Competitive effects of Basel II on US bank credit card lending

We analyze the potential competitive effects of the proposed Basel II capital regulations on US bank credit card lending. We find that bank issuers operating under Basel II will face higher regulatory capital minimums than Basel I banks, with differences due to the way the two regulations treat reserves and gain-on-sale of securitized assets. During periods of normal economic conditions, this is not likely to have a competitive effect; however, during periods of substantial stress in credit card portfolios, Basel II banks could face a significant competitive disadvantage relative to Basel I banks and nonbank issuers.     

Initial Margin Requirements, Volatility, and the Individual Investor: Insights from Japan

Initial margin requirements represent: (1) a cost impediment to the wealth constrained investor and (2) a potential way of mitigating excessive volatility. However, prior empirical research finds that margins are not an effective tool in reducing volatility. We consider the possibility that margins primarily affect certain stocks and investors. Specifically, we test whether margins affect individuals who, as a group, we believe to be the investors most affected when margin requirements change. Our initial empirical tests, however, do not support this contention.     

论新闻侵权中的精神损害赔偿

新闻侵权是在新闻传播的过程中发生的侵权行为 ,其主体为新闻机构 ,侵害的对象为他人的合法利益。新闻侵权发生后 ,新闻机构应当承担民事责任 ,既包括非财产责任 ,又包括财产责任。如果受害人要求精神损害赔偿的 ,人民法院可根据侵权人的过错程度、侵权行为的具体情节等情况具体酌定。在某些情况下 ,新闻机构可根据宪法规定的言论、出版自由和批评建议权主张免除或减轻其民事责任。     

Voting requirements, concessions, international side payments and the European Monetary Union

This paper addresses the question of criteria for selection of EMU members. We identify two factors in the decision process: (1) The costs and benefits which the individual countries attribute to alternative EMU arrangements (`hard-core', medium-sized, all EU members), and (2) the binding institutional restrictions, i.e., the distribution of votes in the European Council and the minimum vote requirements. Within this framework the EU countries are assigned to different groups according to their degree of convergence. Based on stability concessions and side payments these groups decide on the final EMU composition. We show that minimum vote requirements can lead to a suboptimal size of the EMU and can threaten the feasibility of a multi-speed monetary union.     

黔西南“精神扶贫”工作开展的现状与不足

黔西南州是贵州省连片贫困的典型地区,是打赢脱贫攻坚战的关键区域。通过艰苦卓绝的奋斗,黔西南州的精准扶贫工作取得了重大成果。在“精神扶贫”领域,黔西南州在“扶智”“扶志”方面取得了很大成效,但还存在对“扶智”“扶志”认识不足、投入不足、主体错位,缺乏“扶智”“扶志”的文化自信等不足,这是持续打赢脱贫攻坚战面临的重大挑战。     

老年人的精神需求及其社会政策意义

养老问题实质上是老年人的需求与满足问题。精神需求是老年人需求的基本方面和重要内容。老年社会政策应关注老年人的精神需求,建立老年人精神支持和精神保障机制,以提高老年人生活质量,促进社会和谐与稳定。     

The Impact of Capital Requirements and Managerial Compensation on Bank Charter Value

This paper examines the joint impact of capital requirements and managerial incentive compensation on bank charter value and bank risk. Most of the previous literature in the area of banking and agency theory has focused on asymmetric information between either banks and regulators, (and therefore on the role of bank capital), or between bank shareholders and bank managers, (and therefore on the role of managerial ownership). In this paper we unify these issues and present empirical results from the regression of capital requirements jointly with measures of incentive compensation on Tobin's Q, our proxy for bank charter value, and on the standard deviation of total return, our proxy for bank risk. In a sample of 102 bank holding companies we find that capital levels are consistently a significant positive factor in determining bank charter value and a significant negative factor in determining risk. On the other hand, we find our six measures of incentive compensation to be generally insignificant relative to charter value but do provide some evidence consistent with a theory relating types of incentive compensation with risk.     

The Impact of Basel II on Lending to Small- and Medium-Sized Firms: A Regulatory Policy Assessment Based on Spanish Credit Register Data

The objective of this paper is to evaluate the impact on bank credit exposures to small- and medium-sized Spanish firms of the current proposal for reform of the 1988 Capital Accord using information from the Spanish Credit Register. Capital requirements for exposures to those firms, according to the various revisions of the proposed capital reform (from the January 2001 consultative document to the April 2003 one), are calculated to analyze whether the existing pattern of bank financing of small- and medium-sized firms might be altered. Finally, the incentives for individual banks to adopt the advanced internal ratings-based approach proposed by Basel II are evaluated.     

Reserve Requirements,Liquidity Risk,and Bank Lending Behavior

Although reserve requirements (RR) have been used in emerging markets to smooth credit cycles, the transmission mechanism remains blurry. Using bank‐level data, we unveil the interaction of RR with bank lending. We identify a new channel that works through a decline in banks’ liquid assets and loan supply due to an increase in RR. “Quantitative tightening” through RR raises the short‐term funding needs of the banking system, which is met by collateralized central bank lending, thus depleting banks’ unencumbered liquid assets. Our results suggest that such a shift in bank liquidity is associated with a significant change in lending.     

Optimal Dynamic Capital Requirements

We characterize welfare maximizing capital requirement policies in a quantitative macrobanking model with household, firm, and bank defaults calibrated to Euro Area data. We optimize on the level of the capital requirements applied to each loan class and their sensitivity to changes in default risk. We find that getting the level right (so that bank failure risk remains contained) is of foremost importance, while the optimal sensitivity to default risk is positive but typically smaller than under Basel internal ratings based (IRB) formulas. Starting from low levels, savers and borrowers benefit from higher capital requirements. At higher levels, only savers prefer tighter requirements.