Anarchy, efficiency, and redistribution

This paper develops a contractarian theory of the state and the existence of redistribution. The existence of rules of redistribution is explained without any recourse to the risk-aversion of agents. No veil of ignorance is needed. This avoids obligational problems inherent in most other contractarian theories of justice. Hence, this paper departs from the standard legitimization of redistribution as fundamental insurance and interprets it as stemming from a principle of reciprocity in trade. Since this paper deals with an anarchic society, the implementation of redistributional rules is constrained by the assumption of self-enforcement. We show that this assumption changes the interpretation of the state: the state is characterized by a particular design of equilibrium strategies, not by the existence of enforcement agencies.     

The politics of redistributive social insurance

This paper analyses the political support for a social insurance that includes elements of redistribution when there exists an imperfect private insurance alternative. Individuals differ both in their income and risk. The social insurance is compulsory and charges an income-related contribution with pooling of risks. The private insurance is voluntary and charges a contribution based on individual risks. However due to the adverse selection problem, private insurance companies provide only partial insurance. Adopting a non-expected utility model, we show that there is a general majority support for social insurance and that this support is increasing with risk aversion. We also show that a mixed insurance is politically impossible, regardless of the degree of redistribution of social insurance and the joint distribution of risk and income in the population. Lastly, we analyse how the political support for social insurance is affected by any change in its redistributive component and the possibility of using genetic tests.     

The political economy of redistribution under democracy

We ask what redistributions of income and assets are feasible in a democracy, given the initial assets and their distribution. The question is motivated by the possibility that if redistribution is insufficient for the poor or excessive for the rich, they may turn against democracy. In turn, if no redistribution simultaneously satisfies the poor and the wealthy, democracy cannot be sustained. Hence, the corollary question concerns the conditions under which democracy is sustainable. We find that democracies survive in wealthy societies. Conditional on the initial income distribution and the capacity of the poor and the wealthy to overthrow democracy, each country has a threshold of capital stock above which democracy survives. This threshold is lower when the distribution of initial endowments is more equal and when the revolutionary prowess of these groups is lower. Yet in poor unequal countries there exist no redistribution scheme which would be accepted both by the poor and the wealthy. Hence, democracy cannot survive. As endowments increase, redistribution schemes that satisfy both the poor and the wealthy emerge. Moreover, as capital stock grows the wealthy tolerate more and the poor less redistribution, so that the set of feasible redistributions becomes larger. Since the median voter prefers one such scheme to the dictatorship of either group, democracy survives.We would like to thank, Daron Acemoglu, Marco Basetto, Alberto Bisin, V.V. Chari, Pat Kehoe, Onur Ozgur for very useful comments.     

Income Redistribution with Well-Informed Local Governments

This paper examines the problem of redistributing incomeacross jurisdictions and to mobile workers within jurisdictionswhen local governments have better information than the centralgovernment about local production conditions. Under the centralgovernments optimal policy, the subsidies or taxes that localgovernments provide to mobile workers normally depend on whetherthese governments are net recipients or net donors of interjurisdictionalincome transfers. Moreover, the public-input decisions of somelocal governments are distorted. The analysis demonstrates thatit may not be desirable to harmonize social policies across jurisdictions,even when the beneficiaries are quite mobile.     

如何缩小我国个人贫富差距

我国个人收入差距不断扩大,是国民收入初次分配和再分配制度存在缺陷造成的。只有深化分配制度改革,才能从根本上扭转这一趋势,最终更好地实现社会公平。     

Distributional consequences of political representation

We investigate, both theoretically and empirically, the effect of the geographic concentration of representatives on the geographic distribution of fiscal transfers. Our theoretical model predicts that more representatives residing in a geographic area leads to higher government funds to that area. Our empirical analysis uses the fact that in Germany, due to Germany׳s electoral rules in state elections, the number of representatives varies across electoral districts. Controlling for various socio-economic, demographic, and political variables and using a variety of estimation methods, we find that districts with a greater number of representatives receive more government funds.     

The initiative,referendum, and distribution of income: An empirical analysis of Swiss cantons

This study examines how direct democratic institutions affect income distribution before and after taxes. Based on a panel of Swiss cantons from 1945 to 2014, we test the effects of the constitutional reforms of direct democratic instruments. Our findings show that better voter access to the initiative induces policy shifts that significantly decrease top incomes and benefit the upper middle class. For the popular referendum we do not find such effects. The income effects of direct democracy are not a consequence of shifts in fiscal redistribution, but rather result from policy changes affecting pre-tax incomes.     

Redistribution effects of inflation

This note discusses Lee Ohanian׳s paper on “Monetary policy in the midst of big shocks”. In particular, it asks what would happen if assumptions are changed so inflation have redistribution effects. Evidence on nominal positions suggests that such effects can be quantitatively important.     

收入不平等、政策偏向与最优财政再分配政策

本文构建的理论模型探讨了收入不平等、政策偏向与最优财政再分配之间的关系。模型显示:政策偏向是收入不平等与财政再分配恶性循环的决定因素。当政策偏向于穷人时,最优财政再分配系统的选择是提高税率,扩大对穷人的转移支付;当政策偏向于富人时,最优财政再分配系统的选择是降低税率,减少对穷人的转移支付。依据中国数据的实证研究发现:(1)中国收入不平等不断恶化,针对恶化的不平等而采取的财政再分配政策效果差,没能扭转不平等恶化趋势,政策偏向严重。(2)税收再分配政策偏向富人,使富人税负相对轻于穷人,居民收入不平等加剧;偏向于穷人的转移支付多为消费券(物),导致越扶越贫。为此,需要从调整所得税和转移支付政策等方面采取相关对策。     

我国个人所得税再分配效应及累进性的实证分析

税收是调节收入分配差距的有效手段之一。本文循着层层递进的逻辑,建立了税收再分配效应及累进性分解的数学理论模型,实证分析了1995年到2008年间我国个人所得税的再分配效应,剖析了影响其变动的深层次原因。结果表明:除2006年外,我国个人所得税起到了正向、且进一步加强的再分配效应,但调节效果非常有限;平均税率明显偏低,累进性基本呈下降趋势;分类征收模式导致总体累进性下降,工资薪金所得税是个人所得税累进性的主要来源;免征额在工资薪金所得税的累进性中起主导作用,其次是税率结构,而社会保障支出起较小的累进(或累退)效果。因此,在公平视角下改革与完善我国个人所得税制迫在眉睫。