Sampling equilibrium, with an application to strategic voting

We suggest an equilibrium concept for a strategic model with a large number of players in which each player observes the actions of only a small number of the other players. The concept fits well situations in which each player treats his sample as a prediction of the distribution of actions in the entire population, and responds optimally to this prediction. We apply the concept to a strategic voting model and investigate the conditions under which a centrist candidate can win the popular vote although his strength in the population is smaller than the strengths of the right and left candidates.     

我国婚姻中的理性策略

任何一种行为选择都存在理性和非理性之分。理性是相对的,并非是绝对的。婚姻过程的选择也不例外,在某种意义上也是一种理性策略。从社会学的视角出发试图分析婚姻策略中的理性选择问题,目的在于认识和了解婚姻策略的合理性。     

理性的限度——素质教育漫谈之三

素质教育的任务之一是要引导民众从过于执著的感性追求的迷雾中走出来,在提高 理性观照层面的同时,也能够意识到理性的残缺之所在,并形成一种自我弥补的内在动力。在普 遍失落的理性当中,值得注意的是工具理性对认知理性的屏蔽,群体理性对个体理性的排斥,造 成理性的悬置和知与行的分离,并最终导致理性力量的丧失。因此,通过学与思,提升个体的认 知理性,由此而提升群体理性的层次,将成为当前素质教育的第一要义     

考虑社会责任的异质有限理性制造商产量博弈均衡复杂动力学分析

通过考虑消费者剩余,企业利润中引入承担社会责任参数,建立了具有异质性有限理性的古诺寡头博弈竞争模型,分析利润相关参数对系统博弈均衡稳定性的影响,并进行了数值模拟。研究表明单方有限理性系统比双方有限理性系统稳定。产品成本超过一定阈值应避免产量竞争,可以通过承担社会责任,提升产品价格来增加利润,但当企业承担社会责任增加时,系统稳定性降低。此时降低调整产量的速度,观察竞争对手产量调整速度,避免系统进入混沌状态,失去最优产量优势。     

Ex-post full surplus extraction,straightforwardly

Consider an estimate of the common value of an auctioned asset that is symmetric in the bidders’ types. Such an estimate can be represented solely in terms of the order statistics of those types. This representation forms the basis for a pricing rule yielding truthful bidding as an equilibrium, whether bidders’ types are affiliated or independent. We highlight the link between the estimator and full surplus extraction, providing a necessary and sufficient condition for ex-post full surplus extraction, including the possibility of independent types. The results offer sharp insights into the strengths and limits of simple auctions by identifying the source of informational rents in such environments. Harstad acknowledges hospitable accommodation by the Fuqua School of Business, Duke University, and the Olin School of Business, Washington University in St. Louis, during parts of this research. We are grateful for comments and suggestions from Richard McLean and Jeroen Swinkels.     

Does seeing more deeply into a game increase one’s chances of winning?

The substantively rational value of the games studied in this paper does not help predict subject performance in the experiment at all. An accurate model must account for the cognitive ability of the people playing the game. This paper investigates whether the variation in measured rationality bounds is correlated with the probability of winning when playing against another person in games that exceed both players’ estimated rationality bound. Does seeing deeper into a game matter when neither player can see to the end of the game? Subjects with higher measured bounds win 63 percent of the time and the larger the difference the more frequently they win.     

Low information nash equilibria for oligopolistic markets

This paper deals with an infinite horizon n firm oligopoly in which firms are assumed to have incomplete information about one another's actions and profit functions. An equilibrium concept is defined that is similar to the Nash non-cooperative equilibrium, but is suitable for the information assumptions of the model. The equilibrium uses a type of bounded rationality which makes firms' computations relatively easy. This is due to an implicit assumption that computation is costly and a Bayesian approach is prohibitively costly. This low information Nash equilibrium is proved to exist, and, in addition, an adaptive expectations decision process is described which, if followed by all firms, leads to the low information Nash equilibrium.     

我国海洋渔业资源利用中个体理性与集体理性的矛盾及其协调

本文论述了海洋渔业资源中个体理性与集体理性矛盾产生的根源，指出并分析了协调这些矛盾的措施：一是限制渔船的数量，二是采取各种措施恢复海洋渔业资源，三是实施配额捕捞制度。在前述分析的基础上作者提出了完善这些措施的对策和建议。     

政治生态与政治文明的价值合理性形塑

政治文明起源于市民社会对政治国家的分离，它以对市民社会主体性地位的确认为基础，标志着民主、自由、平等、人性的解放及实现程度；政治文明越是向前发展，市民社会的自治程度越高，政治发展也就越是依赖于市民社会的社会性资源，政治文明的价值合法性危机也就越大；为此，必须从政治生态的理论视野出发寻求对政治合法性危机的可能性途径，形塑政治文明的价值合理性。     

Rationality,foolishness, and adaptive intelligence

Technologies of model‐based rationality are the core technologies of strategic management, having largely replaced earlier technologies that placed greater reliance on traditional practice or on communication either with the stars or with the gods. The technologies used by organizations in their pursuit of intelligence can be imagined to change over time as a result of responding to the successes and failures associated with the technologies. Although technologies of rationality seem clearly to be effective instruments of exploitation in relatively simple situations and to derive their adaptive advantage from those capabilities, their ventures in more complex explorations seem often to lead to huge mistakes and thus unlikely to be sustained by adaptive processes. Whether their survival as instruments of exploratory novelty in complex situations is desirable is a difficult question to answer, but it seems likely that any such survival may require hitchhiking on their successes in simpler worlds. Survival may also be served by the heroism of fools and the blindness of true believers. Their imperviousness to feedback is both the despair of adaptive intelligence and, conceivably, its salvation. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.