The dynamics of moonlighting in Russia1

This paper uses the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS) to analyse the dynamics of moonlighting by the working‐age population. We find that moonlighting is transitory and that a desire to switch jobs expressed in the past is positively related to moonlighting in the present and to actual job changes in the future. We also find that workers who moonlighted as self‐employed in the past represent 26.5 percent of the new self‐employed. These results suggest that moonlighting in Russia can be seen as an effective incubator for setting up new self‐employed businesses, thereby providing long‐term benefits for the economy.     

非正规金融研究文献述评

通过对非正规金融的概念、类型、规模、形成原因、市场利率等方面的梳理,指出非正规金融的产生适应经济发展的内在要求,具有客观必然性。非正规金融的高利率在一定程度上是放贷风险的补偿,同时也是对正规金融官僚体制低效率的制度适应。     

我国制造业环境管制的实证研究

从制造业的角度出发,分析了政府对环境管制(ER)的两种形式:正式管制(FER)和非正式管制(I-ER),建立了环境管制均衡方程,并且采用面板数据的分析方法对理论假设进行了验证。研究表明,假设的影响制造业环境管制的主要因素:政府保护意愿、劳动密集程度、产业规模、经济外向度、产业国有化程度、科技吸收转化支出和劳动力素质的高低均产生了显著的影响。     

家族企业中的歧视现象 --作为非正式治理机制的歧视

歧视现象普遍存在于家族企业，本文认为，歧视是家族企业在正式治理机制弱化情况下实施的一种非正式治理机制。家族企业扩张和管理的复杂化，要求雇佣高能力的外部代理人开展专业化分工，但是，现有的正式治理机制难以抑制外部代理人的寻租行为，过高的代理成本阻碍了分工的深入。业主会利用家族代理人和外部代理人共享的“准私人信息”，以及代理人之间信息租金的不同分布，根据血亲关系和私人关系在不同代理人之间实施歧视，通过给与家族代理人优厚待遇，达到抽取外部代理人的信息租金，降低代理成本的目的。     

非正式制度视角下的集群企业信誉机制

产业集群中的企业信誉是保证产业集群有序运作的前提,要保证企业间高效的合作就必须有强有力的制度保障。与科层组织的信誉机制不同,产业集群中企业间的信任和合作主要是依靠非正式制度。文章从关系性嵌入、专用性投资,以及联合制裁三个方面对此问题进行了阐释。文章的结论是,产业集群中特有的信誉机制是导致产业集群竞争优势的一个重要原因。     

企业文化变革的制度透视与经济学分析

本文从新制度经济学的视角出发，把企业文化视为非正式制度，以其基本理论为基础，对企业文化内涵及其变革进行了分析和研究，为企业文化变革提供了理论依据。     

企业中关系结构的演化及其影响分析

理性的管理方式对企业绩效提升的边际作用越来越低，因此理论和实践界对非正式关系的兴趣越来越浓厚。本文以弱连带关系理论和强连带理论为支持，分析了企业内部的非正式关系和企业内部非正式关系的演化过程，提出企业内部应建立有效连带关系，以及构建有效连带关系的相应措施。     

Informal Traders and the Battlegrounds of Revanchism in Cusco,Peru

Informal trading in the global South, particularly in Latin America, is the subject of revanchist urban policy and yet few studies have examined the longer‐term impacts of such intolerant policies on traders. This article explores the evolution and impacts of revanchist policies directed at informal traders in the Andean city of Cusco. It makes two key contributions. First, it documents a shift from early revanchist policies to a post‐revanchist era where policies have become more tolerant of informal traders. However, contemporary policies fall short of a supportive environment for informal trading, hence the authors recommend changes that will ensure informal traders can access the city's streets and become an accepted part of the urban fabric. Second, given the lack of theoretical attention given to the impacts of revanchism, a battlegrounds framework is developed, consisting of spatial, political, economic and socio‐cultural battlegrounds. This framework provides a comprehensive insight into the complex set of interactions that exist between informal traders and the state. It is hoped that the framework will provide a tool for further research into the highly damaging impacts of revanchism across the globe.     

Tax collection,the informal sector,and productivity

An important determinant of informality in a country is its tax enforcement capacity, which some authors argue further distorts the decisions of firms and creates inefficiency. In this paper, I assess the quantitative effect of incomplete tax enforcement on aggregate output and productivity using a dynamic general equilibrium framework. I calibrate the model using data for Mexico, where the informal sector is large. I then investigate the effects of improving enforcement. I find that under complete enforcement, Mexico's labor productivity and output would be 19% higher under perfect competition and 34% higher under monopolistic competition. The source of this gain is the removal of the distortions induced by incomplete enforcement of taxes. These distortions affect the economy in three ways: by reducing the capital–labor ratios of informal establishments; by allowing low-productive entrepreneurs to enter; and by misallocating resources towards low-productive establishments. As a result, TFP and capital accumulation are reduced, and hence output. I decompose the gains following the guidelines of five leading papers in the literature of resource misallocation across plants. I isolate the effects of pure factor misallocation, distorted occupational choices, capital accumulation, and complementarities. I also study marginal improvements in enforcement and find that there is an inverted-U relationship between the size of the informal sector and output. This reflects the fact that improving enforcement entails a tradeoff: more taxes vs. fewer distortions.     

Subterranean Commodification: Informal Housing and the Legalization of Basement Suites in Vancouver from 1928 to 2009

This article draws on Margaret Radin's theorization of ‘contested commodities' to explore the process whereby informal housing becomes formalized while also being shaped by legal regulation. In seeking to move once‐informal housing into the domain of official legality, cities can seldom rely on a simple legal framework of private‐law principles of property and contract. Instead, they face complex trade‐offs between providing basic needs and affordability and meeting public‐law norms around living standards, traditional neighbourhood feel and the environment. This article highlights these issues through an examination of the uneven process of legal formalization of basement apartments in Vancouver, Canada. We chose a lengthy period—from 1928 to 2009—to explore how basement apartments became a vital source of housing often at odds with city planning that has long favoured a low‐density residential built form. We suggest that Radin's theoretical account makes it possible to link legalization and official market construction with two questions: whether to permit commodification and how to permit commodification. Real‐world commodification processes—including legal sanction—reflect hybridization, pragmatic decision making and regulatory compromise. The resolution of questions concerning how to legalize commodification are also intertwined with processes of market expansion.