Unfolding institutional plurality in hybrid organizations through practices: The case of a cooperative bank

This paper provides a theoretically informed analysis of how institutional pluralism unfolds in hybrid organizations through practices. Building on Quattrone's (2015) procedural model, the paper studies institutional plurality in the case of an Italian cooperative bank that has experienced enduring success. By reversing the usual approach to logic, defined as a stable set of beliefs, this paper shows that this hybrid organization uses a recursive system of practices in search of social order. This hybrid organization interrogates its organizational imperatives and defines adequate ways to achieve them. This paper then observes that this system of practices is permeable to external pressures, i.e., inspections by the central bank, a reform of cooperative banks, political pressure for mergers and acquisitions, and Italy's sovereign debt crisis. While such an organization appears to be ongoingly accountable to its multiple stakeholders, external pressures undermine its community accountability system and push this hybrid organization towards compliance accountability. Based on our findings, this paper develops a process model for hybrid organizations to navigate institutional plurality and to explain the potential limitations of the accountability system.     

ONE HAT TOO MANY: KEY EXECUTIVE PLURALITY AND SHAREHOLDER WEALTH

Tracing backward the career paths of the key executives of Business Week’s 1990 listing of the 1000 most valuable publicly held companies, we empirically examined the impact of announced changes in key executive plurality on stockholder returns. We found the more complete the position consolidation, the more negative were the shareholder responses. To attempt to gain further understanding, the additional variables of executive’s origin, the size of the board of directors of the firm, the proportion of outsiders on the board, and prior firm performance were examined. © 1997 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Reassessing Moral Legitimacy in Times of Instability

The presence of conflicting cues about what is legitimate provided by various stakeholders, begs the question of how the legitimacy of contested institutionalized practices is justified. Recent critique of tax minimization strategies exemplifies this difficulty: on one hand, practitioners need to increase shareholders' profits; on the other, a growing number of stakeholders push for ‘fairer’ corporate tax payments. Conducted during a time of public criticism of Australian corporate tax strategies, our study draws on justifications of corporate tax minimization strategies by senior tax practitioners and corporate submissions to a Senate Inquiry on corporate tax avoidance. The study explores how legitimacy judgements come under pressure by conflicting cues. Through the application of Boltanski and Thévenot's (2006) Economies of Worth (EW) framework, we advance legitimacy scholarship by clarifying what constitutes situated judgements in times of instability. Our work puts forward the concept of perceived forecasted consensus as a guide for individuals in making situated legitimacy judgements in times of instability.     

Dynamics of public opinion and policy response under proportional and plurality elections

We compare the patterns of adjustment of government policy to changes in public opinion in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. These countries are similar in many ways, except that the United Kingdom has plurality elections and single-party government, while the Netherlands has proportional representation (PR) and coalition government. This provides the first application of the Macro Polity approach to a country with PR elections. We find that government policy in the Netherlands is highly responsive to public opinion. This cannot be the result of alternation of government, but instead must be the result of some other process, such as coalition bargaining. In the United Kingdom, however, the dynamic of adjustment is far more complex. Alternation of government does not produce responsiveness, but rather seems to get in the way of it. This leads to an over-correction dynamic in which policy can be out of line with public opinion for long periods of time.     

商务英语中某些名词单复数和歧义现象

商务英语中名词单复数的歧义是个独特的语法现象,对商务英语中这一现象（一些常用名词的单复数）作了一些探讨。     

论未来的权力

权力本源于权利和利益,并且离不开权利,权力是经社会确定的。由于社会多元化与经济全球化的新趋势,国家权力不再是统治社会的唯一权力了,人类社会出现了权力多元化和社会化的趋向。随着人类社会文明进步,权力逐渐向权利回归,逐渐社会化和国际化。     

有所为,有所不为——试论中国企业家的扩张情结

在市场经济的发展过程中,为数不少的企业家热衷于以扩张作为企业发展的唯一模式。这在企业管理水平有限,生产和经营的技术含量较低的情况下,反而使企业效益不断递减,导致企业走上了衰亡的歧途。     

Comparison of Scoring Rules in Poisson Voting Games

Scoring rules are compared by their equilibria in simple voting games with Poisson population uncertainty, using new techniques for computing pivot probabilities. Best-rewarding rules like plurality voting can generate discriminatory equilibria where the voters disregard some candidate as not a serious contender, although he may be universally liked, or may be symmetric to other candidates as in the Condorcet cycle. Such discriminatory equilibria are eliminated by worst-punishing rules like negative voting, but then even a universally disliked candidate may have to be taken seriously. In simple bipolar elections, equilibria are always majoritarian and efficient under approval voting, but not other scoring rules. Journal of Economic Literature Classification: D72.     

Strategic Manipulation in Committees Using the Plurality Rule: Alternative Concepts and Frequency Calculations

This paper suggests an evaluation of the plurality rule according to how much it can be manipulated by individuals. We analyze strategic voting with reference not only to the usual notion of Nash equilibrium but also to some weaknesses of this notion, depending on the assumptions about how the individual agents choose their strategies. We provide two types of results for each concept of equilibrium: First, we give necessary and sufficient conditions for a profile to be an equilibrium when the plurality rule is used; and second, we present formulas giving the exact frequencies of unstable situations in the three-alternative case.     

Bipolar Multicandidate Elections with Corruption

The goals of democratic competition are not only to implement a majority's preference on policy questions, but also to provide a deterrent against corrupt abuse of power by political leaders. We consider a simple model of multicandidate elections in which different electoral systems can be compared according to these two criteria. Among a wide class of single‐winner scoring rules, only approval voting is found to satisfy both effectiveness against corruption and majoritarianism for this model.