enter" if monopoly output is observed in the first stage. Hence, limit pricing survives the replicator dynamics and appears in the stable state of the population.JEL Classification: B25, C73, L11We would like to thank an anonymous referee for valuable comments on an earlier version of this paper. Correspondence to: U. Soytas     

An evolutionary game analysis of tariff determination

Tariff determination is an important part in the theories of international trade policy, and game theory in tariff determination enriches the methods for analysis, making the discussion of tariff determination more clearly. Based on the theory of Evolutionary Stable Strategy （ESS）, via the methods of Replicator Dynamics, with the established model of exporting enterprises in two countries similar to ＂Cournot Competition＂, by discussing the importing tariff determination, this paper analyzes both symmetric dynamic game among members in one group and asymmetric dynamic game between two different groups, and gets the conclusion by the characteristics of the ESS.     

Evolution and Mixed Strategies

Selten (1980, J. Theoret. Biol., 84, 93–101) showed that no mixed equilibria are evolutionarily stable when players can condition their strategies on their roles in a game. Alternatively, Harsanyi's (1973, Int. J. Game Theory, 2, 1–23) purification argument implies that all mixed equilibria are approximations of strict, and hence evolutionarily stable, equilibria of games with slightly perturbed payoffs. This paper reconciles these results: Approximations of mixed equilibria have high invasion barriers, and hence are likely to persist, when payoff perturbations are relatively important and role identification is relatively noisy. When payoff perturbations are unimportant and role identification is precise, approximations of mixed equilibria will have small invasion barriers and are unlikely to persist. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C70, C78.     

Stability and instability of the unbeatable strategy in dynamic processes

A strategy is unbeatable if it is immune to any entrant strategy of any size. This paper investigates static and dynamic properties of unbeatable strategies. We give equivalent conditions for a strategy to be unbeatable and compare it with related equilibrium concepts. An unbeatable strategy is globally stable under replicator dynamics. In contrast, an unbeatable strategy can fail to be globally stable under best response dynamics even if it is also a unique and strict Nash equilibrium.