Mass-Elite Equilibrium of Federal Constitutional Legitimacy

William Riker ((1964) Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance. Boston: Little Brown) stressed the problem of the contested nature of federal institutions and argued that federations existed amidst the ongoing challenge to their rules, that federal institutions were being continuously endogenously produced in the interaction of political parties rather than serving as self-enforceable constraints on the political process. As parties changed, so did federalism, and eventually the balance was bound to shift to either one or the other extreme as far as the degree of centralization was concerned. An alternative approach to essentially the same problem of federal instability was to conceptualize the underlying game differently, as a game of coordination, so that institutions would be accepted as constraints and would therefore be self-enforceable because they allow the players to avoid the chaos and successfully converge to an outcome with payoffs exceeding their reservation values (Hardin, 1989, Ordeshook, 1992). The third proposed solution, consociationalism, emphasizes the elite effort to overcome the conflictual nature of the institutional choice (Lijphart, 1977). Here, as in the coordination argument, the hope is that one could create incentives for politicians to view the existing rules as advantageous and to avoid redistribution by means of the institutional revision. Yet, just like the coordination argument, it is based on an implicit assumption that politicians are more easily motivated to act “cooperatively” than are their constituencies. The missing step in the literature is the mechanism by which this more or less “cooperative” behavior of elected politicians could be sustainable in the environment of popular accountability. An essential component in building the theory of institutional design is to show the possibility in a democracy of elected politicians cooperating on institutional matters even when each of their constituencies would prefer to adjust the constitutional terms to its own advantage. Elite “cooperativeness” must be sustainable even in the presence of outside challengers promising to stay closer to the constituent preferences. Here, I present a model of mass-elite equilibrium of constitutional legitimacy, which demonstrates the possibility to motivate the incumbents to sustain the institutional stability while at the same time protecting them from electoral defeat. I also discuss the difficulties and limitations that such a solution faces, in particular, in plural societies. JEL classification: H77, D02 In working on this paper, I have benefited from the discussions with Mikhail Filippov, Peter Ordeshook, Charles Kromkowski, Carol Mershon, and from the comments of the participants of the conference on ‘‘Micro-Foundations of Federal Institutional Stability’’ at the MicroIncentives Research Center at Duke University, Durham, NC, April 30–May 1, 2004, and of the Lansing Lee proseminar at the University of Virginia. The responsibility for the many remaining flaws is solely mine.     

Introduction to the special issue on positive conflict—Conflict and employees: The right and processes to be heard

Conflict, defined as clash, competition, or mutual interference of opposing or incompatible forces or qualities, may be positive. The appropriate amount of conflict may be a delicate balance not easily achieved. Thus, a key issue is conflict management. The major charter of this special issue is the presentation of work which suggests or demonstrates that conflict can be a positive force in the modern organization. It also is pointed out that conflict, positive or otherwise, and its resolution involves a broad spectrum of inquiry into the rights and obligations of those involved in the conflict     

上市公司的关联交易及其信息披露

本文分析了上市公司的关联方关系和关联交易,针对目前存在的上市公司关联交易信息披露问题,提出了一些对策及解决办法。     

Indonesian Politics in 2014: Democracy’s Close Call

Indonesian democracy experienced a near miss in 2014, when Jakarta governor Joko Widodo (Jokowi) defeated former general Prabowo Subianto by a margin of 6.3% in the presidential election. Both candidates were populists who rose to prominence in the context of public disillusionment with incumbent president Yudhoyono; Prabowo, however, condemned Indonesia's democratic system and promised to take Indonesia in a more authoritarian direction. We trace democracy's close call through five phases: the dying months of Yudhoyono's presidency, the rise of populist alternatives, the parliamentary elections of April 2014, the July presidential campaign, and the aftermath. We attribute the strength of Prabowo's campaign to superior organisational and financial support, while Jokowi's victory rested upon strong identification with him among poor and rural voters. Also determining the outcome was the fact that public satisfaction with democracy remained strong, undermining the effectiveness of Prabowo's authoritarian-populist message. Nevertheless, democracy's future remains uncertain, given that Prabowo and his supporters now control a sufficiently large number of parliamentary seats to continue promoting a rollback of democratic reforms.     

Political corruption and capture of the minority

This article presents a model of political corruption in which a briber can choose either to bribe only the incumbent party or to capture also the opposition party to sterilize its monitoring role. The analysis also explores interparty collusion, media independence, and political contestability. The model suggests that policies aiming to strengthen the role of minorities can produce ambiguous effects as they may induce bribers' avoidance behavior. Reputational sanctions appear to be less effective than criminal ones, although political contestability increases their deterrence effect. Paradoxically, harsh criminal sanctions may induce tacit collusion because minorities highly regard their outcomes once in power.     

Who cares about the environment? An empirical analysis of the evolution of political parties’ environmental concern in European countries (1970–2008)

Why do parties offer environmental policies in their political programs? While a number of papers examine the determinants of citizens’ pro-environmental behaviour, we know little about the extent to which political parties adjust their platform towards environmentalism. We investigate this process through data provided by the Manifesto Project Dataset (CMP) for 20 European countries over the period 1970-2008. Following the literature on public concern towards environment, we examine economic, environmental and political determinants. Our findings provide evidence that political parties’ environmental concern is strongly correlated with their political ideology and with country-level economic conditions.     

论公司的社会责任

公司的社会责任是社会经济文化发展到一定阶段协调利益失衡的产物。随着中国社会经济发展的加速,公司对社会的影响也愈加增大。加强公司社会责任的认知及建设,对中国社会的健康、和谐发展有着重要作用。     

企业集团内关联方交易价格的确定

随着我国市场经济的不断发展,许多企业通过收购、兼并、参股、控股、重组等形式成长为企业集团,快速扩展其经营规模和经营领域,提高抗御风险的能力。集团内企业如何合理处理相互间的经济业务,在获取集团整体利益的同时,保证从属企业在经济上的独立性,价格上的公平性。内部交易的价格是否公平合理成了当前集团企业、税务部门、审计部门关注的焦点问题之一。     

The Effect of the Alternation in the Ruling Party on Three-Factor Risks and Returns in ETF: The Case of Presidential Elections in Taiwan

This study discusses the effect of alternation in the ruling party in presidential elections on three-factor risks and returns of the three main exchange-traded funds (ETFs) in Taiwan, which has an unclearly defined international status and whose citizens have the right to vote directly for the president. We find that after the ruling party has been determined, in the period between Election Day and inauguration day, both the stock market and ETFs show a slight rise in prices. This suggests that most investors are initially optimistic after the election results have been announced. Meanwhile, the reverse book-to-market risk value deteriorates significantly. These results indicate that political uncertainty increases the risk premium of market factors and reverse book-to-market factors for some ETFs.     

政党软实力和社会核心价值观论

政党实力由硬实力和软实力构成,社会核心价值观是政党软实力的重要表现形式。高度重视政党软实力和社会核心价值观之间的关系,是中国共产党加强执政能力建设,提高科学建党治党水平的重要课题。