WAVE INTERACTION WITH PERFORATED CAISSON BREAKWATERS

The reflection coefficient of perforated caissons and the total horizontal forces acting on them were experimentally and numerically analyzed and discussed when wave propagates normally. To consider the viscosity effect of fluid and nonlinear action of waves on structures, the VOF (Volume Of Fluid) method combined with the k-ε turbulence model was used to simulate the interaction between waves and structures. Governing equations were solved with the finite difference method. Through 2D experimental study in the wave flume, the empirical relationship between the reflection coefficient of perforated caissons and the main affecting factors were obtained from the experimental data using the least square method. Also the correlation between the ratio of the total horizontal force acting on perforated caisson and the force acting on solid caisson and the main affecting factors were regressed from the experimental data.     

Internal labour markets in the Australian banking industry: their nature prior to the Second World War and their recent decline

This paper uses evidence from late nineteenth-and early twentieth-century personnel records of two Australian banks to examine the nature of internal labour markets prior to the Second World War. It is argued that the industry possessed all the classic features of internal labour markets: limited ports of entry, internal promotion, long careers, and assignment of wages by well-defined rules. The paper then examines the reasons why banks adopted internal labour markets. Finally, the paper examines the recent decline of internal labour markets and examines the role of technological and social changes in this decline.     

Should there exist secondary markets for executive stock options?

This paper investigates the potential disadvantages of the secondary markets for executive stock options (ESOs). The benefits of such markets are evident, but they might also have negative effects for shareholders. Executives might, for example, use inside information to time their ESO selling. We investigate two personal motives of managers that can be assumed to affect their optimal selling decision, that is, managers' personal portfolio management issues and the use of inside information. We explore these motives by analyzing unique data from Finland, where there are secondary markets for ESOs. The results of the study support the traditional portfolio diversification hypothesis according to which managers tend to sell their ESOs when holding an ESO is equivalent to holding the underlying stock; that is, in such a case a manager's wealth is closely tied to the stock price of the firm. With respect to the use of inside information the results indicate that ESO selling activity is not related to future stock price behaviour, suggesting that managers do not use inside information to determine the selling time of their ESOs. These results imply that the existence of secondary markets for ESOs does not weaken the usefulness of ESOs as the management compensation, although the benefits of such markets are evident.     

Accounting for Option–based Compensation: The Economic Cost Approach

The intrinsic value approach amortizes over the life of the option, the difference between the stock price on the date of the grant and the exercise price of the option. The fair market value approach amortizes over the life of the option, the market value of stock options on the date of the grant. These approaches do not reflect the changes in the option–based compensation cost after the grant date. This paper proposes an economic cost approach that not only adjusts for the changes in the value of the options during its life but also records the issuance of the stock at fair market value on the exercise date.     

HYDRODYNAMIC FORCE ON SMOOTH HORIZONTAL CYLINDER IN UNIFORM OSCILLATORY FLOW

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Value of Multinationality: Internalization, Managerial Self-interest, and Managerial Compensation

In this paper, we examine the impact of managerial self-interest on the value of multinationality. Since agency theory also suggests that a divergence between the interests of managers and shareholders can be aligned by effective managerial incentive, we also examine the effect of managerial compensation on the value of multinationality. Our results show that for high- Q (Tobin's Q > 1 ) firms, investors do not associate the spending of free cash flow on multinationality with the problem of overinvestments. For high- Q firms, it is also found that the value of multinationality can be enhanced by effective managerial incentives. For low- Q firms (Tobin's Q < 1 ), it is found that the concern of managerial self-interest overwhelms the benefits of internalization, making multinationality a value-decreasing event. For low- Q firms, managerial compensation is also ineffective in promoting value-enhancing foreign direct investments.     

Investment Opportunities and the Relation Between Equity Value and Employees' Bonus

A sample of firms where employee stock options and other long‐term incentives are absent but an annual bonus is required is examined. A positive relation is found between firm equity value and stock bonus but not cash bonus. The positive relation is stronger when the firm has greater investment opportunities. Additionally, the relation is shown to be nonlinear in the sense that the marginal effect of stock bonus on equity value is positive but decreasing (negative) when the stock bonus is below (above) the breakpoint. Overall, the annual stock bonus is valued positively by investors even though it is linked to the firm's contemporaneous but not future performance.     

潮汐河口平面二维非恒定流数值模拟

本文基于三角形网格划分，采用有限元法，建立了平面二维非恒定潮流数学模型。采用了质量集中、压缩存储的处理方法和“预估校正”的时间推进算法，较好地解决了有限元计算存储量和计算速度问题。对长江口南北支河段进行了验证计算，结果表明模型能较好模拟长江口南北支河段的潮流运动情况，且计算稳定性好、速度快、精度高。     

Adverse selection in group insurance: The virtues of failing to represent voters

Compared with non-union workers, union workers take more of their compensation in the form of insurance. This may be because unions choose democratically, and democratic choice mitigates adverse selection in group insurance. Relative to individually-purchased insurance, we show that group insurance chosen by an ideal profit-maximizing employer can be worse for every employee, while group insurance chosen democratically can be much better. The reason is that democracy can fail to represent the preferences of almost half the group.Received: January 2003, Accepted: September 2004, JEL Classification: J51, D82, G22