Estimating the Economic Benefits of Cleaning Up Superfund Sites: The Case of Woburn,Massachusetts

Superfund was established in 1980 to deal with closed and abandoned hazardous waste sites. Given the large amounts of money being spent on cleanups of Superfund sites, one might hope that the money is being spent in a cost-effective manner, but there is little evidence that the estimated benefits from cleanup affect the cleanup decision. We apply the hedonic method to house prices to estimate the individual willingness to pay (WTP) to clean up a Superfund site. We then show how the individual WTP can be used to calculate the total benefits from cleaning up the site so that a cost-benefit analysis of Superfund cleanup can be undertaken. We apply our technique to the two Superfund sites in Woburn, Massachusetts. We find that the benefits from cleaning up these sites are in the range of $72 million to $122 million (1992 dollars). It is likely that these benefits are greater than the present value of the estimated costs of cleaning up these sites. Thus it appears that the cleanup of the Woburn Superfund sites results in positive net benefits to society.     

Earnings Management to Minimize Superfund Clean‐up and Transaction Costs*

We investigate whether firms identified as potentially responsible parties (PRPs) under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (more commonly known as Superfund) appear to manipulate earnings to minimize their exposure to Superfund clean‐up and transaction costs. We analyze the discretionary accrual behavior of 612 PRPs from 1981 to 1995 and increase the power of our tests by identifying those PRPs with the most incentive to manage earnings during PRP identification years. The results provide robust evidence consistent with the hypothesis that these PRPs use income‐reducing discretionary accruals during PRP identification years in an attempt to minimize Superfund clean‐up and transaction costs. We also consider whether PRPs' incentives to manage earnings change in response to a change in the EPA regulatory regime and find modest evidence consistent with our conjecture.