中国股市行业风险与宏观经济之间的风险传导机制

本文采用行业收益率溢出指数度量股市行业风险,并进一步研究中国股市行业风险与宏观经济的相互影响,同时引入股息率和利率两个中介渠道深入挖掘其传导机制。我们运用GARCH-in-Mean模型对股市行业风险和宏观经济变量之间的一阶矩和二阶矩相互关系同时进行分析,结果发现,股市行业风险和宏观经济变量之间水平值和波动率都存在双向影响,对外溢出效应较大的行业起主导作用。此外,股市行业风险对宏观经济变量的影响方面,股息率和利率均起到中介渠道作用;宏观经济变量对股市行业风险的影响方面,只是利率起到中介渠道作用。股市行业风险与宏观经济的传导效应在不同时期差异显著。本文研究结论有助于深刻理解金融与实体经济之间的风险传导机制,对防范系统性风险、防止金融和实体经济“风险共振”以及提升金融服务实体经济能力等具有参考意义。     

关于国家大安全观与小康安全建设思路的探讨

全面小康社会并非仅仅是一个富裕程度的概念，还是一个生产力水平、国际竞争力的概念。全面建设小康社会，追求的是物质、精神、生态、安全文明的共同发展。所以。衡量小康社会的标准除了经济指标外，还必须包括关乎国计民生的社会人文指标。     

Inter-enterprise arrears in economies in transition

In the context of economies in transition, the paper argues that an excessive liquidity squeeze could throw the economy into a persistent state of low economic activity. In such bad equilibrium, enterprise transactions become largely demonetized, with a chain of arrears, a form of involuntary credit, spreading over the entire system. The empirical analysis of the Romanian experience seems to support the view advanced in the paper.     

Jointness in production and farmers' willingness to supply non-marketed ecosystem services

This paper highlights how farmers' willingness to supply non-marketed ecosystem services (ES) is influenced by whether or not the non-marketed ES are produced jointly with agricultural products. When marketed products and non-marketed ES share some production inputs the production relationships between the two may be complementary, competitive or substitutive. Using a cost minimization framework, it is shown how complementary relationships lead to costless voluntary provision of non-marketed ES (typically the case for ES that are supportive of provisioning ES for marketed farm products). It is also shown how competitive production relationships lead to provision of non-marketed ES at lower cost than when non-marketed ES are direct substitutes for farm products or are produced outside of agriculture. The paper closes by showing how the minimum willingness to accept (WTA) payment for ES that are complementary/competitive is less than or equal to the minimum WTA for the same ES produced in substitute or independent production relationships.     

Incentive Regulation of Prices When Costs are Sunk

We present a model featuring irreversible investment, economies of scale, uncertain future demand and capital prices, and a regulator who sets the firm’s output price according to the cost structure of a hypothetical replacement firm. We show that a replacement firm has a fundamental cost advantage over the regulated firm: it can better exploit the economies of scale because it has not had to confront the historical uncertainties faced by the regulated firm. We show that setting prices so low that a replacement firm is just willing to participate is insufficient to allow the regulated firm to expect to break even whenever it has to invest. Thus, unless the regulator is willing to incur costly monitoring to ensure the firm invests, revenue must be allowed in excess of that required for a replacement firm to participate. This contrasts with much of the existing literature, which argues that the market value of a regulated firm should equal the cost of replacing its existing assets. We also obtain a closed-form solution for the regulated firm’s output price when this price is set at discrete intervals. In contrast to rate of return regulation, we find that resetting the regulated price more frequently can increase the risk faced by the firm’s owners, and that this is reflected in a higher output price and a higher weighted-average cost of capital.     

Racing in two dimensions

In this paper we study an industry in which there is an ongoing sequence of R&D races between two firms. Firms are engaged in product innovation. Products are horizontally and vertically differentiated. There are two key characteristics/dimensions to products, and the level at which these are embodied in products can be increased by R&D. At each time firms can spend R&D on improving their product in one or both dimensions. We allow the possibility of economies scope — so R&D undertaken in one dimension can spillover to the other. The question we are interested in is whether a firm that is ahead in a single dimension but behind in another will focus all its R&D effort in the area in which it is ahead (product specialisation), or whether it will try to do R&D in both dimensions in the hope that it might get ahead in both and end up with a superproduct that dominates in both characteristics. The outcome of this R&D competition determines a Markov transition probability matrix determining the evolution of the industry. We show that when the R&D technology is characterized by constant returns then the only steady-state outcome is one in which the economy stays forever in a position in which one firm produces a super-product and the other gives up doing R&D altogether. This outcome is unaffected by the degree of economies of scope. When the R&D technology is characterised by decreasing returns, then the industry will visit all states and so will exhibit both product specialisation and superproduct dominance at various times. Now the extent of economies of scope matters and we show that the greater the extent of economies of scope, the less likely is the industry to exhibit product dominance, and the more likely it is to exhibit product specialisation.     

中国银行业规模经济和范围经济的实证研究——基于复合成本函数的分析

本文首次在国内利用复合成本函数估计我国国有商业银行和股份制商业银行1998——2003年的成本函数,并计算出各自的规模经济和范围经济。复合成本函数把投入价格的对数二次项和产出的二次项结合起来,具有优良的实证研究性质。实证研究结果表明:时间对我国银行业的规模经济和范围经济影响不显著;国有商业银行和股份制商业银行都存在着轻微的规模不经济和范围不经济,国有银行略好于股份制银行。我国商业银行的两种产出——存款和贷款不存在成本互补性。     

基于宏观资产负债表的居民债务问题及其风险研究

本文从宏观资产负债表的编制出发,对比世界主要经济体的居民债务演变,有效度量中国居民部门的债务杠杆水平。通过宏观部门经济间的关联,构造基于存量-流量一致的部门结构化均衡模型,剖析居民部门债务风险的传导机制,分析货币、财政和地产政策在居民债务风险防范中的作用。结果表明:中国居民部门金融资产负债率和偿债比例偏高,偿债压力逐步加大。但适中的资产负债率和较高的潜在经济增速为我国居民部门债务风险的化解提供了足够的空间。紧缩性货币政策有利于居民部门去杠杆化,但由此引发的消费减速和经济下行将导致企业和政府部门债务攀升;减税较政府直接支出更能激发消费内需、降低居民和企业债务杠杆,同时,长期经济的好转利于政府债务风险稳定。紧缩性地产政策虽然有助于长期经济结构的调整,但需防范短期经济下滑。     

基于宏程序的椭圆轮廓的数控车加工

宏程序在数控编程中有着广泛的应用。文章结合两种椭圆曲线宏程序编程实例,介绍了宏程序在非圆曲线中的编制方法和技巧,分析表明:宏程序数控编程具有编程快捷和程序短小精悍的显著特点,尤其适用于一些含非圆曲线零件的数控编程加工。     

商业银行信用风险与宏观经济——基于压力测试的研究

本文采用压力测试框架,研究了宏观经济波动对商业银行信用风险的影响。文章以不良贷款率度量信用风险,以名义GDP增长率、广义货币供应量（M2）增速、居民消费价格指数（CPI）以及房地产销售价格指数作为宏观经济变量,建立了合适的宏观压力测试模型。在GDP增速放缓、CPI上升、M2增速下降的压力情景下,预测了2011年第一季度到第四季度的不良贷款率的变化路径。实证结果表明在压力情景下商业银行的不良贷款率将会显著上升。