从博弈论看商务谈判僵局的本质和处理

商务谈判中的僵局是谈判双方都不愿看到但又不得不面对的难题。只有了解了商务谈判僵局产生的本质才能够更好地处理好谈判中的僵局。从博弈论的角度,对商务谈判僵局的本质进行了分析,指出在挖掘共同利益的过程中既可以寻求到瓜分共同利益的有效途径,又可寻找到共同利益与个体利益实现的最佳结合点。     

目标公司股权结构对敌意收购的影响——中信证券收购广发证券的案例研究

兼并、收购、接管(敌意收购)和买断,是公司控制权市场常见的几种表现形式。本文通过中信证券收购广发证券的案例研究,从敌意收购的过程、动因、反收购措施及市场反应的角度对其进行了分析,并指出目标公司的股权集中度、交叉持股、非上市公司特征等股权结构方面对敌意收购的影响。     

Blocked-Error-R 2: A Conceptually Improved Definition of the Proportion of Explained Variance in Models Containing Loops or Correlated Residuals

Bentler and Raykov (2000, Journal of Applied Psychology 85: 125–131), and Jöreskog (1999a, http://www.ssicentral.com/lisrel/column3.htm, 1999b http://www.ssicentral. com/lisrel/column5.htm) proposed procedures for calculating R ² for dependent variables involved in loops or possessing correlated errors. This article demonstrates that Bentler and Raykov’s procedure can not be routinely interpreted as a “proportion” of explained variance, while Jöreskog’s reduced-form calculation is unnecessarily restrictive. The new blocked-error-R ² (beR ²) uses a minimal hypothetical causal intervention to resolve the variance-partitioning ambiguities created by loops and correlated errors. Hayduk (1996) discussed how stabilising feedback models – models capable of counteracting external perturbations – can result in an acceptable error variance which exceeds the variance of the dependent variable to which that error is attached. For variables included within loops, whether stabilising or not, beR ² provides the same value as Hayduk’s (1996) loop-adjusted-R ². For variables not involved in loops and not displaying correlated residuals, beR ² reports the same value as the traditional regression R ². Thus, beR ² provides a conceptualisation of the proportion of explained variance that spans both recursive and nonrecursive structural equation models. A procedure for calculating beR ² in any SEM program is provided.     

中国互助游的现状及发展策略研究

网络社区的发展,旅游需求的多元化,催生了一种全新的旅游方式——互助游。根据网络调查的结果分析了互助游的概念内涵和特征,互助游客的旅游行为特征及发展互助游的障碍,在此基础上总结网络调查结果提出部分发展策略,以期引导互助旅游的健康发展。     

末位淘汰——管理中的一柄“双刃剑”

末位淘汰作为一种管理手段在企业界被广泛采用,在实践中具有优缺点,实施末位淘汰要根据企业的实际情况,选择一个部门或几个部门进行。同时要注重培育良好的绩效文化,让刚性的末位淘汰变得充“满柔性”以有利于末位淘汰制的实施。     

基于互惠合作的供应链合作关系稳定机制研究

首先应用强化学习算法对供应链合作关系的稳定机制进行研究;其次从生物学的角度研究了供应链合作关系中的互惠利他合作行为;最后利用计算机进行了系统仿真.研究得出：只要供应链合作关系中存在互惠利他型的企业,不管其所占的比重有多大,该企业都会通过强化学习使得互惠利他行为在供应链中扩散开来,最终达到企业间合作的一种稳定状态.     

虚拟品牌社区顾客体验会带来其价值共创行为吗--基于手机虚拟品牌社区的实证研究

本文以顾客体验为切入点,基于价值共创理论、心理所有权理论和互惠规范理论,并运用于S-O-R理论框架,构建了虚拟品牌社区下,顾客参与价值共创行为产生的影响路径模型,通过问卷调查与实证分析得出:第一,顾客信息体验和娱乐体验越强,其参与价值共创的意愿程度越高,心理所有权部分中介了二者的促进关系;互动体验强化了社区顾客的心理所有权,并经由心理所有权的完全中介提高其参与共创意愿。第二,顾客参与共创意愿程度越高,其价值共创行为就越容易出现,社区的互惠规范正向调节了二者的关系。     

互惠性与理性经济效应的比较性研究

在知识经济时代,行为经济学的发展动摇了传统经济理论的基础,为现代经济学的发展开辟了新的方向。作为行为经济学的基础性假设之一,互惠性偏好对经济人的理性偏好进行了强烈的挑战,从而导致互惠性企业理论对理性管理理论的冲击。互惠性理念在企业管理机制中具有一定的存在性和革命性,促进了管理行为的优化和管理机制的变革,进而有效地改进了企业的运营绩效。基于相同的企业环境,借助于组织学习与知识转移的传导机制,互惠性与理性经济效应的比较性分析深刻地揭示了互惠性偏好的前沿性,验证了互惠性管理策略在现代经济体系中存在着显著的应用价值,从而为我国企业加强互惠性管理战略、进而改进企业的运作绩效提供了现实性的理论借鉴。     

NO‐ARBITRAGE PRICING UNDER SYSTEMIC RISK: ACCOUNTING FOR CROSS‐OWNERSHIP

We generalize Merton’s asset valuation approach to systems of multiple financial firms where cross‐ownership of equities and liabilities is present. The liabilities, which may include debts and derivatives, can be of differing seniority. We derive equations for the prices of equities and recovery claims under no‐arbitrage. An existence result and a uniqueness result are proven. Examples and an algorithm for the simultaneous calculation of all no‐arbitrage prices are provided. A result on capital structure irrelevance for groups of firms regarding externally held claims is discussed, as well as financial leverage and systemic risk caused by cross‐ownership.     

Privacy and Personnel Selection: Reciprocal Rights and Responsibilities

Previous models of invasion of privacy in selection have stressed applicant rights to the exclusion of applicant responsibilities, and have slighted organizational incumbents' needs to acquire accurate knowledge about prospective co-workers. To correct this imbalance, a reciprocal model, enumerating and justifying possible rights and responsibilities of applicants, organizational management, and organizational incumbents, is postulated. This normative model is contrasted with the current mistrust that characterizes many selection interactions. Propositions suggesting ways of gaining the information that organizations require, while still respecting the privacy needs of applicants, are advanced. Tentative suggestions for how human resource professionals could initiate these positive changes are suggested as well.