Coping with coopetition—Facing dilemmas in cooperation for sustainable development: The case of the Dutch smart grid industry

This paper is amongst the first to examine coopetition strategy for sustainable development at the network level. Companies who want to successfully implement complex innovative technologies that support sustainable development need to collaborate with other actors of the innovation ecosystem, including their competitors, so that they can develop standards, interoperable products, pool knowledge, and resources and bundle forces to compete against other technologies. Collaboration with competitors brings benefits, but also many risks. We investigated how firms cope with these risks when establishing an innovation ecosystem to implement a new technology in society. We conducted research in the Dutch smart grids sector and explored how these firms minimize inherent risks of coopetition. We found that system‐building actors in the Dutch smart grid field not only minimize inherent risks, but from the start of their collaboration they implement so‐called enablers to prevent these risks upfront.     

Application of collective knowledge diffusion in a social network environment

ABSTRACT

We present a group dynamics model that shows knowledge integration as a process occurring over time. As each individual in the group contact others, his own knowledge changes, and over time the collective knowledge is obtained. This allows modeling knowledge diffusion in a social network and while the models presented in this paper are not competitive in that area, they approach the problem from previously unconsidered direction. We test the behavior of the model in a multi-agent simulation and we test a simple advertisement campaign in a social network. We provide discussion of elements needed for making model more competitive.     

规范劳动合同制是地勘单位用工制度改革的关键

文章认为,计划经济体制下形成的,地勘单位采用行政命令配合思想政治工作的方式,对固定职工进行各个用工环节的管理模式,已不适合市场经济条件和经济全球化的要求,地勘单位必须规范劳动合同制管理,进行用工制度改革。文章分析了地勘单位劳动管理现状,论述了实行劳动合同制管理的必然性和紧迫性,以及现今地勘单位在规范劳动合同管理方面存在的差距。最后提出了地勘单位规范全员劳动合同制管理的四项措施建议。     

国家行为与产权：一个新制度经济学的分析框架

早期的产权理论侧重于微观层次的分析，较少考虑中观（利益集团）及宏观层次（国家）对产权结构形成的影响及不同层次产权的交互作用的机制。文章从新制度经济学关于国家的定义入手，通过对个体权力与国家、集体行动与国家以及法治化社会与国家的三个层次的分析，提出建立产权制度分析的国家模型，从而论证国家与产权制度变迁的关系。     

超市寄包的法律思考

本文试图对商业流通企业中存在的两种寄存包行为的行为性质进行法律分析,并对此引起的法律责任,产生的法律后果作一理论上的探讨,以求正确界定它们,保护消费者与商业企业的合法权益。     

Marriage Settlements

French couples may choose between two types of marriage settlements governing asset ownership after a divorce or inheritance: common property or separate property. A cooperative model considers the marriage contract as a means of providing for widowhood of the less endowed spouse. A second model addresses the probability of divorce and the production of a marriage good. The common property contract then becomes a means of inducing the wife to invest in the marriage good. Choice of contract, labor supply and fertility are simultaneous. Empirically we find that characteristics of the spouses such as relative age or differences in endowments influence the choice. So do the expected number of children and the wife's labor supply decision. This last decision is also shown to be influenced by the chosen settlement, while fertility is not.
JEL classification : J 12; J 4; K 12     

对远期外汇合约信用风险的监管

随着远期外汇合约近几年来在我国的逐步推行,外汇市场活跃的同时也增加了外汇交易的信用风险,。要实现外汇市场的有序开放和稳定发展,就必须对其实行有效的风险管理,这包括交易主体对信用风险的识别,处置和外部监管。     

企业合同管理制度创新初探

合同是企业与外部进行物流、资金流、信息流交换的基本形式；当前我国市场规则和秩序还不很规范，合同极易被不法分子利用，进行各种违法犯罪活动，企业就可能因此蒙受巨大的经济损失。因此，搞好合同管理，是维护企业合法权益的最基本的要求。文章从分析目前企业合同管理中存在的问题人手，提出完善和创新企业合同管理的建议。     

Research on principal-agency of stockholders and managers under asymmetric information condition

In modem enterprises, a separation of the right of ownership and management results in asymmetric information problems between stockholders and managers. In conditions of principal-agency relationship, the game behaviors between principle and agency within enterprises are impacted by asymmetric information. This study discusses the game behaviors between stockholders and managers by using information economic theories from the perspective of asymmetric information. Based on the model of the principal-agency relationship between stockholders and managers, our research uses quantitative analysis to reveal how to achieve maximum profit expected of stockholders through an incomplete contract, under asymmetric information condition.