Sustainability Northwest: An Integrative Case of a Not‐for‐Profit Organization

Sustainability Northwest (SNW) is a fictional not‐for‐profit organization (NPO) that seeks to develop thought leaders for a sustainable future. This instructional case allows professors to assign students with up to six different roles, including SNW's chair of the board, executive director, volunteer treasurer, and the external auditor. Unique learning objectives include (i) the application of the CPA Canada Handbook, Accounting—Part III to prepare an NPO's financial statements using fund accounting, (ii) the development of recommendations to improve an NPO's board of directors, (iii) the analysis of system flow documents to identify control weaknesses, and (iv) the preparation of an audit planning memo. Instructors can use this case in several milieus. First, professors can foster a student's ability to integrate technical knowledge by (i) assigning students all six roles in a capstone course to promote integration within an individual course or (ii) assigning multiple roles across multiple courses to promote integration across a program of studies. Second, instructors can focus on a particular technical skill by assigning specific roles. This case is ideal for senior‐level undergraduate students or graduate students.     

Investor Attention and Earnings Management around the World

This study examines the determinants of earnings management in an international setting using the limited investor attention model of Hirshleifer and Teoh ( 2003 ). The model predicts that investor attention reduces earnings management. I use analyst following, institutional ownership, and Big N auditor choice to proxy for investor attention. I have four key findings. First, I document that financial analysts curb earnings management in U.S. firms but not in non‐U.S. firms. Second, I document that institutional block‐holdings curb earnings management across the world. Third, Big N auditors reduce earnings management in U.S. firms but not in non‐U.S. firms. Fourth, I document that corporate governance mechanisms reduce earnings management in U.S. firms but not in non‐U.S. firms.     

Effect of corporate governance on default risk in financial versus nonfinancial firms: Canadian evidence

This paper investigates the influence of corporate governance variables on default risk of Canadian firms after the 2008 financial crisis. We provide evidence that important governance mechanisms have differential impacts between Canadian financial and nonfinancial firms. Ownership structure, (e.g., institutional ownership and insider ownership), has a significant impact on the default risk of financial firms but not on nonfinancial firms. Nonfinancial firms with more independent boards are associated with lower default risk, while financial firms with larger boards and more independent boards have higher default risk. In addition, although cross‐listing in the US reduces the default risk for Canadian nonfinancial firms, it actually increases the risk for Canadian financial firms during the postcrisis period. Copyright © 2016 ASAC. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Role of Pension Business Benefits in Institutional Block Ownership and Corporate Governance*

We investigate whether potential pension contracting benefits lead institutions that provide pension services to acquire ownership blocks in firms and the implications of such blockholdings on the firms' corporate governance. We use the 2006 Pension Protection Act, which expanded pension participation in certain states, as a quasi-exogenous shock and find an increase in block ownership by pension-providing institutions in firms with substantial operations in affected states. Further, we find that the acquisition of a large block increases the likelihood that the institution will provide future pension services to the firm. With regard to corporate governance, we find that the acquisition of large pension blockholdings is associated with higher CEO pay and lower CEO turnover following poor financial performance. However, contrary to the prediction of the private benefits hypothesis, we do not find consistent evidence that large pension blockholdings are associated with declining firm profitability, suggesting that pension institutions are incentivized to exert monitoring to preserve the investment value of their blockholdings. Overall, our evidence is consistent with pension service institutions acquiring ownership blocks to obtain pension contracts, but our evidence does not support the prediction that they use their influence to compromise shareholder value.     

Shareholder Empowerment and Board of Directors Effectiveness*

We develop a model to examine implications of empowering shareholders to replace directors. We find that shareholder empowerment functions as a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it can weaken ineffective boards' incentive to hold on to their position. On the other hand, it can induce both effective and ineffective boards to behave strategically to avoid a potential dismissal. As a result, empowerment does not necessarily increase firm value; in some cases, empowerment exacerbates the agency problem it is intended to address. Giving shareholders the power to set board compensation (have a “say on pay”) can mitigate these problems. However, even when empowerment benefits (harms) the shareholders, firm value may decrease (increase). Finally, we discuss empirical and policy implications of the main findings.     

The Relevance of XBRL Voluntary Disclosure for Stock Market Valuation: The Role of Corporate Governance

The aim of this paper is to investigate the relevance for stock market pricing of accounting earnings of voluntary disclosures in XBRL files considering the quality of corporate governance. Results are the following. It appears that XBRL extensions attract financial analysts. Good governance is positively associated with voluntary XBRL extensions. We observe that XBRL extensions enhance the positive relationship between accounting earnings and stock price. However, this positive association is reduced for firms with good governance, suggesting a substitution effect between XBRL extensions and corporate governance. Finally, it appears that XBRL extensions would strategically be related to earnings quality. This research highlights the importance to consider governance when assessing the value relevance of XBRL disclosures for stock market pricing.     

Equity recognition of mandatory accounting changes: the case of transitional goodwill impairment losses

This study investigates if and how the use of the retroactive method to account for a mandatory accounting change affects a firm's measurement and recognition choices. We examine if reporting incentives and constraints are associated with the magnitude of transitional goodwill impairment losses reported by Canadian firms implementing Section 3062 on purchased goodwill. Our results indicate firms have an incentive to both overstate and understate transitional goodwill impairment losses. We also show that financially literate and independent audit committees constrain managerial opportunism. Copyright © 2008 ASAC. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

What Questions Do Board Members in Public Service Organizations Ask about Executive Compensation?

The purpose of this study is to investigate the governance questions that board members in public service organizations ask as they go about fulfilling their responsibilities for the oversight of executive compensation. We investigate the usage and perceived importance by board members of the 24 questions proposed by the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants that directors should ask about executive compensation. The study is based on a usable sample of 47 board members from public service organizations who attended a Canadian director training program. Our results suggest that the recommended executive compensation governance questions are not being asked with the same frequency or considered equally important by board members of public service organizations. Furthermore, the correlation between a question’s usage frequency and its perceived importance was not perfect. However, there appears to be a significantly positive relationship among the number of executive compensation governance questions asked and selected elements of a board’s governance structure.     

Holliston Helping Hands

This case focuses on fraud investigation in a not‐for‐profit organization, along with an examination of governance and management control practices. The student assumes the role of an accountant investigating a possible fraud. The student is first presented with sample invoices paid by the organization that are fraught with irregularities and red flags of potential fraud. Drawing on the student's knowledge of control systems and corporate governance, the student's task is to identify suspicions of possible fraudulent transactions, identify key suspects, and develop an investigative plan. The class can also discuss recommendations to improve governance and control mechanisms to avoid future occurrences of fraud. The case is presented in three parts, and closely parallels a fraud investigation as additional information is revealed in each successive part of the case. This is much like peeling the layers of an onion which is a common way to describe the evolution of a fraud investigation. This case is based on a real fraud investigation conducted by one of the authors who was engaged by the province's Ministry of Health. Students who express disbelief about issues portrayed in the case can be reassured that these faithfully represent actual events.