Cognitive ability and human behavior in experimental ultimatum games

Recent researches have shed light on the effect of cognitive ability on economic decision-making. By measuring cognitive ability applying Raven's progressive matrix test, we obtain two significant results that this effect affects decision-making in two types of experimental ultimatum games. First, the higher the cognitive ability, the larger the amount a sender offers when the offer is smaller than or equal to the half split. Second, the higher the responders’ cognitive ability, the smaller the offer they accept, when they accept it or not with the strategy method. This study not only finds new factors that affect decision-making in experimental ultimatum games, but also provides more evidences that cognitive ability influences economic decision-making.     

Consequences of a green image of drone food delivery services: The moderating role of gender and age

Drone food delivery services play a significant role in protecting the environment, because the services are operated by batteries that can be charged with electricity. Therefore, this study tried to examine a green image in the context of drone food delivery services. More specifically, this study proposed that a green image of drone food delivery services plays an important role in the formation of attitude toward using the services. In addition, it was hypothesized that the attitude has a positive influence on behavioral intentions including intentions to use, word‐of‐mouth intentions, and willingness to pay more. Lastly, the moderating role of gender and age was proposed during the theory‐building process. A theoretical model, which included 12 hypotheses, was developed and tested using a total of 427 samples collected in Korea. The data analysis results showed that a green image of drone food delivery services has a positive influence on attitude toward using the services, which in turn positively affects three subdimensions of behavioral intentions. Furthermore, gender and age played partly as a moderator. The current paper was the first to study the green image of drone food delivery services, so the findings of this study mean a lot to the theoretical aspect.     

Social Comparisons in Ultimatum Bargaining

Experiments are used to examine the effects of social comparisons in ultimatum bargaining. We inform responders about the average offer before they decide whether to accept or reject their specific offer. This significantly increases offers and offer‐specific rejection probabilities. For comparison, we consider another change in informational conditions: telling responders the total pie is $30—ex ante it was either $15 or $30—affects offers and rejection probabilities roughly as much. Our results are consistent with people’s dislike for deviations from the norm of equity but inconsistent with fairness theories, where people dislike income disparity between themselves and their referents.     

格莱明银行模式:基于关联博弈的分析

从关联博弈角度对格莱明银行模式进行了分析,认为格莱明银行小组贷款模式实现了贷款博弈与社会资本博弈的紧密结合,正是这种紧密关联博弈克服了成员贷款中的 "搭便车"行为.由于重复博弈的存在,社会资本成为一种可置信的威胁,保证了贷款协议的执行,成功克服了合约中产生的代理问题.格莱明银行模式对我国小额信贷激励机制的建立具有重要的参考价值.     

西方现代股利政策理论及实证研究回顾

本文对西方现代公司股利政策方面的理论和实证研究进行了一个综合性的回顾和分析。其中包括主流的股利行为模型、股利的信息内涵、代理成本、追随者效应,也包括国内研究中较少涉及的债务约束、声誉学说、成长机会和交易成本问题,以期对国内相对落后的股利政策研究和随意性较强的股利政策制定带来一定的借鉴意义。     

Average Monotonic Cooperative Games

A subclass of monotonic transferable utility (T.U.) games is studied: average monotonic games. These games are totally balanced. We prove that the core coincides with both the bargaining set à la Davis and Maschler and the bargaining set à la Mas-Colell. To obtain this result a technique based on reduced games is used. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C71     

政府预算过程中的多方利益博弈

本文通过探讨目标各异的多种角色参与的预算过程 ,指出预算过程是一种博弈过程 ,在此过程中代表各方利益的参与者为取得支出优先权展开竞争。本文主要对各支出部门之间、政府预算部门与支出部门之间、政府与公众之间以及中央与地方之间在预算决策中的竞争博弈行为进行分析 ,提出完善预算制度的政策建议。     

Pollution Control in Open Economies: Implications of Within-period Interactions for Dynamic Game Equilibrium

This paper examines a two-country, dynamic game model of pollution control in the presence of economic interactions between countries within a period, as well as the environmental interaction between periods (i.e., a change in the stock of global pollution). These economic interactions emerge because of changes in the terms of trade of polluting goods or the market share of domestic polluting industries. It is shown that if within-period externalities exist, a noncooperative equilibrium may result in a smaller stock of global pollution in the steady state than does international cooperation. Moreover, the properties of equilibrium paths depend on the direction and size of such externalities. In addition, trigger strategy equilibria that achieve the outcome of the collusive solution are examined.     

公司治理结构中经营者盈余管理的博弈分析

本文从经营者与监督者之间的博弈模型入手,讨论了公司治理结构对盈余管理的影响,并在分析了我国目前的公司治理结构存在的问题后,提出了一些措施,最后给出了研究建议。