开放式创新社区中用户交互反馈对个体创新贡献度的影响

开放社区中的用户交互反馈是用户创新活动的重要组成部分，基于需求满足理论，研究其他用户反馈对个体创新贡献度的影响。结合典型开放式产品设计社区——Local Motors平台，采用数据挖掘方法，从数量、质量和情感3个方面研究开放式创新社区中FOU对个体创新贡献度的影响。结果表明，反馈数量和质量均对个体创新贡献度有显著影响，其中反馈次数对个体创新贡献度有显著正向影响，反馈率和反馈人员多样性对个体创新贡献度有显著负向影响，反馈长度和反馈支持文件对个体创新贡献度没有影响，正向情感倾向在用户反馈和个体创新贡献度之间无任何调节作用。     

The long overhang of bad decisions in agro-industrial development: Sugar and tomato paste in Ghana

In theory, learning from past mistakes should result in adapted and improved development policy. However policy learning can be difficult to achieve, and the link between learning and policy change is neither direct nor immediate. In this study we look at learning in agro-industrial policy in Ghana, by tracing the interest in sugar production and tomato processing over six decades. Specifically we ask why four failed factories established in the early 1960s have continued to play central roles in both policy and public discourse. Using policy documents, academic material, and the popular press, we show that Ghana’s policy focus on sugar production and tomato processing has endured, despite the fact that the factories were misconceived, poorly sited, ill-equipped and poorly managed. Indeed, the political ideas that underpinned the establishment of these factories in the early days of independence can be seen in the current One District, One Factory policy. We suggest that it is their symbolic and political value, not their economic value, which keeps the discussion around these factories alive. Even when shut down, they are a physical manifestation of historic commitments by the state, and as such they guarantee the attention of politicians, and hold out hope of a next re-launch. Unfortunately as long as the factories continue to be incorporated into each new generation of agro-industrial policy, it is difficult for any alternatives to gain traction. This analysis highlights the very long overhang of bad decisions, particularly when they are associated with physical infrastructure. Learning from past mistakes will only happen if the short-term political cost of turning policy learning into policy action can be overcome.     

环境政策工具对生态创新的影响: 研究回顾及实践意义

各种环境政策工具用来推进生态创新的开发、传播与应用，但不同政策工具对生态创新的作用效果还有待进一步挖掘。系统梳理了环境政策工具对生态创新影响的相关研究，探究不同政策工具的作用及其本质，以理解在推动生态创新开发、传播与应用情景下环境政策工具的作用及其实践意义。     

Overconfidence and tax avoidance: The role of CEO and CFO interaction

We investigate how overconfident CEOs and CFOs may interact to influence firms’ tax avoidance. We adopt an equity measure to capture overconfident CEOs and CFOs and utilize multiple measures to identify companies’ tax-avoidance activities. We document that CFOs, as CEOs’ business partners, play an important role in facilitating and executing overconfident CEOs’ decisions in regard to tax avoidance. Specifically, we find that companies are more likely to engage in tax-avoidance activities when they have both overconfident CEOs and overconfident CFOs, compared with companies that have other combinations of CEO/CFO overconfidence (e.g., an overconfident CEO with a non-overconfident CFO), which is consistent with the False Consensus Effect Theory. Our study helps investors, regulators, and policymakers understand companies’ decision-making processes with regard to tax avoidance.     

产业共性技术政府支持性研发外包合同影响因素研究

建立产业共性技术研发外包博弈模型，从政府视角研究以共性技术产出最大化为目标的最优政府支持性研发外包合同，并对最优外包合同影响因素进行分析。研究表明：足够多的政府预算是共性技术政府支持性最优研发外包合同存在的前提，最优合同条款随政府预算的增大而增多，企业保留收益增大倒逼政府预算增加；企业最优知识技术投入与共性技术价值系数以及从研发中分享的收益份额正相关，与政府支付的固定研发费用负相关；政府最优知识技术投入与固定研发费用及单位投入成本系数负相关；企业最优投入与政府投入成本系数负相关，与政府投入对研发成功的贡献系数正相关，且企业最优投入随其研发能力的增强而加大。最后，根据研究结论，从政府预算、项目前景及支持性资源分配3个方面提出共性技术研发外包合同实施的政策建议。     

政策不确定性、财政扩张与区域商业银行风险——基于中国地方官员变更和银行业的证据

文章利用2007-2017年我国93家区域商业银行的面板数据，并结合省级宏观经济数据和地方官员变更数据，实证考察了中国地方官员变更引起的经济政策不确定性对区域商业银行风险的重要影响。研究结果表明：（1）地方官员变更引起的政策不确定性增大了区域商业银行风险；（2）地方官员变更引起的政策不确定性，通过提高银行的资产收益率降低了商业银行风险；而不确定性时期的财政扩张，通过降低银行资产收益率增大了商业银行风险；并且财政扩张的负面影响大于政策不确定性的正面影响；（3）各省的市委书记发生职位更替引起的政策不确定性对区域商业银行风险的影响更大。文章研究为新时代背景下的金融供给侧结构性改革、政府宏观经济政策的制定以及财政体制与金融体制之间的联系提供参考。     

和谐社会与价值--能量理论

本文延续了《经济学的本质》、《经济学的表象》两书提出的“价值-能量”理论,对构建和谐社会的要求、过程和目的进行了科学的分析,并为之奠定了科学的理论基础.     

CREDIBILITY, MACROECONOMIC FUNDAMENTALS AND MARKOV REGIME SWITCHES IN THE EMS

The main objective of this paper is to use the Markov regime‐switching modelling framework to describe and analyse the credibility of a number of countries participating in the European Monetary System during 1980–1998. Our credibility indicator, based on Hughes Hallet et al.'s (1997) methodology, is subject to discrete regime shifts and is made dependent on macroeconomic fundamentals. We carry out extensive testing to assess the specification of the Markov regime‐switching model and the potential existence of permanent breaks. A contribution of our paper is the specification of a multivariate Markov switching model that allows us to examine whether macroeconomic variables have asymmetric effects on credibility. Another contribution is the specification of a regime‐switching model with time‐varying transition probabilities, which enables us to determine whether changes in macroeconomic variables can trigger switches between the low and high credibility regimes. We find strong evidence of regime switching behaviour in all countries. Both the level of credibility and the transition probabilities display an asymmetric response to changes in macroeconomic variables, with the stance of fiscal policy exerting the most systematic influence in all countries.     

东部地区农业结构变动与政策变量之间的相关性研究

本文通过农民收入变量、农民受教育程度、农村人均固定资产投资额、政府用于农村人均文教娱乐用品及服务支出和政府用于农村财政支出等政策变量与东部地区农业结构变动的相关性分析,再根据未来若干年我国及东部地区农业政策变化趋势,从而预测未来我国东部地区农业结构的变化趋势。     

Game theoretic derivations of competitive strategies in conjoint analysis

While conjoint analysis has been applied in a wide variety of different contexts in Marketing, most applications fail to explicitly consider retaliatory reactions from competitors. In this paper, a methodological extension is developed for conjoint analysis by explicitly modeling competition in a game theoretic context. The Nash equilibrium concept is employed to model competitive reactions to produce design, and its implications for reactive product strategies are discussed. The optimal product design problem for each firm is formulated as a nonlinear integer programming problem, which is solved via a specialized branch and bound method combined with a heuristic. In order to compute a Nash equilibrium, a sequential iterative procedure is proposed. The proposed procedure is illustrated under several scenarios of competition using previously published conjoint data.This research has been supported by the Henry Rutgers Research Fellowship, Rutgers University.