Who Defended Monetary Stability in a Specie Regime? Evidence from the Chinese History

Despite the lack of political accountability, ancient autocracies maintained a level of monetary stability that rivals modern democracies. This paper hypothesizes that it is the threat of counterfeiting that has constrained currency debasement. Unwilling to share seigniorage with counterfeiters, who are active only if currency is debased, the government refrains from debasement unless in extreme fiscal situations. To document the facts, we build a database of historical Chinese copper coins that covers the period from the Qin dynasty (221 BC–207 BC) to the Republic of China. We also use the introduction of the steam press in late Qing China as a natural experiment to test the theory. The steam press produced coins of fine patterns that counterfeiters were unable to mimic. As the theory predicts, the removal of the threat of counterfeiting triggered the most serious debasement in the history of the Qing dynasty (1644–1912).     

Inflation Dynamics and its Sources in the Ottoman Empire: 1586–1913

This study examines the dynamics and determinants of inflation in the Ottoman Empire during the 1586–1913 period. There are two possible reasons for inflation: fiscal expansion and monetary expansion, which could be generated through the debasement of local currency (Akçe). We used a set of political and structural variables in order to explain the change in inflation dynamics. In particular, we considered the war years, periods of Ottoman history that show different characteristics (the slow‐down period, the recession period and the break‐up period) and the period of constitutional monarchy. Moreover, we tested whether the inflation process was the same for each sultan and whether each sultan’s behavior during the first year was different from the rest of his reign. The empirical evidence reported here suggests that war accelerated inflation as expected and fiscal expansion rather than the debasement of the Akçe was the main reason for inflation. Moreover, the slow‐down, the recession and the break‐up periods affected inflation positively; both fiscal expansion and the debasement of the Akçe were seen in these three periods as sources of inflation. While employing different inflationary policies during his reign, each sultan accelerated inflation in the first year of his reign by the debasement of the Akçe or by fiscal expansion. Last, the constitutional monarchy period had a significant positive effect on inflation although fiscal expansion, rather than the debasement of the Akçe, was the source of inflation during this period.     

Espen Moe,Governance, Growth and Global Leadership: The Role of the State in Technological Progress, 1750–2000

Abstract

The concept of the ‘dissolution of estate society’ (standssamfunnets opplesning) has not been much used in Norwegian historical research. The great process of social change which took place in the 19th century, the main features of which have their counterparts in the social development of the other Scandinavian countries, has been discussed within other conceptual contexts. Norwegian historians have often stressed the contrast between an urban society and an agricultural society based on self-sufficiency, or between the people and their administrators. In economic history the changes which came with industrialization, and the shift from an agricultural economy based on self-sufficiency to an agricultural economy based on buying and selling, have been the subject of much research. In social and political history the subjects which have aroused the greatest interest have been the struggles of the farmers as well against the bureaucracy as against the commercial capitalism of the towns, and the role of the farmers in the movement towards political democracy.     

Separation of Unit of Account from Medium of Exchange

The separation of a unit of account (UoA) from a medium of exchange (MoE) in the commodity–money system is investigated by considering explicitly a seller's choice of UoA in terms of either an MoE or a unit of metal weight. If the likelihood of debasement of an MoE and its rate are high enough, the price is posted in terms of a unit of metal weight rather than an MoE. Interestingly, this MoE–UoA separated equilibrium yields the flexible nominal price, whereas an MoE–UoA integrated equilibrium yields the sticky one. This implies the nominal price rigidity in the fiat‐money system where MoE and UoA are integrated.